Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي

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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي

Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي

@MazenEzzi

Journalist, researcher, EHESS, Editor of HLP section @TheSyriaReport.

Paris, France Katılım Ağustos 2013
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
Charles Lister presents himself as a Syria specialist and author on jihadism, yet since the fall of the Assad regime and the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Damascus, his output has shifted into a sustained campaign of distortion against the Druze of al-Suwayda. He amplifies selective micro incidents, ignores structural violence, and normalizes narratives that legitimize repression, including the July 2025 genocidal campaign carried out by extremist Islamist factions against the Druze. While an entire community of less than half a million people remains under siege since July 2025, facing bombardment, arrests, blackouts, and economic strangulation, he continues to misrepresent reality. This is not analysis. It is a form of soft propaganda that borders on anti-Druze bias, rooted in an ideological indulgence toward Islamist actors, where demonizing a vulnerable minority becomes acceptable.
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
What happens when a group once listed as terrorist becomes part of the counterterrorism system? A closer look at the political repositioning of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria. My new article: daraj.media/en/from-the-te…
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
Many analysts argue that regime change in Iran cannot result from a mostly aerial military campaign, pointing to the absence of historical precedents. The main weakness in this argument is that it assumes regime change primarily as a democratic process. In authoritarian systems, regime change rarely happens that way. It more often takes the form of successive small collapses in the regime’s capacity to control the state and society. This can involve regions slipping out of central control, ethnic or social components distancing themselves from the regime, institutions and public services fragmenting, and competing claims to legitimacy emerging. It often also includes the rise of new political actors, unions, militias, and rival armed forces. The second weakness in the argument is the claim that air power alone cannot lead to regime change because there is no historical precedent. But this comparison overlooks the scale and nature of what we are witnessing today. We are facing complete air superiority capable of striking military, security, and political targets across an entire country with an unprecedented density of firepower, combined with electronic and information dominance. In other words, what is happening now may itself become the historical precedent.
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
My new article in @the_amargi, “Reconstruction in Syria Between External Investment and the Reproduction of Political Rent.” Its publication may feel slightly out of sync with the moment, as most attention is currently focused on the war involving Iran. Yet the question of reconstruction in Syria remains crucial precisely because it will shape the country’s political economy for decades to come. In the article, I argue that the core issue is not simply the scale of reconstruction funding, but the structure of investments and the governance model behind them. While Syria’s reconstruction needs exceed $216 billion, most of the announced $28 billion in investments consist of memoranda of understanding rather than fully financed projects. Moreover, the majority of these investments are concentrated in sectors such as energy, ports, airports, tourism, real estate, and telecommunications—sectors that generate highly centralized revenues and are often governed through long-term concessions. The article explores the gap between urgent social reconstruction needs—housing, basic services, local infrastructure, and productive sectors—and the investment pattern currently emerging, which appears shaped more by geopolitical positioning and financial returns than by social priorities. It also examines how reconstruction is being organized through executive-led negotiations with foreign investors, in the absence of a publicly articulated national reconstruction plan. The key argument is that reconstruction in Syria is not merely about rebuilding cities. It is a state-defining moment. The current trajectory risks consolidating a modified rentier model centered on large-scale external investments and centralized decision-making, rather than fostering a diversified productive economy and broader social participation. In short, the article tries to move the discussion beyond the question of how much money will come to Syria, and instead ask a more fundamental question: what kind of political economy reconstruction is actually creating.
The Amargi@the_amargi

A year after Assad’s fall, Syria’s reconstruction costs are estimated at over $216bn, but investment is clustering in energy, ports, and real estate via long-term concessions, with limited support for basic services. ✍️ @MazenEzzi theamargi.com/posts/reconstr…

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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
The siege imposed by the transitional administration forces, along with the governor of Suwayda appointed by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, has intensified following the al-Matuna massacre, where those same forces executed 5 Druze farmers in cold blood. At al-Matuna crossing, trucks carrying vegetables and food supplies have been blocked for four consecutive days. Drivers report that entry is denied unless they obtain approval from the governor. Even private vehicles and passenger buses are subjected to inspections, with bread confiscated and strict limits imposed on how much can enter. While humanitarian aid trucks from the World Food Programme are allowed through, commercial food shipments are halted. This collective punishment follows directly after the execution of Druze farmers in al-Matuna.
السويداء برس@presssuwayda

معبر المتونة يمنع دخول سيارات الخضار والغذاء على الرغم من استئناف حركة المرور عبر طريق دمشق السويداء اليوم الأربعاء، ودخول شاحنات الطحين المقدمة من برنامج الغذاء العالمي؛ استمرت إجراءات التضييق وتقييد حركة نقل البضائع من جانب معبر المتونة التابع للسلطة السورية المؤقتة. وأكد عدد من سائقي سيارات نقل البضائع للسويداء برس، أن حاجز المتونة منع سيارات نقل الخضار والمواد الغذائية من الدخول إلى السويداء اليوم الأربعاء، حيث تتوقف سيارات نقل البضائع عند المعبر منذ ساعات الصباح، لليوم الرابع على التوالي، دون السماح لها بالدخول إلى السويداء. ويقول المسؤولون عن حاجز المتونة للسائقين، إن المرور ممنوع بقرار من مصطفى بكور، ممثل السلطة المؤقتة في السويداء، وأن عليهم الحصول على موافقته للسماح لهم بإدخال الخضار والمواد الغذائية إلى السويداء. كما شمل التقييد إجراءات تفتيش دقيقة بحثاً عن "الخبز" في السيارات الخاصة وحافلات نقل الركاب من دمشق إلى السويداء، حيث يتم مصادرة ربطات الخبز ويمنع العناصر دخول أكثر من ربطتي خبز في كل آلية. معطيات تشير إلى استمرار فرض قيود من السلطة المؤقتة على طريق دمشق السويداء، والسماح فقط بتنقل المدنيين ومرور الشاحنات التي تنقل مساعدات أممية. ولم تُصدر السلطة المؤقتة أي توضيح رسمي حول أسباب تقييد الحركة على طريق دمشق السويداء، واتخاذها إجراءات تمنع حركة نقل البضائع، ما ساهم في ارتفاع الأسعار داخل السويداء وشح بالمواد الأساسية. التوترات على طريق دمشق السويداء تأتي عقب أيام من مجزرة بحق أربعة مزارعين، ارتكبها أحد عناصر الأمن العام التابع للسلطة المؤقتة في قرية المتونة شمال السويداء. #السويداء #دمشق #السويداء_برس

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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
This video shows the funeral of the victims of the summary execution of Druze civilians in the village of al-Matouna, in northern rural Suwayda. Identity-based killing carried out by the forces of the transitional administration, a daily reality for Alawites along the Syrian coast, had already reached Suwayda in July 2025, when around 2000 people were killed. The current violence follows the same logic and targets the same communities. The transitional administration is driving a broad and ongoing radicalization process among Syrian Sunnis, actively spreading an extremist Salafi ideology that treats minorities as infidels and apostates and legitimizes violence against them.
السويداء برس@presssuwayda

#شاهد من تشييع شهداء #مجزرة_المتونة في مدينة شهبا اليوم الاثنين. #السويداء_برس

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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي retweetledi
The Amargi
The Amargi@the_amargi·
“Unification by force… is not a law of history.” Mazen Ezzi traces how Syria’s unity was built through mandates and centralisation, and why today’s coercive reunification reproduces conflict rather than resolving it. Analysis by Mazen Ezzi theamargi.com/posts/syrias-u…
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
Today, five civilians were summarily executed in Suwayda. Local media reported that a group of farmers from Suwayda came under direct gunfire while harvesting olives in the village of al-Matouna in northern rural Suwayda. The farmers were displaced residents of al-Matouna, a village currently occupied by transitional administration forces, whose population was forcibly displaced during the July assault and barred from returning. They had entered the village only after obtaining security permits from General Security, which controls access to the area. Victims and injured were transferred toward Damascus, as families gathered at hospitals in Suwayda awaiting any confirmation of their relatives’ fate. This crime comes amid a sustained escalation by the transitional administration in Suwayda. Yesterday, mortar fire and heavy machine guns were deliberately targeting residential areas. Suicide drones were being deployed and landmines were being planted. This escalation has been intensifying for days, causing further civilian casualties, the deaths of National Guard fighters, and extensive damage to homes and property. The forces occupying more than 30 villages, in west and north of Suwayda, are composed of extremist and tribal armed groups operating under the authority of the transitional administration. Those villages and towns remain under STA's control following the July 2025 assault, and their residents forcibly displaced and required to obtain “security permits” to enter their own villages. This surge in violence has coincided with the de-escalation of fronts in Rojava. It underscores that this authority has no political horizon grounded in human dignity, equal citizenship, or power sharing. Its sole conception of politics is coercion through violence. After the genocidal massacres against the Druze in July 2025, a broad local consensus has emerged in Suwayda rejecting any form of integration with an authority that kills people for who they are. This is not a moral stance, but an existential one. The right to defend existence cannot be relativized or stripped of legitimacy by disinformation campaigns that invert victim and perpetrator, demonize the Druze, and whitewash the practices of the transitional administration.
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
I don’t see the Syrian issue as Syria simply being 'not ready' for democracy in the abstract. Like Iran's repeated violent top-down changes, the repeated failures stem from power being centralized and imposed by force, without a genuine inclusive social contract. Today's trajectory risks the same pattern under a new ideological flag. The real problem isn't democracy itself, but the lack of arrangements that recognize diversity, genuinely share power, and block domination by any single group. Absent that, whether authoritarian or nominally democratic, governance tends to reproduce violence instead of stability. What power-sharing mechanisms do you think could realistically align with Syria's fragmented society?
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Arina Singh آرینا سینگ
Arina Singh آرینا سینگ@_arinasingh_·
Political history of Iran for the past century and a half is filled violent attempts for a change. In that sense in some context I argue that we are not ready for democracy in a risk management sense and just structurally it’s not aligned. How do you feel about Syria? Do you think it’s heading towards repeating a historical mistake again? What are your thoughts on best form of governance aligned with Syrian society?
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
My first article with @the_amargi is now out. It examines why Syria’s “unity” is so often treated as a fixed historical truth rather than a political problem. The piece argues that Syria’s centralized state is a relatively recent construction, imposed through mandate and force rather than built on a pluralistic social contract, and shows how this unresolved history shapes today’s crisis, where reunification by force replaces politics and unity becomes an ideological slogan rather than a viable political project. theamargi.com/posts/syrias-u…
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
When human rights language comes to stand in for politics, something crucial is lost. In Syria, documenting violations gradually replaced naming power, conflict, and rule. Politics turned into moral accounting. Actors into witnesses. Legitimacy into a balance sheet of abuses. Drawing on Michel Dobry’s Sociology of Political Crises, my article argues that crises don’t just blur boundaries between fields, they reorder them. When one field dominates another, both are distorted. What we get is neither politics nor rights, but a hollow substitute for both. Read the full article here: daraj.media/en/when-we-los…
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
Today, a serious escalation was carried out by the forces of the transitional administration and allied tribes, with six mortar shells fired at the city of al-Suwayda from the occupied villages west of the city. There is nothing to deter the shelling of a city home to around 100,000 civilians, despite an existing ceasefire and a US-brokered agreement. Even more alarming, this attack comes while al-Suwayda has been under siege since July 2025, and coincides with military escalation on the Rojava fronts. There is no clear reason and no military justification. Targeting civilian areas is, in itself, a war crime. This escalation signals a troubling drive to wage wars of subjugation across Syrian geography, in a country that borrows money to pay public sector salaries.
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
Today, January 26, 2026, marks the eleventh anniversary of Kobani’s liberation from ISIS. The irony is stark: the city that marked a historic turning point in ISIS’s defeat is once again under siege. This time, the siege is imposed in the name of the “centralized state,” “restored sovereignty,” “territorial unity,” and the “monopoly of violence”—by the transitional administration, extremist Salafi factions, and allied tribal forces, while Kobani’s rear remains fully exposed to Turkey, a direct partner in the fighting and blockade. A marginalized and impoverished Kurdish city, Kobani endured decades of deliberate neglect under Baathist rule. In July 2012, it became the starting point of self-administration in northeast Syria. In 2014, ISIS besieged the city, turning it into an existential battle. At the lowest point, Kurdish defenders held just two neighborhoods—yet their resistance forced international air intervention. On January 26, 2015, Kobani was liberated. The battle became a turning point and the beginning of ISIS’s collapse. Today, eleven years later, Kobani is besieged again—while ISIS is reemerging. Perhaps Kobani’s crime is that it once embodied a living example of an alternative that was possible.
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
Recent discussions about children detained in al-Qatan Prison in Raqqa invite a broader reminder. On Dec 21, 2025, two Druze minors, Nidal Bashar al-Haddad (15) and Qays Bashar al-Haddad (13), were reported detained in Adra Prison near Damascus. They were held without judicial review, in clear violation of basic legal protections. In July 2025, during the transitional administration’s military operation against Druze communities in Suwayda, massacres were committed that resulted in the killing of around 2000 civilians. During that operation, hundreds of Druze were abducted, including women and children. Some of these children were held in solitary confinement in Adra Prison, never brought before a court, and were released only after seven months, following sustained media pressure. Selective concern obscures patterns. And obscuring patterns prevents accountability.
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي tweet media
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
Unifying a country under a single central authority may be politically legitimate, but it is not a law of history. States often fragment after major political ruptures. Syria today lacks the political conditions for consensual reunification. A state ruled through the dominance of a single communal bloc cannot integrate the rest of society without compromise, power-sharing, and guarantees of equal citizenship. That is the minimum meaning of democracy. Absent this, “unity” becomes a security slogan. Reunification by force turns into wars of subjugation that may reclaim territory but hollow out society.
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي retweetledi
Rami Jarrah
Rami Jarrah@RamiJarrah·
This isn’t about who did this and who did that. Both sides have shown they are willing to kill each other. What we’re witnessing in northern Syria, like any conflict, may only be the tip of the iceberg. If everything were being filmed, we would probably be having an entirely different conversation. So let's acknowledge how fragile this situation is. One video, one incident, is enough to permanently scar an entire community, like the man from Suwayda who was shot dead simply for admitting he was Druze. It doesn’t matter whether it’s a rogue element or an isolated abuse. If an offensive is underway, the blame will fall on whoever ordered it. Yes, in a country this fractured, even a single visible atrocity by state-aligned forces can shatter the hopes of a unified country for decades, turning it into imposed rule governed by fear and capitulation. That risk alone makes any offensive reckless. The only way to avoid permanent damage is to avoid violence altogether. Instead of beating the drums of war, all Syrians should be advocating for peace. To those calling for an offensive to “unify” the country: You know what many of these fighters are capable of. You know there is hatred and extremism in their ranks. And yet you have faith and confidence that Al-Sharaa will somehow manage them, filter out the worst elements, and prevent abuses through personal oversight. That isn’t a safeguard, it’s wishful thinking. It’s gambling civilian lives and the future of the country on one man’s judgment. Also not forgetting that you plan to share something you call home with these people and given that you insist that its based on centralized rule, the least you should be doing is making sure nothing jeopardizes that becoming an impossible reality, even if it's just out of a matter of self-interest. The less damage inflicted on hearts and minds now, the less conflict you inherit later. Force is only going to create fear and resentment, brushed under the carpet to deal with when it creeps up again. What’s astonishing is that people are willing to go to war and accept the risks of deploying state forces that are clearly plagued by tribalism and have compassion for one community over another, risking everything, instead of having confronted the state when it was critical and demanded it was founded on the country’s diversity, one collectively capable of viewing all Syrians as their own. And I’m not talking about token representation. This isn’t about percentages or the number of officers or soldiers from other sects. A truly diverse army means the convictions of one sect cannot define the identity of the entire force, which is exactly what we see today. Even state supporters openly admit the army needs diversification, so there’s no point in pretending the problem doesn’t exist. The fact is that had the army been built inclusively, these deployments would have been viewed in an entirely different light. That’s how you fix the problem at its foundation, not through reckless, lazy experiments that end up looking like occupations. Syria’s diversity is what makes the country what it is, yet too many seem unconcerned about losing it. If you truly wanted the best outcome, you would ask yourself whether what you’re advocating for can realistically hold the country together. If you think that a demonstration of force while relying on external legitimacy will put everything to rest, then you clearly haven't been paying attention all these years.
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
Sulayman Abdul Baqi is currently in Washington and is being treated by some Western research circles as a “Druze leader.” In Suwayda, he is widely known not for legitimacy or representation, but for a deeply controversial past. According to long-standing local accounts, he was reportedly convicted in a criminal case, later fought with pro-Assad National Defense Forces after 2011, and subsequently became associated, according to local reporting, with ransom kidnapping mediation networks. Since 2023, he has been aligned with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and reportedly helped form a security group linked to the Transitional Administration’s General Security apparatus. This group facilitated the penetration of Suwayda in July 2025, followed by massacres against Druze communities that resulted in the killing of around 2000 people. In the context of Suwayda’s society, these actions have cemented his reputation as a traitor. Despite this, and despite lacking any social legitimacy and being unable to enter Suwayda itself, he was appointed by the Transitional Administration to a senior security role there. Presenting such figures as “leaders” distorts local realities and helps launder coercive power and mass violence.
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Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي
Mazen Ezzi مازن عزي@MazenEzzi·
Thomas Barrack operates with a deeply distorted reading of both history and politics. He repeatedly frames Syria’s crisis as a legacy of Sykes–Picot and Western partition, yet speaks and acts as a decision-maker imposing outcomes on Syrians themselves. His assumption that Syria must be unified under the dominance of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham amounts to the imposition of an external will on society, without consent. Despite clear and repeated popular rejection by minorities of HTS rule—expressed through three consecutive wars of subjugation waged against Alawite, Druze, and Kurdish communities, leaving thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced—Barrack remains committed to the same approach. This reveals a simple truth: his problem is not with Sykes–Picot, but with the peoples of the region themselves. He advances no democratic framework for resolving conflict, shows no concern for protecting the lives or dignity of minorities, and speaks only with admiration for centralized authority, supplying it with justification, legitimacy, and leverage. In negotiations he has overseen between minorities and the transitional administration, Barrack has consistently acted from the administration’s right flank, using every tool available to impose HTS’s terms—including explicit threats of war.
Ambassador Tom Barrack@USAMBTurkiye

The greatest opportunity for the Kurds in Syria right now lies in the post-Assad transition under the new government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. This moment offers a pathway to full integration into a unified Syrian state with citizenship rights, cultural protections, and political participation— long denied under Bashar al-Assad’s regime, where many Kurds faced statelessness, language restrictions, and systemic discrimination. Historically, the US military presence in northeastern Syria was justified primarily as a counter-ISIS partnership. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Kurds, proved the most effective ground partner in defeating ISIS’s territorial caliphate by 2019, detaining thousands of ISIS fighters and family members in prisons and camps like al-Hol and al-Shaddadi. At that time, there was no functioning central Syrian state to partner with—the Assad regime was weakened, contested, and not a viable partner against ISIS due to its alliances with Iran and Russia. Today, the situation has fundamentally changed. Syria now has an acknowledged central government that has joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (as its 90th member in late 2025), signaling a westward pivot and cooperation with the US on counterterrorism. This shifts the rationale for the US-SDF partnership: the original purpose of the SDF as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired, as Damascus is now both willing and positioned to take over security responsibilities, including control of ISIS detention facilities and camps. Recent developments show the US actively facilitating this transition, rather than prolonging a separate SDF role: • We have engaged extensively with the Syrian Government and SDF leadership to secure an integration agreement, signed on January 18, and to set a clear pathway for timely and peaceful implementation. • The deal integrates SDF fighters into the national military (as individuals, which remains among the most contentious issues), hand over key infrastructure (oil fields, dams, border crossings), and cede control of ISIS prisons and camps to Damascus. • The US has no interest in long-term military presence; it prioritizes defeating ISIS remnants, supporting reconciliation, and advancing national unity without endorsing separatism or federalism. This creates a unique window for the Kurds: integration into the new Syrian state offers full citizenship rights (including for those previously stateless), recognition as an integral part of Syria, constitutional protections for Kurdish language and culture (e.g., teaching in Kurdish, celebrating Nawruz as a national holiday), and participation in governance—far beyond the semi-autonomy the SDF held amid civil war chaos. While risks remain (e.g., fragile ceasefires, occasional clashes, concerns over hardliners, or the desire of some actors to relitigate past grievances), the United States is pushing for safeguards on Kurdish rights and counter-ISIS cooperation. The alternative—prolonged separation—could invite instability or ISIS resurgence. This integration, backed by US diplomacy, represents the strongest chance yet for Kurds to secure enduring rights and security within a recognized Syrian nation-state. In Syria, the United States is focused on: 1) ensuring the security of prison facilities holding ISIS prisoners, currently guarded by the SDF; and 2) facilitating talks between the SDF and the Syrian Government to allow for the peaceful integration of the SDF and the political inclusion of Syria’s Kurdish population into a historic full Syrian citizenship.

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