Michael Daly

It’s worth pointing out that Gov Ron DeSantis was warned about this when appointing Jay Collins LG This seat is very purple and we won it during the huge red wave of 2022 Now we got a radical leftwing nut in the Florida Senate - and for what? To appease egos

Let’s talk about that deal, Gavin. Obama gave Iran $150 billion in sanctions relief. Then put $1.7 billion in cash on a cargo plane and flew it to Tehran in the middle of the night. Iran literally called it a ransom payment. Iran then took the money, and; A) Funded Hezbollah. B) Funded Hamas. C) Funded the Houthis who spent the next decade shooting at American ships. The same people who were chanting “Death to America” the whole time. OH!!! And the deal didn’t stop Iran’s nuclear program. The money Iran used came from somewhere, Gavin. You just posted a picture of the guy who sent it. Oh.. and by the way, the Senate never ratified it. It wasn’t even a real treaty. Obama couldn’t get it through his OWN GOVERNMENT but he did it anyway. I’m sick of the bullshit coming from this account. Trump is just cleaning up Obama’s messes… and there are MANY!

The man who actually got Iran to make a deal that kept Americans safe

Senator Chris Murphy: "The people we care about most, the undocumented migrants" He actually said that

ICE doesn’t belong at our airports. Our Office of Immigrant Affairs has updated guidance and you can call their legal hotline at 800-354-0365.

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.