Shiroi

We already built this, @anza_xyz Our testnet was live back when the Solana testnet was still alive. Good times 😅 Launching mainnet soon.. Let's connect!

@kachoksk No worries, we will warm them up 👌

@Shiroi_sol Solana txs will freeze?

Are you ready?!

@naturespower Shipping positive vibes 👀

@Shiroi_sol LOOKS AMAZING 😁

Recently, our team had the chance to present our project at the Cyberpunk Hackathon by @colosseum. It was a new and exciting experience — we challenged ourselves, highlighted our strengths, and gained a fresh perspective. Now we’re gearing up for Solana Breakpoint (@SolanaConf), where we’ll be showcasing our project at the Block Zero side event. We’re looking forward to sharing what we’ve built and hearing valuable feedback. See you at Breakpoint!

🚀 Shiroi Alpha Testnet is LIVE! We're opening the doors to the next era of Solana block production with BBM — a PBS-inspired block builder module. Join the testnet 👇 form.typeform.com/to/MMVdC8Pk Let's cook 🍳⚡

BBM – The Next Stage in Block Production on Solana From BAM to BBM: Evolution of the Approach During the development of the Block Assembly Marketplace (BAM), the Shiroi team concluded that the initial concept had significant limitations and required substantial modifications to achieve maximum efficiency. Architectural analysis and practical testing demonstrated the need for a deeper rethinking of the block production model in Solana. The result of this work is the Block Builder Module (BBM) — an evolution of BAM with fundamental improvements and new capabilities. What is BBM? BBM (Block Builder Module) is the evolution of BAM, aimed at building a more efficient and fair system of block production in Solana. How does it work? Current Solana model: - Validators independently produce blocks; - They sort and order transactions; - Full control over block assembly. Proposed BBM model (PBS-like): - Validators do not assemble blocks themselves; - Validators only add assembled blocks to the network; - Block production is delegated to BBM. Key Advantages. 1. Transparency & Fairness: - Block production becomes fully observable and auditable; - Fairer competition among participants. 2. Efficient MEV Utilization: - Local auctions instead of centralized structures; - Custom scheduler for optimal transaction ordering; - Fairer competition for sniping, arbitrage, liquidations, and other trading opportunities; - More participants get a chance to bid; - Only those paying the highest price succeed. 3. Spam Reduction: - No incentive for transaction spamming: arbitrageurs and snipers lose the need to flood the network with transactions just to outpace each other; - Winners are determined by bid price, not speed or volume; - Reduced network load from redundant transactions. 4. Increased Throughput: - More transactions processed per slot; - Optimized block time usage. Problems Addressed by BBM. Current challenges in Solana: - Time manipulation: According to @ChorusOne, timestamp games increase block rewards but harm the network; - Client inequality: Firedancer (@jump_firedancer) captures significantly higher rewards compared to standard Agave (@anza_xyz); - Execution inefficiencies: Issues with execution and scheduling. BBM solutions: - Eliminates advantages from time manipulation; - Levels the playing field across all client types; - Optimizes execution and scheduling processes; Economic Benefits Data from @0xGhostLogs: arbitrageurs on average pay 30–50% of their profits as tips, showing massive potential for validator revenue growth. Expected outcomes: 1. Higher validator revenues through: - Increased competition; - Greater process transparency; - Fairer distribution of all MEV opportunities. 2. Fairer competition among traders: more time to submit bids in auctions instead of relying on “perfect infrastructure” (low latency, validator proximity) Technical Details Architecture: - Clear role separation: block production vs. block addition; - Local auctions for all MEV opportunities (arbitrage, sniping, liquidations, etc.); - Custom scheduler for optimal transaction ordering. Integration: - Fully compatible with existing validators; - Gradual rollout without disrupting network operations. Conclusion BBM represents a significant step forward in Solana’s infrastructure, delivering: - Fairer revenue distribution; - Improved network efficiency; - Better conditions for all ecosystem participants. Precise efficiency metrics will be published upon completion of testing.

We present our BAM (Block Assembly Marketplace) solution with our ideas and innovations, and showcase our development for combating rug pulls – Anti-Rug. How it works: We assemble blocks by ordering transactions through local auctions before execution. This brings Solana closer to a PBS-like architecture (separation of builders and block proposers) with emphasis on privacy, verifiability and programmability, plus phased deployment and open-sourcing plan. Reducing negative MEV. We'll be ready for testnet soon, stay tuned for updates.

@TridentSolana Let's cope with this task together!

@Shiroi_sol Props to you for pushing the convo on validator issues and sandwich attacks! Solana's ecosystem needs more transparency like this. Tools like Trident can simulate these real-world scenarios to harden protocols against such exploits. Keep it up!

Hello everyone! On August 28, 2025, at 18:00 UTC, we had a validator call attended by members of the core team. We were finally able to convey everything we had previously written about. In particular, we described the following issues: 1. The concealment of sandwich attacks, where a transaction after the victim's one was split into several parts, causing the @0xGhostLogs (sandwiched.me) algorithm to register only the first transaction in the sequence as a loss-making one, without reacting to the entire transaction chain. We posted about this situation on August 23, 2025, addressing @MarinadeFinance (the team has not yet responded on the forum). 2. Delays or complete rejection of votes by the leader concerning other validators. 3. The injection of frontrun or sandwich transactions, which can result in them losing stake from the Solana Foundation and getting blacklisted. We were fully heard, and the core team showed interest in our analysis. We will soon provide them with information on all attack methods. A big thank you to everyone who participated in the call and thanked us for the work done. It is very important to us!

@chrischang43 You are always welcome, friends. We still have a lot of work ahead of us, we must make Solana crystal clear and honest!

6/ We’re deeply thankful to the community (special shoutout to @Shiroi_sol) who shined a light on this new sandwiching strategy and others for pushing to reduce toxic MEV x.com/Shiroi_sol/sta…

1/ Big update for Sandwiched.me: We’re rolling out Sandwich Detector v2 – a major step forward in catching malicious actors who profit from extractive sandwich attacks

@0xDenysK @jito_sol We are also waiting for JIP-25... JIP-24 is currently in the works

@Shiroi_sol No more relevant since the @jito_sol introduced JIP-25 which will end the race.

Unprecedented Attack on Validators On July 29, 2025, Solana witnessed the first-ever case of a validator attacking fellow validators (excluding DDoS attacks, which are hard to attribute to a specific validator). HelixNode began programmatically rejecting vote transactions from competing validators receiving stake from the Jito pool, artificially degrading their performance metrics. The first victim was validator @meyerbro , who reported the issue in the Solana validators chat. Impact Summary: Dozens of affected validators Losses of up to 200 vote credits for some Use of a legal protocol feature for competitive purposes The attack exploited validators’ ability to ignore messages from other participants—a legitimate protocol option—but applied it as a tactic to eliminate competitors from the Jito pool. While this may seem minor in the context of the entire blockchain, the Pandora’s box has been opened. 1/6

Hello everyone, Publishing the next report under the topic "Mempool Without Sandwiches". As of now, the number of validators has decreased to 18 (down from 32 in the previous report). The total stake has dropped from 3.5M SOL to 2.6M SOL. Out of the 2.6M SOL, nearly 2M SOL comes from Marinade’s delegation. Unfortunately, the @MarinadeFinance team still hasn’t provided any feedback in this thread — which is disappointing. Approximately 800,000 SOL in delegation was received from @jito_sol . See you in the next update. Actual table link is here - #gid=17" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d…

Hello everyone. It’s quite unfortunate that the @MarinadeFinance team remains completely silent on this issue and hasn’t taken any action to revoke bonds or unstake from validators who are actively running sandwich attacks — cleverly hiding behind position splitting to make it look “clean.” But unlike them, we do care. That’s why we keep publishing the stats. As of August 22, the total number of validators increased by one and now stands at 33. The total stake has grown to 3,523,318 SOL (up from 3,498,194 SOL, a delta of +25,123 SOL). For epoch 837, only 24 validators from our list receive Marinade stake, with a combined total of 2,155,774 SOL delegated. At the moment, Marinade controls roughly 9.6 million SOL — and over 20% of that stake is being used to execute sandwich attacks. Sad? Absolutely. What’s even sadder is that Marinade’s shiny new “reputation system” doesn’t change the reality: Marinade reacts painfully slowly to new challenges in the ecosystem. Once again, we urge you to pay attention to this issue: @TimGarcia0 @jito_sol @benhawkins @0xGhostLogs @0x7cf Link for our table - #gid=1814182991" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d…

A quick update on the new so-called “private pool without sandwiches”. Things are moving fast: the number of connected validators has jumped from 17 to 31 (almost 2x growth), and the connected stake has skyrocketed from 1,318,031 SOL to 3,498,194 SOL (2.6x increase). Almost all validators in the pool are heavily backed by @MarinadeFinance stakes. We hope this time the team will react quickly to address the issue. Stay tuned — we’re actively monitoring the mempool dynamics and will keep you posted! I'll attach a link to a Google Sheets document with each post, and every new update will be on a separate tab. The current relevant tab is 19.08.2025 - docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d… We also hope this situation will get the attention it deserves: @TimGarcia0 @benhawkins @jito_sol @0x7cf @0xsucxub @0xGhostLogs

@0xsucxub @w3e_uk Hi Nika, We were just looking for your contacts to tag you in our post. There are no contacts on GitHub. What do you mean?

@Shiroi_sol @w3e_uk Guys is it ok to do posts like that and sandwiching in one time ?

Old Problems in a New Wrapper We received reports from fellow validators: they were approached with offers to join a so-called “private mempool without sandwiches” with promises of “security and high yield.” This sounded too good to be true. Together with @w3e_uk, we decided to validate these claims using on-chain metrics. 1/7

Conclusion: Our sample shows significant delegations (including from Marinade, JITO, Edgevana, and others) to these validators. In practice, however, their blocks consistently carry traffic from a program exhibiting clear sandwich-bot behavior. This directly contradicts the claims of a “private channel without sandwiches.” We will continue monitoring and publish further updates.

Validators Processing Contract Flow At the link below we provide a list of validator identity keys whose blocks contained transactions from the program (based on our dataset). For transparency, we include their activated stake (SOL) and tx_count (the number of times the program appeared in their slots within the analyzed range). #gid=0" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d… 6/7