Sam Dagher

Belated thank you to the @FT for putting “Assad or We Burn the Country: How One Family’s Lust for Power Destroyed Syria” on the list of best 12 books “shedding light on the conflict in #Syria & its place in the wider power struggles across the Middle East” ft.com/content/d889cf…

APNewsAlert - DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Iranian state television's English arm, quoting anonymous official, says Tehran rejects US ceasefire proposal.

IRAN'S TASNIM NEWS AGENCY, CITING UNNAMED MILITARY SOURCE, SAYS IRAN COULD ACTIVATE THE BAB EL-MANDEB STRAIT IF ATTACKS ARE CARRIED OUT ON IRANIAN TERRITORY OR ISLANDS -Reuters News

A Pakistani source told @Reuters: "The Iranians told us they will get back to us tonight. The media is reporting they’ve said no. But we have not received any official confirmation from Iran. So we are just waiting. They are all underground and communication is big challenge."

Why Venezuela-style regime modification and surrender deal won't work in #Iran (probably): Mohammad-Bagher #Ghalibaf Edition After a large-scale regime decapitation effort, which by my estimate has killed around 15 first-tier political and security figures in Iran since the 12-Day War, President Donald #Trump appears to be testing the waters on whether the Islamic Republic's leadership has been sufficiently changed so as to clear the path for major concessions across the board on key nuclear, missile, and proxy issues (for example the 15-condition list in the Times of Israel[2]). The man the Trump administration has in its sights to make this deal is the Islamic Republic's Speaker of Parliament Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf. In fact, Ghalibaf is exactly the kind of ambitious and opportunistic figure (some might say "political shapeshifter") suitable to be an Iranian strongman and Delcy Rodriguez (much more so than even Ali Larijani), if not for three major constraints, which will make a surrender deal by any regime figure difficult to accept for the foreseeable future. 1. Who is MB Ghalibaf MB Ghalibaf was born in Mashhad's environs in Khorasan Razavi province in 1961 (an area home to one of the Islamic Republic's most powerful networks which included former Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) to a Shia family with a Kurdish-speaking father and a Persian-speaking mother. His surname means "carpet weaver" in Persian. Ghalibaf has climbed his way up the Islamic Republic's hierarchy for 45+ years to emerge as arguably the (or one of the) most powerful political figures in Iran today. More than many others in the regime, he's relied on his talent and ambition, for example not having the advantage of coming from a prominent clerical family like Ali Larijani. He joined the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) in 1980 and went on to become one of the youngest commanders (including of the 25th Karbala Division) during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), in which he lost a brother (Side note: There is a touching TV interview he once did where he recounts the martyrdom of his brother and its impact on him). Ghalibaf, who earned his PhD in political geography from Tarbiat Modares University in 2001, would go on to hold some of the most important positions in the IRGC (where he achieved the rank of Brigadier General) and security establishment after the war including: IRGC's Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters commander (GHORB, the IRGC's engineering arm and among the leading contractors in the country, 1994-97); IRGC Air Force commander, where he also trained as a pilot, and went on to fly commercial aircraft (1997-2000); and police commander, where he was credited for modernizing the force, but was also responsible for violent crackdowns on political dissent including student protests (2000-05). In 1999, after the University of Tehran student uprising, Ghalibaf was one of the twenty-four IRGC commanders who sent a threatening letter to then President Mohammad Khatami urging him to further repress growing student activism and social demands. In 2005, Ghalibaf tried his hands at national elected office, running to be president as a candidate for the (then) recently emerged principlist political current (Islamic Republic's mainstream conservatism). During the campaign he also tried to appeal to nationalist sentiment and mainstream society by casting himself as an Islamic Reza Khan (later Reza Shah Pahlavi-the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty), a patriotic modernizing strongman figure. Despite his talent and ambition, Ghalibaf lacked the political acumen to maneuver himself to lead the rising conservative movement, losing the principlist primary to Mahmood Ahmadinejad who would go on to become president that year. Ghalibaf was not on good terms with Ahmadinejad, who was said to have prevented him from attending cabinet meetings. Ghalibaf is a four time loser in presidential elections in 2005, 2013, 2017 (when he withdrew in favor of Ebrahim Raisi), and most recently 2024. He failed to find his footing in Iranian presidential politics, being consistently outmaneuvered to his left by "moderate"-reformist figures that can more credibly represent the reform agenda without his baggage of IRGC-ties and repression of dissent, and from his right by hardliners who distrust him in part due to his reputation for political flexibility and financial corruption. Despite these losses he has been handed consolation prizes at each defeat and continued his ascent to the top including: As the longest serving Mayor of Tehran, where he was credited with modernizing the city's governance and infrastructure, but also suffered from several corruption scandals (see for example the Issa Sharifi case) (2005-2017); Expediency Discernment Council member (eight session, 2017-2022); and speaker of parliament (2020-present). In parliament he has remained a mainstream principlist, but while this meant being squeezed between "moderates" and hardliners in his quest for the presidency, it has served him well in the legislature as it's allowed him to manage and mediate factional tensions to advance regime priorities and his own influence. For example, he has worked with the Masood Pezeshkian government in some areas (staving off the "Hijab and Chastity" bill so as to avoid harsh enforcement of the mandatory hijab that provokes social tensions), but in other areas supported the impeachment a Pezeshkian Cabinet minister (see Minister of Economy Abdol-Nasser Hemmati's imepachment). In this sense he bears some resemblance to recently assassinated Supreme National Security Council secretary Ali Larijani. Throughout his ascent, he has maintained strong ties to the IRGC, and remains closely tied to its senior leadership network (famously having a friendship with the assassinated IRGC-Jerusalem Force commander Major General Ghasem Soleimani), although there are tensions with some commanders over his reputation for flexibility and corruption (see for example former IRGC chief commander Major General Mohammad Ali "Aziz" Jafari and the Yas Holding Company scandal). 2. Ghalibaf at war: Why he's no Delce Rodriguez Given the breadth and depth of high-level decapitations since the 12-Day War, and vacuum of power at the top of the regime (Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is unable to rule directly due to debilitating injuries and/or safety concerns, and President Masood Pezeshkian is a non-entity for now), Ghalibaf has arguably stepped onto center-stage as the leading political figure in Iran following Larijani's assassination. He was already seen as a major figure in the war effort before this. His circle of power, all of whom have good ties to Mojtaba, includes IRGC chief commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and former IRGC Intelligence Organization commander Hossein Taeb (the latter two are said by some sources to have orchestrated Mojtaba's selection as leader). For an ambitious and opportunistic figure like Ghalibaf, one could argue NOW is his moment to seize the reins, make a deal with Trump, and consolidate power. The Trump administration is correct in viewing him as a much more suitable figure for a Venezuela-style regime modification than, say, Larijani. However, Ghalibaf has shown himself to also be cautious throughout his career, for example lacking the boldness of Ahmadinejad (one of the reasons the latter has been purged from the political while the latter has not). Furthermore, he faces at least three main constraints. (a) Absence of trust: There's a near total absence of trust by the Islamic Republic toward the Trump administration. This is, after all, the government that pulled out of the JCPOA and permitted or launched two wars during active diplomacy. Should the Islamic Republic capitulate, it will be left even more defenseless than now, while having no reliable guarantee that the US (and Israel) will hold up its end of the bargain or not make even harsher demands down the road when Iran is in a vulnerable condition. (b) The IRGC: The kind of deal that the Trump administration and Israel are looking for-across the board capitulation on nuclear, missile, and proxies issues-means dismantling much of the strategic power of the IRGC which would be a major blow to its place in the regime and institutional identity at a time when their domestic position has been contested by a popular uprising (that could rise again in the future). (c) Regime's hardline social base: Surrender to the US on the three key issues would also be a major blow to the morale and identity of the Islamic Republic's hardline social base (which some estimates place as high as 15% of Iran's population). Furthermore, to stabilize the domestic situation after a deal, the regime may also need to offer concessions to mainstream society (e.g. social freedoms and removal of the mandatory hijab). If, after all the economic hardship hardliners have endured and loyalty they've shown to the regime by mobilizing during crises like war and popular uprisings, the ruling system in effect surrenders, what has it all been for? They may revolt or simply not heed the call to mobilize next time there is a crisis. This dynamic is especially relevant for Ghalibaf, who as I noted before, is unpopular among hardliners. Basically, any whiff of surrender by Ghalibaf right now could trigger backlash against him by the IRGC and/or hardliners, eliminating him, or triggering a major fracture in the regime. That's not to say such a Delce-style maneuver is impossible long-term. It's just very difficult during war-time when the groundwork has not been laid. Ghalibaf would need to know an acceptable deal is available and build a critical mass of support among regime elites, the IRGC, and hardliners outside of crisis conditions. We are not there right now. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic could have done this years ago to put the regime on a more sustainable footing while retaining more of its major deterrence assets and without suffering wars and popular uprisings, for example after October 2023 or November 2024. The longer it waits the more difficult and costly such an exit from the dead-end becomes. If Ghalibaf survives the war, and manages to consolidate his position, he could become the leading figure in an IRGC-led third Islamic Republic (a scenario which was already likely before the war) or even the strongman of a post-Islamic Republic authoritarian regime (a less likely scenario I've nonetheless discussed before). Personal note: I've followed Ghalibaf since starting in this field in the early-to-mid-2000s. I wrote a political biography of him at the request of a major European city in the early-2010s (they were considering him for a mayoral award) and thought he was well-positioned to win the 2013 Iranian presidential elections-one of my first major wrong analytical calls. Just as with the Islamic Republic in general, I have had a tendency to overestimate Ghalibaf, for which I've attempted to correct in recent years. We will see now if his moment has arrived and he can seize it. [1] Politico: ‘We're in the testing phase’: Trump admin eyeing Iran’s parliament speaker as US-backed leader politico.com/news/2026/03/2… [2] Times of Israel: Trump says talks with Iran progressing, as Israel said to fear premature ceasefire timesofisrael.com/trump-says-tal…

Iranian military spokesperson mocks U.S. attempts at a ceasefire deal, insisting that the Americans are only negotiating with themselves. The comments come shortly after the Trump administration sent a 15-point ceasefire plan to Iran through Pakistan. apnews.com/article/iran-u…

While #Trump speaks about the end of the war with #Iran, the posture of his Gulf allies toward Tehran is hardening significantly with #UAE and #SaudiArabia signaling that they will have to respond to Tehran's continued attacks and threats against them. Iran has so far launched some 5,000 missiles and drones at Gulf states with the UAE bearing the brunt. “This is not our war, but Iran is making it ours,” says @MABaharoon bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

This is the statement issued by Iran today on the Strait: “open” to “non-hostile passage” only for ships Iran approves and “in coordination with the competent Iranian authorities.” In other words: NOT open.

The spokesman for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has rejected President Trump’s suggestions that talks have been taking place with Iran, suggesting the US has been ‘negotiating with yourselves’.

I joined ⁦@JoumannaTV⁩ & @Laurapdavison from #Dubai this morning to discuss on ⁦@BloombergTV⁩ #Trump’s efforts to end war with #Iran. I spoke about the view from Tehran as well as our story on Gulf states losing patience with the Iranian regime bloomberg.com/news/videos/20…

Trump says he’s “talking to the right people” in #Iran to end the war but on the ground it’s something else so far. A #UAE military contractor was killed and over a dozen Emirati and Bahraini soldiers were wounded in an attack by #Iran on #Bahrain yesterday

My Uncle Napoleon, Iraj Pezeshkzad Forgive me, but the TV version is even better. I grew up watching the series on video tapes. Part satire and screwball comedy, this Tehran garden and family compound is very much set in the “before” of the revolution.

I’ve been asked many times by friends what books I would recommend about #Iran, especially this week. Here are some I’ve treasured over the years to keep me connected to a homeland I cannot set foot in. There are so many more, these are simply the ones I always go back to. Suggestions welcome 👇

NEW: #Iran’s biggest Gulf Arab neighbors are considering joining the US-Israeli war against Iran, and could be pushed to if Tehran attacks their critical infrastructure, according to several people with knowledge of the situation #SaudiArabia #UAE bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

Air raid sirens sounded in the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait as Saudi Arabia says it intercepted more than 20 drones. Debris damaged Kuwait’s power grid, and Amazon says drone activity hit its Bahrain operations. The UAE warned that thunder may be mistaken for blasts as tensions grow.

Amazon Web Services suffered a disruption to its services in Bahrain due to drone activity, the company said in a statement. “We continue to support affected customers, helping them to migrate to alternate AWS Regions.”

Lebanon’s PM Salam says #Iran’s IRGC commanding Hezbollah operations in #Lebanon: “The Revolutionary Guard, which is present &, unfortunately, is managing the military operation in Lebanon. These people have forged passports & entered country illegally” today.lorientlejour.com/article/150040…

Israeli strike on Hazmieh kills 1, Israel says it struck IRGC member: “The mayor added that the targeted individual had arrived at the apartment only an hour before the strike, and the rental had not been made in his name” today.lorientlejour.com/article/150048…

Israeli strikes have killed 1,039 and wounded 2,876 in Lebanon since March 2. today.lorientlejour.com/article/150049…

Where Is Mojtaba Khamenei? Is he wounded? Is he even alive? Mystery surrounds Iran’s new leader - and Iran fills the gap with AI and voiceovers. wsj.com/world/middle-e…