Papa Boham 🇬🇭🇬🇧

Yesternight at the Jubilee House, I asked the President when teachers will be deployed to our 30,000 empty classrooms. He said the recruitment portal will open very soon with a policy shift that targets deployment quotas for only teacher deprived districts. Teacher surplus urban municipalities, regional capitals, and metropolitan areas are excluded. This is exactly our advisory to GoG since since. Clearance and deployment must go strictly to deficit districts where teachers are actually needed. District Education Directors must be held accountable for deployment decisions on their quotas. For this to work, however, civil society groups like Eduwatch must have access to placement data for real time monitoring and reporting. If the President shields teacher distribution from political, traditional, and religious influence, we can solve this. If we continue preference based postings, we will only deepen the inequities, and continue pouring water in a basket. We are monitoring!

SETTING THE RECORDS STRAIGHT ON THE BIG PUSH ALLEGATIONS —————————————— ISSUE 1: Claims that 81% of Big Push contracts were sole sourced with 107 Projects Response: The claim is inaccurate and false. The total number of Big Push projects is 54, not 107. Indeed, 23 of these projects were inherited from the immediate past Npp govt, all of which were sole sourced with no funding source prior to this administration. Out of the 54 Big Push projects: i. 7 were awarded through restricted tendering, and ii. 47 were sole sourced In effect, only 44% of Big Push projects were sole sourced. However, approximately 98% of ALL road projects awarded under the previous NPP admin were sole sourced. ISSUE 2: Propriety of procurement methods used Response: The procurement methods adopted were justified by prevailing circumstances. On average, road projects take up to 36 months to complete. Government was confronted with: i. urgent national security concerns ii. widespread public demos & demands for urgent delivery of good roads iii. a severely deteriorated road network that required prompt action These conditions necessitated immediate intervention, making reliance on certain expedited procurement methods both lawful and appropriate. ISSUE 3: Claims that Big Push procurement did not follow due process and did not ensure value for money Response: The claim is totally false. Due process was strictly adhered to across all Big Push projects, with multiple layers of technical, financial, and institutional oversight to ensure value for money. These include: i. Design and cost structuring undertaken by the relevant technical agencies to ensuring alignment with engineering standards and project specifications ii. Benchmarking and validation of contractor pricing, comparative analysis to guard against inflated costs iii. Independent technical scrutiny by the Ghana Institution of Surveyors to verify scope, design integrity, and cost assumptions iv. Commencement authorisation issued by the Min of Finance, ensure fiscal discipline and compliance with public financial management requirements These processes ensure that projects are not only compliant with procurement laws but also deliver efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and technical soundness. ISSUE 4: 23 projects inherited from Npp & placed under Big Push constitutes “looting” Response: The 23 projects were ongoing, sole sourced, and lacked dedicated funding. Their inclusion under Big Push was to provide financing & ensure completion. Characterising this as “looting” is baseless and ignores the policy of delivering stalled projects for public benefit. ISSUE 5: Competitive tendering under current administration Response: Since assuming office, over 400 road projects have been subjected to competitive tendering and duly advertised in the national dailies. This marks a clear departure from past practices. ISSUE 6: Misconception of “rehabilitation” Response: There is a fundamental misunderstanding of the term “rehabilitation” by 4th estate. In road construction it is a term of art that can involve a complete overhaul of a road, not merely surface-level repairs. Projects such as Dodi Pepesu fall within this technical definition. ISSUE 7: Claims on cost per kilometre Response: The allegations of high cost per kilometre lack any evidence. The comparisons ignore critical variations in project scope, design standards, and engineering requirements. Even when this flawed method is applied, several Npp projects record higher cost per kilometre figures than Big Push. Examples: 1. Accra–Tema Motorway and Extensions (19.5km): US$17.34m per km 2. Dualisation of Adenta–Dodowa Road (22km): GH¢60.35m per km 3. Upgrading of Apirade–Domyinase Bridge Point over Birim Oda (3.2km): GH¢27.14m per km 4. Kotie–Sewua Feeder Road and critical access roads (9.12km): GH¢26.20m per km 5. Kyei Abohontedome & feeder roads (2.6km): GH¢23.37m per km Indeed, cost structures vary depending on scope of works.

She said she has a boyfriend, now she is cooking at my place

Kwame Governs Agbodza, Minister of Roads and Highways, says our claim that a company with one staff has been awarded a contract under the Big Push is disinformation. Here’s the evidence from the SSNIT clearance certificate in the contract document signed between the Minister and build managers, which indicates that the company had only one worker when the contract was signed. Build Managers is upgrading the Apegusu- Mpakadan Feeder Road (9km) at GHS 146 million. Cost per kilometer of the feeder road is GHS 16 million.