Marcia Chiga

@LynneStactia is it not the same Madhuku you were saying he does this for money now you are praising him like a hero hahahahahaha🤣🤣🤣 #CA3 zvaendwaa!!

elections and decides where the voting boundaries are on the map. This clause splits those jobs up. From now on whenever the law talks about drawing boundaries, ZEC's name is replaced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Delimitation Commission, which will handle that job exclusively.#CA3

Clause 13: takes away the power to draw voting boundaries from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and gives it to a brand-new, specialized group. ​"Delimitation" simply means drawing the borders for fields like electoral constituencies and wards. ​Right now, ZEC runs the

Thats false narrative on #CA3.the secret ballot is good for it has its own advantages on doing so as follow: ​Public Accountability: Voters have a right to know exactly how their elected representatives vote on laws, taxes, and policies. Open voting allows citizens to see if an MP is keeping their campaign promises. ​Party Discipline: Political parties can ensure their members stick to the party platform and vote as a unified block, which makes government policy more predictable and easier to pass. ​Prevention of Bribery and Corruption: It is much harder for outside interest groups or wealthy donors to buy an MP's vote. Because the vote is public, any sudden, unexplained shift in an MP’s voting pattern will be instantly visible to the public and the media. ​Transparency and Trust: Open voting reduces backdoor political deals and suspicion. Everyone—the public, the media, and other politicians—can see the exact tally and who supported what, building trust in the legislative process. #CA3 zvaendwaaa!!

@bbmhlanga Minister Ziyambi is right you must read and understand why they are doing so.there is nothing to fear if you support the bill or not it must be known by the people who voted for you in Parliament for scrutinty so why should it be public??

They said the Bill has support but they can’t even trust each other. They fear vote by secret ballot. Guided democracy.

@NewsHawksLive .@DougColtart. Good day Counsel. FYI!

That is also the story of Zimbabwe. The direct presidential election system in Zimbabwe is not a product of popular demand and will, but an authoritarian design. Further research shows that Asian presidential and semi-presidential systems present a highly variable landscape, though the dominant pattern is consistent with the global trend: where direct presidential elections exist, they are most often the product of transitions from military or one-party authoritarian regimes. South Korea provides the clearest success story. Following decades of military rule under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the 1987 June Democracy Movement forced constitutional revisions restoring direct presidential elections. This transition permanently removed the military from executive decision-making and anchored South Korea's subsequent democratic consolidation. The Philippines followed a similar trajectory following the 1986 People Power Revolution that ended the Marcos martial law regime. Indonesia's 2004 constitutional amendment establishing direct presidential elections came after the collapse of Suharto's three-decade 'New Order' military government. Elsewhere in Asia, across 20 states, the legacy of authoritarianism has disrupted rather than produced direct electoral mechanisms. Myanmar's military maintained authority even through the 2010s quasi-civilian transition by retaining a constitutionally guaranteed 25% unelected parliamentary bloc, and the February 2021 coup eliminated even that restricted civilian space. In Central Asia, bordering Eastern Europe, the post-Soviet presidencies of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are direct-election systems that are simultaneously authoritarian consolidations, where elections serve to legitimise personal rule rather than to transfer power. In Eastern Europe, spanning 18 states, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc between 1989 and 1991 required rapid constitutional engineering across the region. The prevalent choice among successor states was semi-presidential or presidential systems with direct executive elections. The logic was specific to the transition moment: newly empowered democratic oppositions lacked the organisational capacity to dominate parliamentary elections, while reformed communist parties retained significant financial resources and patronage networks. A directly elected president, potentially a charismatic figure such as Lech Wałęsa (photographed) in Poland, could capture a national majority vote more readily than a fragmented opposition coalition could win a parliamentary majority. The European Parliament's 1989–90 analysis of democratic change in Eastern Europe documents this institutional calculus explicitly. Over time, outcomes diverged sharply. States that constrained the presidency and strengthened parliaments, the Baltic states, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, consolidated as stable democracies. States that concentrated power in the directly elected executive, Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, the Central Asian republics, drifted into authoritarianism. Georgia illustrates the trajectory in reverse: having experienced the direct-election model for three decades, its parliament voted in September 2017 to switch to indirect parliamentary election of the president, with the first such election conducted by a 300-member electoral assembly in December 2024. Outside the four major authoritarian-heritage clusters, a small group of established democracies and hybrid systems - 10 states - use direct presidential elections. These states constitute the principal counterarguments to the thesis that direct election correlates with authoritarianism. The 51 states using indirect election of the executive encompass a wider variety of institutional designs, but are distinguished from the direct-election group by a markedly stronger association with stable, consolidated democracy. TO BE CONTINUED...

The Zimbabwean opposition and civil society argument, supported by some analysts and lawyers, argument treats the 110 as a homogeneous democratic bloc in their endorsement of direct election. Yet disaggregation reveals the opposite. The 110 is not a coalition of democracies. It is, in its dominant composition, a record of authoritarianism. Latin America, with 19 states, represents the global epicentre of pure presidentialism, and its embrace of direct presidential election is inseparable from its experience of bureaucratic-authoritarian military regimes during the Cold War era. Following the democratic transitions of the 1980s and 1990s, constitutional framers sought to establish executives with direct popular mandates specifically to counterbalance the residual institutional power of the armed forces and prevent military veto over civilian politics. The Latin American transitions were not organic democratic evolutions. In Brazil, the 1984 Diretas Já movement saw millions take to the streets demanding direct elections precisely because the military regime had used indirect electoral mechanisms to insulate itself from popular accountability. In Chile, the directly elected executive inherited from the Pinochet constitution was gradually purged of its unelected military senators. In Argentina, the indirect electoral college was replaced by a direct qualified plurality system in the 1994 Pacto de Olivos. In Uruguay, described in contemporaneous reporting as a country with one of the highest per capita rates of political prisoners in the world during the 1973 to 1985 military government, the armed forces extracted amnesty concessions in exchange for permitting the restoration of civilian rule via direct election. Of the 19 Latin American directly-elected presidencies, 18 have a significant military, one-party, or authoritarian heritage. The sole exception, Costa Rica, is notable precisely because it abolished its army in 1948 and has maintained civilian democratic continuity ever since. Coming closer home, Africa contributes the single largest bloc to the direct-election count, 43 states. The historical explanation is consistent across the continent. Following independence largely in the 1960s, most African leaders, some of them supported in their liberation struggles by the Soviet bloc, argued that multiparty democracy would exacerbate ethnic and regional divisions, and institutionalised single-party systems in the name of national unity. By the late 1980s, facing severe economic stagnation, structural adjustment pressures, and the withdrawal of Cold War largesse, these one-party governments were forced to liberalise, particularly after the Berlin Wall collapse and Soviet Union disintegration. The mechanism of liberalisation was, in nearly every case, the adoption of direct presidential multipartyism. As the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-published study, Transitions Without Consolidation (1994) documents, the African democratisation wave of the early 1990s was characterised by transitions that were managed rather than genuine, incumbent one-party apparatuses retained the centralised presidential structures they had built and simply rebranded them as multi-party direct elections. The result, documented extensively by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, was the emergence of dominant-party systems in which direct elections reproduced incumbent hegemony rather than enabling executive turnover. Of the 43 African direct-election states, all but Namibia, which was born as a multiparty democracy in 1990 yet under SWAPO's unbroken dominant-party control, have a documented history of single-party or military authoritarian governance. The African bloc alone accounts for 39% of all direct-election states globally. The explanation to that lies in the one-party states agenda and the imperial presidency aspiration by its authoritarian leaders.

Mugabe wanted the direct presidential election system for himself in 1987 when he introduced it through the Lancaster House Constitution Amendment N0.7. In 2013, Mugabe and the late founding MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai conspired to retain the direct presidential system with a national referendum rubberstamp. While some people would like to pretend otherwise for immediate convenience and to win the current debate, the truth is that the 2013 constitution was an elite political pact and compromise rather than a flawless reflection of the grassroots popular will. Just like its historical constitution and constitutional amendments predecessors in 1979 and 1987 respectively, its creation and adoption were driven by necessary negotiations between opposing political parties. It was a negotiated marriage of convenience between the ruling Zanu PF and the two MDC formations or factions. While civil society groups like the National Constitutional Assembly pushed for deep reform, the final document was heavily shaped by a give-and-take among political elites, resulting in provisions that balanced democratic institutions with retained presidential powers. Comparing these three landmark Zimbabwean agreements reveals several shared characteristics: comprise, concessions and a balance of interests. In 2013, the people were mobilised by political parties to make stage-managed submissions and to vote for the product of the choreographed process. That is the truth of what happened. Anything else is revisionist and being economic with the truth, or simply a misrepresentation, if not outright deceit and falsehood. This opinion-editorial is structured in six parts: verification and methodology of the 110/51 count; disaggregation of the direct-election group by region and regime history and type; analysis of the indirect-election group; a specialised analysis of the Commonwealth of Nations; the specific case of Zimbabwe; and an analytical synthesis assessing the thesis against the strongest counter-arguments. The figures of approximately 110 countries utilising direct presidential elections and 51 countries employing indirect elections are consistent with a rigorous, bottom-up classification of all 193 United Nations member states, conducted for this op-ed. The count rests on three explicit methodological decisions that are necessary for internal consistency. First, the universe of comparison is republican states only. Monarchies, whether absolute or constitutional, are excluded from both the direct and indirect counts. A monarchy is not a presidential system of any kind. Whether it is the United Kingdom's Westminster model or Saudi Arabia's absolute sultanate, the executive is not derived from a presidential election. Excluding the 41 monarchies from the 196 states surveyed leaves a universe of 155 republican and party-state systems. Second, party-states, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, North Korea, Eritrea, and Afghanistan, among others, are classified as indirect. Their national assemblies or party congresses formally elect or confirm the head of state through a legislative mechanism, even if the process is non-competitive. This is the correct comparative classification: the mandate is not derived directly from universal popular suffrage. Third, Angola and Guyana are now classified as indirect-election systems. Until 2010, Angola had a direct system. Guyana changed in 1964. In both countries, the president is the leader of the party that wins the majority of parliamentary seats, determined by popular vote. The popular mandate directly triggers the presidential appointment. Comparative databases, including the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network and the International IDEA Electoral System Design Database, consistently classify both as presidential systems. The count is therefore methodologically robust and internally consistent. It belongs to this research, conducted in 2026, and is not borrowed from any third-party estimate.

#GoodLongRead Evidence-Based Research Shows Direct Presidential Electoral System Places Zim in a Club of Authoritarian States and Dictatorships 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠: 𝐴 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠 BY KELVIN JAKACHIRA As debate on Zimbabwe Constitutional Amendment Bill N0.3 (CAB3) continues and heads to parliament after the just-ended parliamentary public consultation process, one of the battlefronts is whether the country should stick with a direct presidential election model or shift to a parliamentary system where the president is elected by the legislature. This is now beyond the contest of whether a referendum should be held or parliament has the legal right to make the constitutional amendments. It is now about debating what is and not what should have been: engaging reality as it is whether right or wrong in terms of process. The idea of the debate should not be to win an argument, but to shed light and insight on the public discourse to help the people, voters and legislators make informed and better decisions and choices in the process. The architecture of executive election systems is not a neutral administrative variable. It is one of the most consequential decisions in constitutional design, shaping the legitimacy of executive power, the dynamics of executive-legislative relations, and the long-term trajectory of democratic consolidation. When states choose between the direct and indirect election, they are making a foundational choice about how power is sourced, constrained, and transferred. In the current CAB3 debate, critics of the bill and those who want Zimbabwe to retain a direct presidential election system have deployed a numerical argument: that approximately 110 countries in the world directly elect their president, against only 51 that do so indirectly. Their argument says the global majority therefore vindicates the direct model as the democratic standard compared to electing a president through parliament. The argument is intended to suggest that moving away from direct election represents a retreat from the democratic mainstream. This opinion-editorial tests that argument. While it accepts the 110/51 count, which, as this research shows, is a defensible and methodologically sound figure, it disaggregates the 110 to reveal what that majority entails and demonstrates that the majority of countries which have direct presidential elections are actually authoritarian states and dictatorships. Contempaparry Zimbabwean history shows this. The current direct presidential election system is clearly rooted in the 1987 Unity Accord between Zanu and Zapu in the context of the Matabeleland atrocities and the late former president Robert Mugabe's one-party state agenda. The current direct presidential election system and the imperial presidency was not a creature of the popular will and democratic aspiration; far from it - it is a relic of the one-party state agenda and Mugabe's power consolidation and retention plan. Whether Zimbabwe keeps the current presidential system or transition to the parliamentary model is not the issue, but to show that the mere fact that most countries elect their leaders via direct elections does not make them more democratic and manifest international best practice. When the 110 direct-election states are unpacked by history, region and historical regime type, the overwhelming majority are former military regimes, former one-party states, former socialist states, or current authoritarian systems. The evidence is overwhelming. The direct presidential election model is not the hallmark of liberal democracy. It is, historically and statistically, the preferred institutional design of dictatorships in transition. The Mugabe example and legacy on that fits the bill.

@MacBelts Old post you are selling wrong narratives the VP isupports the Party and the President.

You have been warned. Zvineropa mukati izvi

This is an old video people are having conspiracy theories about the VP which is misleading.People should watch the whole video abd stop this.The VP is so united with the President and the Zanupf party.

President Emmerson Mnangagwa was stunned yesterday by Zanu PF youths who told him that while his own generational mission was to fight the liberation struggle, as he had said during his address at their national assembly gathering in Harare, theirs was to support Constitutional Amendment Bill N0.3 (CAB3)!

Constitutional Amendment Bill3 clause 14 explanation: ​Right now, the Constitutional Court has very strict rules about what it can do. It is only allowed to listen to and decide on cases that directly involve the Constitution (for example, if someone argues a new law violates their constitutional rights). If a huge, complicated legal problem comes up that isn't directly about the Constitution, this court can't touch it. ​The Big Change: ​This clause changes the rules. It says that from now on, the Constitutional Court can also step in and hear any case that involves an important legal question affecting the general public. ​Why this matters: ​Sometimes, laws can be confusing or interpreted in different ways by lower courts, causing major issues for the country, even if the Constitution itself isn't being broken. ​By passing this clause: ​The highest court can now use its expertise to clear up those big, confusing legal arguments. ​It ensures that major legal decisions affecting everyone are decided by the most senior judges in the land. ​In short: It gives the ultimate court the green light to step in and fix any major legal debate of public importance, not just constitutional ones. #CA3 zvaendwaaaaaa!!!

diversifying of different cultures in Zimbabwe🤝🧚🏻‍♂️🧛🏾‍♂️🧝‍♀️🧑🏿‍🦼#CultureMonth

Today is Culture Day in Zimbabwe, and President ED is hosting a major celebration in Bulawayo to showcase the country's traditional music, food, dance,and art.​The event is part of a global United Nations,UNESCO initiative meant to show and protect different cultures around!!

integrity"—which is just a fancy way of saying they want to make the organizations more trustworthy, fair, and focused on doing one job well without outside interference. #CA3

The new Delimitation Commission will focus strictly on one job: drawing the map, deciding where voting districts start and end, and balancing out the population in those areas. ​By separating this from the everyday management of elections, the goal is to improve "institutional

Clause 12 of the Constitutional Amendment Bill3 explanation: ​The Big Change: ​Right now, an organization called the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) handles two massive jobs: ​Running elections. ​Drawing the boundary lines for voting areas (called delimitation).