
Luca
7.5K posts


@haugejostein It looks to me other GP want destroy us... EU tried to appease Russia, forged strong economic bonds and result was?
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@PhotoTardies @NameCanBeBland Se il nome finisce in vocale potrebbe essere italiano, Spagnolo, portoghese. Se assomiglia a quei 3 ma si pronuncia in modo diverso dalla scrittura è francese. Se ha tante consonanti è slavo. Se sembra gutturale è germanico! 😹
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คุยกับพวกฝรั่งอยู่ คือแยกคนเอเชียไม่ออกเลย ก็เลยสอนวิธีเดาจากชื่อ ไปใส่น้อทออลเอาเอง
- ชื่อสกุลสามคำ อ่านออกเสียงง่ายๆ = เกาหลี
- ชื่อสกุลสามคำ แต่ออกเสียงไม่ตรงกับที่เขียน = จีน
- ชื่อสกุลยาวขึ้นนิดนึง อ่านแบบตรงกับที่เขียน = ญี่ปุ่น
- ชื่อฝรั่ง นามสกุลจีนๆ = สิงคโปร์
- ชื่อเหมือนคนสเปน = ฟิลิปปินส์
- ชื่อยาว นามสกุลยาวมากๆ = ไทย
ไทย
Luca retweetledi

Smartphones are not the explanation for the recent decline in fertility. Instead, they are an accelerator of deeper forces already at work.
Let’s start with the facts. Fertility is falling almost everywhere: in rich, middle-income, and poor countries; in secular and religious countries; and in countries with high and low levels of gender equality.
The decline accelerated around 2014. So, no country-specific explanation will work unless you are willing to believe that 200 distinct country-specific explanations arrived at roughly the same time.
Smartphones look like the obvious candidate: the first iPhone was released in 2007, and global adoption has been astonishingly fast.
Economists understand the first major decline in fertility in advanced economies, from 6 or 7 children per woman throughout most of human history to about 1.8, that occurred between the early 1800s and roughly 1970, well before smartphones. The main drivers were a sharp fall in child mortality (effective fertility was rarely above 3 and often close to 2) and the shift from a low-skill, rural agrarian economy to a high-skill, urban industrial one. We have quantitative models that fit these facts well.
Country-specific factors mattered too, of course. Proximity to low-fertility neighbors accelerated Hungary’s decline, while fragmented landowning structures accelerated France’s. But these were second-order mechanisms.
This is also why most economists long considered Paul Ehrlich’s doom scenarios implausible. We forecast that fertility in middle- and low-income economies would follow the same path as in the rich, probably faster, because reductions in child mortality reached India or Africa at lower income levels (medical technology is nearly universal, and most gains come from handwashing and cheap antibiotics, not Mayo Clinic-level care). Much of what we see in Africa or parts of Latin America today is still that old story.
But in the 1980s, a new pattern appeared. Japan and Italy fell below 1.8, the level we had thought was the new floor. By 1990, Japan was at 1.54 and Italy at 1.36.
This second fertility decline began in Japan and Italy earlier than elsewhere, driven by country-specific factors, but the underlying dynamics were widespread: secularization, an education arms race, expensive housing, the dissolution of old social networks, and the shift to a service economy in which women’s bargaining power within the household is higher. The U.S. lagged because secularization came later, suburban housing remained relatively cheap, and African American fertility was still high. U.S. demographic patterns are exceptional and skew how academics (most of whom are in the U.S.) and the New York Times see the world.
My best guess is that, without smartphones, Italy’s 2025 fertility rate would be about 1.24 rather than 1.14. I doubt anyone will document an effect larger than 0.1-0.2. Italy was at 1.19 in 1995, not far from today’s 1.14. The TFR is cyclical due to tempo effects, so I do not read too much into the rise between 1995 and 2007 or the decline from 1.27 in 2019 to 1.14 today. The direct effect of smartphones is not zero, but it is not, by itself, that large.
Where social media, in general, and smartphones, in particular, matter is in the diffusion of social norms. What would have taken 25 years now happens in 10. Social media are not the cause of fertility decline; modernity is. But they are a very fast accelerator.
That is why social media are a major part of the story behind Guatemala (yes, Guatemala) going from 3.8 children per woman in 2005 to 1.9 in 2025. Without them, Guatemala would also have reached 1.9, just 20 years later.
Modernity, in its current form, is incompatible with replacement-level fertility. By modernity, I do not mean capitalism: fertility fell earlier and faster in socialist economies than in market economies. Socialist Hungary fell below replacement in 1960, and socialist Czechoslovakia in 1966 (both experienced small, short-lived baby booms in the mid-1970s). By modernity, I mean a society organized around rational, large-scale systems and formalized knowledge.
Countries will not converge to the same fertility rate. East Asia is likely stuck near 1, possibly below, given its unbalanced gender norms and toxic education systems. Latin America faces the same gender problem plus weak growth prospects, so I expect something around 1.2. Northern Europe has more egalitarian family structures and might hold near 1.5. The very religious societies are probably the only ones that will sustain 1.8.
All of this could change with AI or changes in population composition. We will see. But on the current evidence, deep sub-replacement fertility is the “new new normal.” Unless we reorganize our societies, better learn to handle it as best we can.

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@EmanueleBracco Da noi per favorire la proporzionalità di collegi piccoli la ripartizione è nazionale da qui l'effetto "flipper". In Spagna con la ripartizione x collegio la proporzionalità è minore perché essendo piccoli eleggono pochi deputati = soglia di sbarramento implicita X collegio
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@EmanueleBracco Il mattarello non ha introdotto alcuna coalizione. Sono stati i partiti a coalizzarsi, potevano pure andare soli. I collegi piccoli sono di 5-6 deputati non 15. Ma per collegarli agli elettori devi usare il sistema spagnolo che li elegge dove prendono i voti non come da noi
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Aboliamo le coalizioni, sbarramento al 5%, proporzionale puro con riparto di collegio (no riporti, flipper etc) e abbiamo una (pur risicata) maggioranza di CDX e mandiamo la macero i partiti filibustieri di generali, trozkisti, sanniti. 1/n
Gianmarco Di Lella@gmdilella
Nuova media statistica dei sondaggi delle intenzioni di voto: Fratelli d'Italia torna sopra il 28% mentre il Partito Democratico scende sotto il 22% 🟦 DX : 43,8% 🟥 CSX: 44,5%
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Luca retweetledi

La sorella di Salim El Koudri al Corriere.
E poi ci sono quelli che vorrebbero remigrare gli italiani come lei.
#Modena

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@unviajeaitaca Più che altro gli slavi sono arrivati nei Balcani solo nel VII secolo dopo cristo...
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A pesar de que en 2018 se logró llegar a un acuerdo en Prespa, la disputa entre Grecia 🇬🇷 y Macedonia del Norte 🇲🇰 sigue siendo candente.
Muchos saben que en 1991, tras la disolución de la ex Yugoslavia, el territorio se dividió en seis repúblicas independientes. Una de ellas era la ex República de Macedonia, país que limita al norte con Grecia.
El uso de este nombre generó mucha bronca en Grecia, sobre todo en la región en la que vivo, Macedonia. La misma Macedonia que supo ser un reino, que tuvo como rey 👑 y emperador al mismísimo Alejandro Magno. En esta región se encuentra su ciudad natal, Pella. También Egas, donde nació y gobernó su padre, Filipo II. También está el Monte Olimpo, morada de los dioses olímpicos, adorados durante siglos por los antiguos griegos. En esta región se fundó Tesalónica, ciudad que lleva el nombre de la hermana de Alejandro Magno, gracias a su general Casandro, que fue quien se casó con ella. A pocos kilómetros se encuentran Mieza y Stagira: en Mieza Aristóteles educó a Alejandro; en Stagira fue donde nació el gran filósofo.
Imaginen el revuelo que se generó entre los griegos; se estaba usando un nombre que corresponde a su identidad histórica y cultural. Pero eso no termina ahí. Además, la República de Macedonia, o Skopja, como la llaman los griegos (por su capital), comenzó una campaña propagandística en el mundo y a nivel nacional, diciendo que Grecia fue quien les robó su historia. Según ellos, en la antigua Macedonia se hablaba el idioma que se habla hoy (o sea, una lengua eslava), que esa historia les pertenece y que ellos son los legítimos herederos de Alejandro Magno. Se comenzaron a levantar estatuas colosales de Filipo y Alejandro en la capital y a generar información falsa y tergiversada. Además, se utilizó el "sol de Egas", símbolo del antiguo reino de Macedonia, como bandera del país.
Esto llevó a que Grecia, durante el gobierno de Alexis Tsipras, firmara un acuerdo con sus vecinos, el Acuerdo de Prespa, en 2018. Se formalizó el cambio de nombre erga omnes por el de República de Macedonia del Norte.
Así y todo, siguen llevando el nombre Macedonia y reclamando parte de la historia de Grecia como propia.
En la antigua Macedonia se hablaba un dialecto del griego, una mezcla de eólico y dórico. Hay suficiente evidencia arqueológica e histórica que respalda la idea de que el reino de Macedonia era helénico. Adoraban a los mismos dioses, tenían los mismos nombres propios y usaban el mismo alfabeto. Cualquiera que hoy sepa hablar griego puede leer las inscripciones de la época.
Pero no son los únicos que reclaman la gloria de Alejandro. También está Albania 🇦🇱. Pero esa es una historia para otro posteo.



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@RomeInTheEast Anche Cesare o gli imperatori "classici" come Traiano erano ammiratori di Alessandro. Cesare avrebbe pianto davanti alla statua di Alessandro perché a 40 anni non aveva ancora fatto niente mentre Alessandro aveva conquistato il mondo a 30
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Even in the 13th century, at a time of a relative surge of Hellenism in the Eastern Roman Empire at Nicaea, Theodore II Laskaris still looked back mostly to the early Roman Empire for models of statesmanship:
Theodore had a “wide-ranging knowledge of examples of good and bad rulers. He refers to leaders and monarchs from the Old Testament (Moses, David, Solomon) and draws his models of statesmanship mostly from Roman history: Brutus, Hannibal, Cato, Pompey, Caesar, Antony, Gaius, Nero, Titus, Trajan, Hadrian, and Marcus Aurelius. Paragons of justice for him were Caesar, the founder of ‘the monarchy,’ and Trajan. Late antique emperors appear less frequently in his writings: Maximian, Constantine, Licinius, Theodosius, and Justinian. Greek heroic and historical figures (Achilles, Agamemnon, Odysseus, Cyrus, Alcibiades, Philip, and Demetrios Poliorketes) are even rarer, showing that he sought models for his rule chiefly in the Roman era. The one exception is Alexander, whom Theodore saw as a world conqueror, an enlightened ruler trained by Aristotle, and a friend of philosophers.”
I find this interesting that perhaps one of the Eastern Roman Emperors most affiliated with Hellenism still looked to the ancient Romans so much, as well as legendary Alexander the Great.
Source - The Byzantine Hellene: The Life of Emperor Theodore Laskaris and Byzantium in the 13th Century by Dimiter Angelov

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@Ruffino_Lorenzo Ma come si fa a mettere la Svizzera in qualsiasi comparazione? Hanno iniziato con l'oro rubato agli ebrei e continuato con quello degli evasori ed elusori di tutto il mondo
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@24Mattino @paolomieli Giusto ma le proteste non durarono due giorni, più due mesi 😅
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.@paolomieli: "Per fortuna il popolo iraniano non ha creduto alle promesse di Trump di "liberazione" e non si è fatto massacrare da regime iraniano. 45 mila morti ci furono quando scattarono le proteste in soli due giorni, hanno poi fatto bene a non credere a Trump"
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Pannella considerava il PCI come un apparato burocratico, dogmatico, statalista, ostile alle libertà individuali.
Andrea Orlando@AndreaOrlandosp
A 10 anni dalla scomparsa di Marco Pannella manca una figura che ha coniugato il primato della politica con la testimonianza, guardando ai diritti degli ultimi come condizione per affermazione dei diritti di tutti.
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@nanoscalebiomed La verità è che c'è tutta questa discussione solo perché il tizio è nero. Fosse stato con gli antenati modenesi la metà delle polemiche non sarebbe esistita e il 100% dei media avrebbero scritto "matto si lancia sulla folla". E nessun politico avrebbe interrotto viaggi di stato
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@24Mattino @paolomieli Magari preferiscono quella che c'è ora. L'hanno scritta loro nel 2018. Inoltre anche basta cambiare legge elettorale a ogni tornata, è un trucco da Repubblica delle banane in cui il governo di turno vuole massimizzare le sue chance di vittoria o almeno impedire che vinca l' opp.
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.@paolomieli: "La proposta di legge elettorale della destra c'è, farà schifo, sarà incostituzionale, ma c'è, la proposta della sinistra non c'è, forse è quella di lasciare la legge che c'è, ma forse sarebbe il caso che proponessero anche loro una legge elettorale"
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Luca retweetledi

Rassegna stampa phastidiosa
Grazie al prof. @MicheTiraboschi
Quando il pavimento salariale diventa il soffitto. Spunti dal caso francese sulla contrapposizione politica tra salario minimo o salario giusto bollettinoadapt.it/quando-il-pavi…
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Luca retweetledi

Let me lay out the unpleasant arithmetic of the replacement rate, and why a modern society finds it so hard to reach.
A population of 100 women in an advanced economy needs 210 children to replace itself. Why?
Absent sex-selective practices, roughly 105 boys are born for every 100 girls. Evolution overshoots male births because boys are more prone to early death from accidents and disease. Therefore, of 210 children, about 108 are boys and 102 are girls. Not all girls reach the midpoint of their fertile age: accidents, suicide, homicide, and illness take some. In an advanced economy, about 98% of them survive, leaving 100 women to replace the original 100.
Now consider the distribution of children per woman.
Imagine 15 women have no children. Five do so by choice, for various reasons (professional, affective, religious). Ten face unfixable fertility problems, theirs or their partner’s. The 10% figure is conservative: the medical literature points to around 13%, and that does not even count male fertility problems.
Of the remaining 85, 10 have one child, 60 have two, 10 have three, and 5 have four. I am stopping at four to keep the post concise; very few women in younger cohorts have five or more children, but I could adapt the example to account for them.
Hence, the 100 women in this population have 180 children, for a completed fertility rate of 1.8.
Interestingly, this is roughly the rate we saw in many advanced economies until the early 1990s, and in the U.S. until around 2008.
But we are still 30 children short of replacement! Voluntary childlessness is only 5%. Three-quarters of women have two or more children. Look around: most of your friends will have two, plenty will have three or four. And yet, we are well below replacement.
You would not look at this population and call it selfish (is having two kids hedonistic?) or accuse it of losing family values (only 5% of women are choosing voluntarily not to have children).
The point is simpler. To reach 210 births, you need a substantial share of women to have three or more children. Two as the “normal” pattern will not get you there. And modern society makes three or more a costly proposition for most families.
Of course, current fertility rates in most advanced economies are well below 1.8. But my point is that, under present social arrangements, we should not expect 2.1, even if (to humor last weekend’s debate) we banned smartphones and TikTok. We need many, many more families with three or four children.
More pointedly, there is no self-regulating mechanism that pushes a society back to 2.1. The market-clearing analogy many economists use is flawed; scarcity feedback does not work the same way. (Another post on this another day.) And, as I often read, the claim that “nature” somehow regulates current overpopulation is just childish mumbo jumbo.
So yes, the arithmetic of replacement rate is unpleasant.

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Luca retweetledi

È perché gli USA sono una nazione con alti salari
Se aumentano i salari reali aumenta in proporzione il costo dei servizi rispetto a quello dei beni fisici
Se tutti i salari aumentano domani del 20% la televisione ti costa di meno, la babysitter ti costa uguale
@jason@Jason
They updated the most legendary chart on twitter What stands out?
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