Perekeman
16.2K posts

Perekeman
@PocoRabonne
Soy ese no eme




#ATENCIÓN 🔴 |El alto tribunal encontró que desvió cerca de COP 90 mil millones para la contratación de obras públicas en cinco departamentos. 👉🏻 trib.al/iEIMfG5

Son @IvanCepedaCast y @petrogustavo los llamados a responderle políticamente al país por la nefasta paz total y por la muerte de Miguel Uribe. Fue Cepeda quien intercedió para que Santrich e Iván Márquez se volaran y fue Petro quien nombró al Zarco Aldinever negociador de paz. Que no olviden la responsabilidad política con la que cargan.







Hasta ahora comprendo a cabalidad la expresión "narco barroco".


“El episodio más doloroso en 14 años” Néstor Morales expresó su solidaridad con las víctimas de acoso sexual en @NoticiasCaracol asegura que tenía un aprecio por los implicados y sus familias. #MeTooColombia #NestorMorales #AcosoSexual #YoTeCreoColega

Israel’s Channel 12 has now leaked what it claims is a U.S. “15-point document” to end the war with Iran. The reported mechanism is a one-month ceasefire, during which there will be negotiations over these terms. That alone is likely a non-starter for Tehran. Iran has been clear it does not want another temporary pause that allows the U.S. and Israel to rearm, rebuild, and return to the fight—as has already happened before. It is seeking a permanent settlement that allows it come out of economic isolation. Then there are the terms themselves. Much of this reads like a familiar maximalist wishlist: no enrichment on Iranian soil, dismantling core nuclear infrastructure, abandoning regional alliance network. In other words, demands that Iran has consistently rejected—before the war, and likely even more so now given the leverage it believes it has gained. At the same time, there is a notable U.S. offer: the reported offer of full sanctions relief, including removal of snapback threats. That suggests Washington may be signaling openness to a broader strategic tradeoff. So there may be the outline of something workable here. But as an opening bid, much of this still looks fundamentally misaligned with what Iran would accept—and therefore unlikely to get serious traction in Tehran without significant revision.







