صد سال بِگایی
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کاش یکی به من کمک کنه: گذاشتن یک موتور و یک ماشین، همزمان، داخل پارکینگ اختصاصی (منظورم اینه که مشاعات نیست)، بدون هیچگونه مزاحمتی برای دیگران، از نظر رفت و آمد ( که مثلا کنار در باشه، مسیر رو تنگ کنه)، سد معبر، اذیت شدن برای پارک کردن ماشین بقیه، از نظر قانونی مشکل داره؟


Prime Minister Netanyahu has few people to blame but himself. When President Trump posted his now-famous message, "Help is on the way," Netanyahu likely saw a historic opportunity: persuading the President of the United States to join a campaign against Iran and fundamentally alter the regional balance of power. From that moment onward, it appeared that Israel's overriding objective was to convince Trump that the time had come for a decisive confrontation with the Islamic Republic. Every argument, every intelligence assessment, and every potential scenario seemed directed toward one goal: securing greater American involvement. The problem was that the underlying assumptions were deeply flawed. It is difficult to believe that Netamyahu genuinely expected Kurdish groups, opposition movements, or exiled political figures to trigger regime change in Iran. Such expectations would reflect a profound misunderstanding of the resilience of the Islamic Republic and the limitations of external pressure. That was not a strategy; it was wishful thinking. Trump has always preferred clear victories and limited commitments. He is willing to use force, but he has consistently shown little appetite for open-ended conflicts or nation-building projects. The prospect of regime change in Tehran may have been appealing rhetorically, but once the conflict threatened broader economic consequences, particularly disruptions to energy markets and maritime trade, the calculus inevitably changed. The Strait of Hormuz represented the critical turning point. An extended closure or sustained disruption of shipping lanes would have imposed significant costs on the global economy and directly affected American interests. For a president focused on economic performance and domestic political considerations, that was a risk not worth taking. The Israeli PM should have understood this. They knew that Trump had no intention of deploying large-scale American ground forces to Iran under virtually any circumstances. Without such a commitment, regime change was never a realistic objective. Military pressure alone could weaken Iran, but it was unlikely to bring down the regime. Faced with mounting economic risks and limited strategic upside, the administration's incentives shifted toward de-escalation and diplomacy. Reaching an arrangement with Tehran that preserved freedom of navigation and prevented a wider regional conflict became the more attractive option. In that context, efforts by Netanyahu to block or complicate such an agreement only increased friction with Washington and reinforced the administration's determination to pursue a diplomatic off-ramp. The result is that Israel risks finding itself in a strategically weaker position. It has not achieved a transformative outcome in Iran, while at the same time potentially damaging its credibility with its most important ally. The broader lesson extends beyond this particular conflict. Future American administrations may become even more skeptical of arguments that military pressure alone can fundamentally transform Iran's political system. The war may ultimately mark the end of an era in which regime change was viewed, explicitly or implicitly, as a viable foundation for Western policy toward Tehran. If that is the case, any Israeli policymaker will need to rethink their assumptions. Weakening Iran and overthrowing the Islamic Republic are not the same objective. The recent confrontation demonstrated that the former may be achievable through military means; the latter almost certainly is not without a level of American commitment that neither President Trump nor, likely, future U.S. presidents are prepared to provide. The result is a diplomatic fiasco of historic proportions for Israel, one that is unlikely to fade quickly and whose political and strategic consequences may be felt for years to come. #IranWar



رویترز: نیمی از مبلغ صندوق ۳۰۰ میلیارد دلاری توافق ایران و آمریکا تأمین شده است رویترز گفته است این مبلغ از طریق سرمایهگذاری خصوصی در صندوقی با عنوان «صندوق بازسازی و توسعه» تأمید و پس از امضای توافق نهایی وقف زیرساختهای آسیبدیده ایران میشود. buff.ly/PfBYU8d















