Marcebotin

1.1K posts

Marcebotin

Marcebotin

@Marcebotin

PhD @LogosRG -University of Barcelona. Philosophy of Mind, Consciousness. (He/Him)

Katılım Nisan 2013
336 Takip Edilen372 Takipçiler
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
My new paper on the meta-problem of consciousness is finally published! If you want to see what is up with this cool new a posteriori version of Russellian Physicalism check out the paper bellow: academic.oup.com/pq/advance-art…
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Philip Goff
Philip Goff@Philip_Goff·
A physicalist has to bite 1 of these bullets: 1) a blind from birth neuroscientist could know what it's like to see red (@danieldennett style old-school physicalism). 2) we know nothing about what pain is from knowing how it feels (@davidpapineau style new-fangled physicalism).
Lorenzo Elijah (PhD)@LorenzoElijah

I agree this is self-evident. Seems there’s a deeper disagreement here about what needs explaining. One side defines consciousness as qualia (subjective experience from the inside). The other defines consciousness as something information processing. Which side you take frames the whole debate.

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Marcebotin retweetledi
Jacopo Pallagrosi
Jacopo Pallagrosi@JacopoPallagro·
My paper "The Acquaintance Trilemma: Knowledge, Consciousness, and Mental Qualities" has been accepted for publication in Erkenntnis! Preprint available here: philpapers.org/rec/PALTAT-6
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
Apparently all this time it was not available to download! now it is: philpapers.org/rec/BOTAPR-2
Marcebotin@Marcebotin

philpapers.org/rec/BOTAPR-2 A paper I wrote some time ago is finally forthcoming in AJP. In it, I introduce a new view—a posteriori Russellian physicalism—and argue that, unlike other physicalist positions, it can accommodate revelation within a physicalist framework.

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Massimo
Massimo@Rainmaker1973·
Rare footage of a plane flying over North Sentinel Island. It is considered one of the most dangerous places in the world, where anyone who visits this island has a high chance of dying.
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J.P.A.
J.P.A.@2Philosophical_·
The appropriate credence for illusionism about consciousness is 0. If you notice that it’s like anything at all to be you, then you know that consciousness is not an illusion; case closed.
Philip Goff@Philip_Goff

@2Philosophical_ I think @davidchalmers42 has a higher credence in illusionism since then, as have I, mainly due to conversations with @keithfrankish . Still very confidence it's false though!

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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
@haterdeplotino @2Philosophical_ quizas solo estamos hablando de quien se merece el label ilusionista y quien no jaja Funfact: estoy con Papineau en un summer school en valencia y ayer nos contaba que Galen Strawson que por lo visto son super colegas le llamo ilusionista y que tuvieron una pelea jajj
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
@haterdeplotino @2Philosophical_ propia estrategia argumentativa, tiene que negar esto siempre (Frankish), y explicar porque pensamos que hay verdades que acerca de la conciencia que se puede capturar mediante estos conceptos (fenomenicos) cuando en realidad no las hay
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
@haterdeplotino @2Philosophical_ La motivación del ilusionismo es que disuelve el problema y para eso tienes que negar lo obvio, creo que medias tintas no es enough. Weak illusionism me parece fisicismo standard (tipo-B) no una postura con su propio espacio teorico. Tienes alguna otra cosa en mente?
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anatman 🌱
anatman 🌱@haterdeplotino·
@2Philosophical_ Illusionism does not say that consciousness does not exist, it says that it lacks some properties generally ascribed by philosophers In a weak illusionistic form, it even allows for phenomenal consciousness It just disallows intrinsic-ness, ineffability, etc.
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
@dioscuri @BishopPair Maybe there is a middle ground? such that the nature of pain is not exhausted by a functional definition, but nonetheless it is essential to pain that, in virtue of how it feel, it plays a particular functional role
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Henry Shevlin
Henry Shevlin@dioscuri·
@Marcebotin @BishopPair I agree that valence has an intrinsically motivational component - if you don't mind it at all, how can it feel unpleasant? - but that just suggests to that valence isn't really a matter of qualia, at least if we think qualia are by definition not defined by functional role.
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Dan
Dan@BishopPair·
Neither of these are right. Suffering is not bad because it leads to death, it is primitively bad. Nevertheless, death is not primarily bad because it involves suffering - it is bad insofar it is a privation of good.
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
@dioscuri @BishopPair Also, I would say that pain essentially negatively valance , so maybe the first scenario is not conceivable? I know there is those experiments that people say they are in pain but don't mind it, but i tend to think that thats not really pain.
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
@dioscuri @BishopPair I think that if there is no phenomenology to the cognitive response I would choose the latter
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
Let me know if you would like a preprint of the paper!
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
Unfortunately, the peer review process has taken quite a long time, so really it is an old paper where some details remain a bit underdeveloped. You can find a more refined version of the view—presented in the context of the meta-problem—here: (philpapers.org/rec/BOTAPR).
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Marcebotin
Marcebotin@Marcebotin·
philpapers.org/rec/BOTAPR-2 A paper I wrote some time ago is finally forthcoming in AJP. In it, I introduce a new view—a posteriori Russellian physicalism—and argue that, unlike other physicalist positions, it can accommodate revelation within a physicalist framework.
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