
聖天 LegendsOfSky【新人Vtuber | 技術支援+熱愛創作】
880 posts

聖天 LegendsOfSky【新人Vtuber | 技術支援+熱愛創作】
@LegendsOfSky_
#個人勢 #vtuber 💬主普通話/國語,副粵語。 擅長影視相關的硬技術支援,有需要可以私訊。 📎喜歡沉浸在創作和享受作品的喜悅中 📎喜歡喝茶,也喜歡甜點;如果有下午茶,我一定要++ 📎天才般的笨蛋;笨蛋般的天才 📎☝️向目標衝刺時很聰明,其餘時間都是笨蛋 📎歡迎勾搭,看我耍笨



Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.






















