Chamberlain's Ghost

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Chamberlain's Ghost

Chamberlain's Ghost

@RSA_Observer

History, geopolitics, social issues. Peels apples with scalpels. Quiet civil conversations. Mostly somewhere in the moderate middle. Mute button enthusiast.

Katılım Ağustos 2011
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
Some of you may wonder about the name of this profile - Chamberlain's Ghost. Just briefly, when this war started in early 2022, I strongly expressed the view that Ukraine should seek a settlement with Russia as soon as possible. This was long before we all learned about the abortive Istanbul negotiations. For this I was pilloried by friend, family, acquaintance and stranger alike. I was labelled 'Putin's shill', 'Munich appeaser', 'Neville Chamberlain' and and many other things besides. But I was right then and I am still right now. The only solution to this war for Ukraine was and still is a negotiated peace. The only difference now from then is that now the terms will be worse, many people have died and a great deal of destruction has been done. This was, in the greater sense of matters, an avoidable war. People did not need to die and a country did not need to be wrecked. But in substance ideology preceded pragmatism.
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
Some interesting thoughts and indeed, the broader view is that Russia has no need to carry out escalatory strikes into Europe. But I question the idea that such an attack by Russia would necessarily bring the broader European population to support greater efforts against Russia. The contrary may very well prove to be the case.
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
I watched the first half of Die Weltwoche interview with Peskov. I find Peskov quite an interesting and articulate character. A lot of what he said though conformed very closely to what is perhaps best referred to as the 'standard Russian messaging position'. I did though note that he neatly sidestepped the question when he was asked about the possibility of Russia striking European industrial facillties engaged in supplying military equipment to Ukraine - unlike when he was asked about the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons, which he very effectively downplayed by referring to the established Russian nuclear doctrine. It seems to me that the European view - and probably the view of almost everyone - is that it is practically impossible that Russia would carry out such attacks into Europe given the far reaching consequences, and in broad terms I would normally also regard it as quite unlikely. But it struck me when watching the interview that in 2021 almost nobody seriously believed that the Russians would actually invade Ukraine and that when it happened, within Europe at least, there was almost total disbelief. When I connect the various dots of what is happening right now and indicators around likely Russian repositioning for escalation, I do wonder whether European credibility may be tested once more.
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
This GCC analogy raises an interesting question. The GCC has no Article 5 equivalent but consider how Saudi Arabia (has) maintained a purely defensive stance throughout and (has) never struck back at Iran so as to avoid further escalation. But while Europe has the Article 5 'card', the escalation risks with Russia are stratospherically different and Europe is not well positioned, outside of France's nuclear arsenal in particular, to do a great deal about Russian strikes. Also, there is likely to be little popular support amongst most European electorate for an all out war with Russia. Conceivably therefore European reactions to Russian strikes may in at least some instances remain largely defensive in nature. The Russians may also possibly (mis?)calculate accordingly.
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Braudel Marx
Braudel Marx@BraudelMarx·
I hate to say this, given that I live in Europe, but the lessons of the ongoing Iran war are clear. The US relies on two types of proxies: fighting proxies (Israel, Ukraine) and docile proxies (GCC states, European allies). The latter provide funding and basing, while the former supply the muscle. Iran appears to have surprised many by quickly striking the GCC docile support networks in response to US/Israeli attacks. At some point, Russia may draw a similar lesson and begin targeting European support infrastructure in the same way.
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
@vtchakarova Something that's been on my mind for some time. How come Europe, the home of ASML, which has long been the global leader in EUV chip making tools does not also lead the world in actual chip making and is apparently not a very serious competitor in the AI race?
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
So I find myself wondering about Lindsey Graham, what exactly is his legacy? Nothing of any real value that I can think of. And perhaps that says it all.
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
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Tatiana Stanovaya@Stanovaya

Some thoughts on the current situation around the war 📌Putin appears to believe that Russia is winning and will ultimately win the war. In his view, taking Donbas is only a matter of time. He seems ready to pay almost any price to achieve that goal because he sees it as an existential issue for Russia. Those who expect that increasing pressure on Putin will create more room for negotiations are likely to be disappointed. More pressure is more likely to lead to further radicalisation in Moscow and a stronger military response. 📌Economic difficulties, which are becoming more serious, together with battlefield losses and the fuel crisis, are unlikely to make Putin reconsider his approach to the war. Instead, they are more likely to harden his position, encourage further escalation, and increase the risk of scenarios that many have previously dismissed as bluff. 📌There is a growing gap between the political leadership and the rest of the country, particularly the business community, which increasingly wants the war to end. At present, there is little room for internal debate or for questioning Putin’s course. Instead, the leadership appears committed to further escalation, with no clear limits. This is likely to make these internal contradictions more acute over time. 📌Ukrainian strikes inside Russia are strengthening anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western sentiment, making it easier for the Kremlin to justify further escalation. At the same time, Russian public opinion is divided. Some argue that the war should end roughly along the current front line, while others call for far more extreme measures, including the destruction of Kyiv, the use of nuclear weapons, and mass violence against Ukrainians. A prolonged war of attrition will further strengthen both camps. 📌The year 2026 appears to be a particularly important stage in the war. For the first time, the cumulative effects of the conflict are having a visible impact on Russia’s domestic situation, raising questions about the state’s ability to continue functioning in the same way. This weakens Putin politically, but it also appears to make him more radical, contributing to a growing sense among parts of the Moscow elite that a catastrophe may be approaching. 📌There is a strong and growing expectation that significant changes lie ahead. There is little understanding on what form they will take, who will drive them, or how fast they may begin. However, there is an increasingly widespread belief that, if the current war of attrition continues, Russia’s resources will come under growing strain, while the economy remains constrained and growing numbers of businesses become unviable. The overall conclusion is that two processes are unfolding at the same time: increasing external escalation and deepening internal contradictions. The West should be prepared for unexpected developments.

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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
@enithka I think it comes from the fact that both Dutch and English are (or originally were) Germanic languages and so they have a common origin in these types of words.
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
I have a fascination with English words. Here are two 'lost' words, but lovely ones. ereyesterday - the day before yesterday overmorrow - the day after tomorrow
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
I see there are still discussions (eg @phl43) about how and why China (has) stabilized the global oil markets. The answers are fairly accessible it seems, but essentially as @AngelicaOung puts it, the Chinese are 'stability pilled'. Grok offers a fairly good overview (see the link below) of matters. But there's something bigger to chew on here and that is the broader picture of China's pursuit of stability and what it means reaching into the future if we accept the idea of some sort of Pax Sinaica. There's almost nothing trade and industry needs more than stability and the Chinese are all about trade and industry - just as the US and Europe really once were too. Each period of 'Pax', whether Britannica or Americana has created a material degree of stability and brought with it in general terms expansion in trade and industry and overall, economic improvement. But for the Chinese it's at a very different level rooted in Confucianism. A bit of reading around the concepts of tianxia and wangdao is very revealing (more later perhaps if there is interest). Essentially, the Chinese outlook on global relations lies in quite a different paradigm to that of the West; it is fundamentally less coercive and more co-operative in nature. Of course one should not be naive about matters. China acts out of self interest. But what is important is how it does so. And in some ways it is quite distinct from other players who have at times either caused or sought to use instability to their own ends. This is a major shift and to my mind at least, a positive one. x.com/i/grok/share/e…
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
I'm reading the underlying post to the one you (Daniel) quoted and am thinking this is a very concerning development for almost everyone outside the Russia-China framework, especially when it includes when it includes the construction of manufacturing plants in Russia too. It touches on something I said a few days back about the combination of AI and industrial capacity being a key factor in future conventional warfare. "The proposal calls for Russia to share what it has learned at the front while China contributes AI and mass-production capacity as the two powers jointly develop the next generation of autonomous “swarm” munitions." I hear what Sari says about workaround of chokepoints and there's a lot truth in that but it's also the case that China has an excessively deep pool of skilled people and that it's all probably only a matter of time. Just turning though to a point in Sari's note about Europe breaking through the political fatigue point - I hear what Sari says and think she is right but my concern is that Europe seems to be struggling on multiple fronts simultaneously. The one that concerns me the most is the apparent steady decay in German industrial capacity, which has in many ways long been the heart of European economic wellbeing (restarting the German economy was key to the Marshall plan) and a big part of the European security architecture. An industrially decaying and economically challenged Europe is going to find it hard to fully rearm, albeit obviously any degree of rearmament increases deterrence. My great current concern is that the Ukraine situation escalates in a broader European spillover. In any event, in sum Sari is likely right that Putin and Xi gain nothing from Ankara that pleases them. But I suspect that none of it is really very unexpected to them either. I remain though of the view that in the long run Europe and Russia need to figure out how to reach a modus vivendi, preferably through an agreed security architecture. I wonder whether in time a younger generation of Europeans and Russians may eventually take the lead on this. One thing is certain: the current status quo is not sustainable.
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
@vtchakarova Even then I thought it might be 'a show of force' to intimidate. But a while before the actual invasion - I seem to recollect about a fortnight before - it was reported that blood supplies were moved to the locations in question. That put it beyond any reasonable doubt.
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Velina Tchakarova
Velina Tchakarova@vtchakarova·
“How can we have been so wrong for so long?” In Western Europe - Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, etc., the political leadership and its intelligence services didn’t see the Russian war on Ukraine coming. Now, they also don’t see the new Cold War between US & DragonBear.
Velina Tchakarova tweet media
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
@ProfDBernstein Yes that's all true, but it also rather cranks up the volume of what it says about Israel when the Saudis would rather deal with the Syrians.
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Chamberlain's Ghost retweetledi
John Shreffler
John Shreffler@johnshreffler0·
Newsfeed just now.
John Shreffler tweet media
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
@GarryW46170 I think so too. I think at some point the Russians could well be pushed into doing something they'd prefer not to have to do.
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Garry W
Garry W@GarryW46170·
@RSA_Observer Very good. A tightly written prediction which rings all too possible and indeed probable, if the vacuous Kaja Kallas remains in position through year end.
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Chamberlain's Ghost
Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·
So, we're at the stage where Don Tzu is talking about reinstating the blockade on Iran, talking again about taking Kharg island and talking again about striking Iranian desalination plants. Because of course, these were all such great ideas the first time around.
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