Seth Frantzman

I am thrilled to announce the release of my new book, 'The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza.' While I've covered numerous Gaza wars, this one has been harrowing and long. Awakened by Hamas rocket fire on October 7, 2023, I began covering the conflict from its very first day.

Le immagini del ministro israeliano Ben Gvir sono inaccettabili. È inammissibile che questi manifestanti, fra cui molti cittadini italiani, vengano sottoposti a questo trattamento lesivo della dignità della persona. Il Governo italiano sta immediatamente compiendo, ai più alti livelli istituzionali, tutti i passi necessari per ottenere la liberazione immediata dei cittadini italiani coinvolti. L’Italia pretende inoltre le scuse per il trattamento riservato a questi manifestanti e per il totale disprezzo dimostrato nei confronti delle esplicite richieste del Governo italiano. Per questi motivi, il Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale convocherà immediatamente l’ambasciatore israeliano per chiedere chiarimenti formali su quanto accaduto.

Interesting ; two key Israeli political leaders, who both hold important posts; the context is, in one part the upcoming elections where voters will get to decide which type of Israel will prevail; but also leads to some questions, because why weren’t the flotilla detainees simply sent home, what was the logic of bringing them for this kind of footage and under whose authority are the activists, they aren’t being charged, or at they. In the end of the day then this raises some questions about sequence of control of events; since the PM had left hearings in order to deal with this; but then to have it end up like this is interesting

@BarakRavid @michaldivon Why were the activists turned over from the professional navy to this ; prior incidents didn’t involve this parading like one might see in certain other countries

Israeli foreign minister Saar condemns minister of national security Ben Gvir his provocative video

Interesting

@gcaw Right 😞 that’s what I meant can’t edit it tho…

@sfrantzman *March 10

On May 10 The Atlantic had an article by Graeme Wood about Ahmadinejad that raised the point of the strike possibly freeing him. theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/03/… "Why Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Is Still Useful"

The flotilla activists who were interdicted at sea far from Israel’s border, were brought to Israel and it seems are being made to crouch and assume various positions and being tied/taped and marched around ; unclear if they will be charged but it seems they are being used in massaging now; in the previous flotilla it seemed they went back home after being stopped by the Navy professionals (except two detained briefly); and there were a few photos of sandwiches being given out in several previous ones; this is different ; Interesting

Where might they come from

@ItayBlumental @Liorfink The new Israel

עד עכשיו הצליחו לוחמי שייטת 13, צה"ל חיל הים ומשרד החוץ, להשתלט על המשט לעזה בלי פרובוקציות מיותרות- ואז הגיע בן גביר. בתיעוד שהפיץ בעצמו נראה בן גביר מסתובב בין פעילי משט כפותים, נדרשים לשכב על הרצפה, כשהשר "לביטחון לאומי" קורא לעברם "אנחנו בעלי הבית". כמה נזק האיש הזה מייצא בשביל פרובוקציה בשקל ותשומת לב.

@JasonMBrodsky oh

The Jordanian military announces it shot down a drone of unknown origin in its airspace. No casualties were reported. timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry…

@guyelster "Early"...it's been forever. even if technically it is

#BREAKING Israeli Knesset agrees to proceed to a vote on an early elections

“Countries have had to dramatically increase defenses because of the proliferation of global conflicts and they need systems that will work. And most countries don’t have the time right now to build their own defense systems locally and quickly,” said Seth J. Frantzman, an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies who has covered Israel’s arms industry for a decade and wrote the book “Drone Wars.” apnews.com/article/israel…

Is there any other language in the world where an author refuses to have their work published in it because of a conflict abroad, or even the actions of a state that they disagree with? I mean, maybe there is, are people cancelling Russian because of the invasion of Ukraine? The theory being the publishing house is in the state or whatever...like no translation to Russian if publishing house is located in Moscow? The whole story here is that one has to beg to have this in Hebrew because of this whole thing...I think it's bizarre to punish a language because of the actions of a state. but as you can imagine there is some convoluted explanation...but hey...finally...it has been sorted out...as long as one bows down to the complex tedious confines of BDS....

955 days the people of Kiryat Shmona in northern Israel have been under Hezbollah rocket and drone attack. Today as children celebrated Shavout, which is happening all across Israel in schools, they had to rush off due to sirens. Now the theory is this is a ceasefire...and Hezbollah is greatly weakened, destroyed, dismantled, defeated, crushed, mashed, bashed, ruined, huge casualties, operating as only small cells, just a few guys now, hiding, just on the verge of collapse and utter defeat... 955 days. And children are still dealing with this in Kiryat Shmona, a city that had to be EVACUATED completely because of Hezbollah threats after October 7, 2023; an entire city, because it couldn't be defended from the threat, whose people had to flee with their kids, their lives turned upside down for a year until there was an operation against Hezbollah in Sept-Nov 2024...in which reports claimed Hezbollah lost 70-80 percent of its arsenal and most of its commanders...and yet after another operation in March-April 2026 and clearing the border a few miles into Lebanon...this continues. 955 days of war The theory is that cities in northern Israel should just accept it, like Sderot and communities after 2005 were told to accept it, and the more they accept, the more it was portrayed as success.

interesting

@ShMMor What do you mean, aren't you aware of the Pre-emotive Doctrine...

@sfrantzman I assume "emotive" was a typo, but it weirdly works here.

Be wary seeing these land areas as a gain. Anyone who thinks they are, should go to these areas and see for themselves. These are military buffer zones. Many villages in the areas have been razed. The land area of the Korean DMZ is about 1,000 sq km also; even if one of the militaries were to take that area but maintain it as a buffer, it would not be a gain. All of these areas are also up for discussion. Israel has adopted a new policy of razing areas along the borders as a kind of pre-emotive offensive defense. But it’s not without problems. It requires a lot of troop commitments and constant tempo of operations; and in Lebanon there are casualties. It’s a new security zone like in the 80s, which I don’t think anyone now sees as a major gain for Israel. The real gain for Israel is not endless conflict over a few ruined areas on the border; that’s just tactical; the only gain is if it leads to strategic wins and changes things. Historically having a military buffer zone of fighting area like the so called “Spanish March” pose a complex challenge. The gain for Israel is not in these potentially costly buffer zones

It's fascinating how my view about removing Hamas since October 7 has remained consistent but the kind of replies change over time. After October 7 when I said the strategy should be similar to Mosul against ISIS, remove Hamas systematically, the first replies were something like... - You don't understand war, this will take years. Ok, so in the spring of 2024 when reports said that Hamas was "dismantled" in northern Gaza and only a few Hamas "battalions" remained in Central and Southern Gaza, I said, ok, great, now let's go into Rafah, which should have been done before, but let's do it now as the plan calls for and then remove Hamas. Set up a new governance in the freed areas and slowly strangle Hamas, let the civilians move to the new area. And the refrain was something like "we can't win because of the Biden admin." Ok, so then the second hostage deal happened in January 2025 and Trump was in power and I said, ok let's get the hostages out and finish this and set up a new governance. Then the response was "now you'll see, Trump is in charge, now Hamas will be defeated." Ok, then comes March 2025, the ceasefire deal collapses, new fighting, and aid cut off...but then things stall...then GHF is set up in May...and by this time the IDF has gone into the same areas sometimes three or five times. The aid cut-off didn't work despite all those who heralded using aid as a pressure point (they were still trying to cut off aid in October 2025, a completely failed policy). The response moves to "Hamas only controls Gaza City and the Central Camps"...ok, so then remove them from those areas. So the Gaza City op begins in July-August 2025 with targeting of hi-rises, and desolation of the border areas, but Hamas remains. Finally there is the US-backed deal Sept-Oct that comes into place. All the hostages return. This removes the discussion about how to operate with the hostages there. OK...so now the ISF can go in with CMCC and begin the work of creating the new governance and replace Hamas. Great. But no, instead Hamas remains and begins to rebuild and no civilians are allowed to leave the Hamas zone to a new area in Gaza. So now the response is "we can't clear the Hamas-run area, they are weakened and not a threat, it's not worth more losses for that, better to just keep them weak and there....and civilians can't be allowed out of the Hamas run area because they are a threat." So, we've come full circle back to pre-Oct. 7...of basically, it's acceptable to have Hamas in power and that's kind of the status quo preference. What began as "can't defeat Hamas because it will take years, have to dismantle every home because of tunnels, there are hostages so one can't operate there, it's Biden's fault holding back Israel, when Trump comes then victory...but also have to destroy hi-rises...but then cut off aid...but then not...but then GHF, but not...and then peace deal with plan for ISF and disarming 'the easy way or hard way'..." And the usual reply "you don't have a better plan." I've said the same thing for 955 days. The strategy should be similar to Mosul against ISIS, remove Hamas systematically, allow civilians to leave the Hamas area to have new governance, new schools and health care; remove Hamas systematically. This won't happen until it is realized that Hamas is not the preferable group to run Gaza and that having Hamas run Gaza isn't some 3D chess that helps; but actually it's a disaster for everyone involved. I thought October 7 and the mass murder of 1,000 people and kidnapping 250 might lead to the realization that Hamas shouldn't have the four decades of appeasement and privilege it has had. But it still retains this. Until people decide things have to change. That Hamas is not preferable.

I feel like I remember Kirkuk in 2017 when the concept was to empower the militias and empower Baghdad, against the KRG. Now we have to go dismantle the very thing that some experts thought was a good idea...strong militias..."strong" Baghdad...normalize the militias via state salaries...It's like Hezbollah 2.0 or the Iraqi version of the IRGC.

"Washington urgently needs a clear and enforceable strategy to dismantle the Iraqi militias and the PMF structure that has transformed Iraq into a platform for Iranian regional aggression."

Arutz 7 had different info: "Several Bedouin suspects armed with clubs attempted Tuesday to steal ammunition and military equipment from Israel Defense Forces firing ranges in the Jordan Valley. The incident took place near the Home Front Command training base at Nabi Musa during live-fire training exercises conducted by military forces in the Jordan Valley region." Nebi Musa is near Jericho, up the road to Jerusalem a bit. When I read armed I thought with guns, but this says something else.

@eie2727 @sfrantzman And where exactly are they from? (Where do they live to be exact)

Armed Not good There has long been similar problems in the Negev, part of the lawlessness and arms smuggling that has grown

@UkDday No idea. I feel like NATO "could" if it wanted to. But it's not a likely scenario.

@sfrantzman do you think NATO could open Hormuz? Will they ?