Siach Eved

No, my question is not how to square the two statements of the Rambam. Whilst that is indeed a worthwhile endeavour that I have worked on in the past, he never made the claim that "feelings are subjective accidents". In response to your point, I agree with you, but there is a large gap between something being the "essence" or cause of something, and it being a "subjective accident". Again, I am still unsure how you square specifically the claim that "feelings are subjective accidents" with the Rambam I brought, who seems to see some actual value in the emotions? Is it not a bit too dismissive and reductive?

Then your question is how to square the two statements of the Rambam. Without doubt, the latter is describing a byproduct or symptom, not the essence itself. When I value something, the corresponding emotions follow from that valuation, but they do not generate it. A person may experience the very same emotional intensity in romantic longing or in countless other earthly desires. That itself demonstrates that the emotion is a subjective secondary: it may testify to the presence of a valuation, but it cannot account for its cause or essence.

Kavanah (intention) is not an emotional state; it is the conscious decision to fulfill an objective obligation. Feelings are subjective accidents; duty is absolute.

No, but perhaps with this (הלכה ג): "וכיצד היא האהבה הראויה הוא שיאהב את ה' אהבה גדולה יתירה עזה מאוד עד שתהא נפשו קשורה באהבת ה' ונמצא שוגה בה תמיד כאלו חולה חולי האהבה שאין דעתו פנויה מאהבת אותה אשה והוא שוגה בה תמיד בין בשבתו בין בקומו בין בשעה שהוא אוכל ושותה יתר מזה תהיה אהבת ה' בלב אוהביו שוגים בה תמיד כמו שצונו בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך והוא ששלמה אמר דרך משל כי חולת אהבה אני וכל שיר השירים משל הוא לענין זה."

You find this contradictory to that? ודָּבָר יָדוּעַ וּבָרוּר שֶׁאֵין אַהֲבַת הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא נִקְשֶׁרֶת בְּלִבּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁגֶּה בָּהּ תָּמִיד כָּרָאוּי וְיַעֲזֹב כָּל מַה שֶּׁבָּעוֹלָם חוּץ מִמֶּנָּה. כְּמוֹ שֶׁצִּוָּה וְאָמַר בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשְׁךָ. אֵינוֹ אוֹהֵב הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אֶלָּא בְּדַעַת שֶׁיְּדָעֵהוּ. וְעַל פִּי הַדֵּעָה תִּהְיֶה הָאַהֲבָה אִם מְעַט מְעַט וְאִם הַרְבֵּה הַרְבֵּה. לְפִיכָךְ צָרִיךְ הָאָדָם לְיַחֵד עַצְמוֹ לְהָבִין וּלְהַשְׂכִּיל בְּחָכְמוֹת וּתְבוּנוֹת הַמּוֹדִיעִים לוֹ אֶת קוֹנוֹ כְּפִי כֹּחַ שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּאָדָם לְהָבִין וּלְהַשִּׂיג כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ בְּהִלְכוֹת יְסוֹדֵי הַתּוֹרָה:

@dovid_g Not all the information in your response is accurate

Fake Talmud Quotes About Goyim (Gentiles) - Rabbi Debunks The Talmud is never speedread. Once I spent 3 months on 6 short lines of Talmud. So, to get the entire context for each of these pieces, unfortunately, no short form video will be enough.

I agree with the above. I only mean to point out that the Torah doesn't indicate that the hardening of the heart caused, as a justifying reason, any punishment to Pharaoh (a point only relevant if one is happy to grant philosophically that God could have revoked Pharaoh's free will, something I know that you don't).

Yes, but when I say that the hardening was a necessary condition to make the ensuing punishment possible, I mean this only in the sense of creating the conditions under which man may choose to sin , just as, for example, God creates a drought in order to test whether Abraham will descend to Egypt. Abraham still retains the ability not to. If the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart means a direct determination of his decision, then no genuine choice remains, and punishment becomes unintelligible. But if it means affecting his physiological or psychological disposition in the face of the signs and plagues, then free will is not abolished, rather, the circumstances within which choice unfolds are altered.

The Hardening of Pharaoh’s Heart and the Preservation of Free Will One of the most famous and difficult questions in Jewish thought arises in the Exodus narrative: how can the Divine act of hardening Pharaoh’s heart be reconciled with the supreme metaphysical and religious principle of free will, to which the Torah itself testifies in its unequivocal call to "choose life"? If God is the one hardening Pharaoh’s heart, then Pharaoh has no choice, and any punishment inflicted on him is a theological injustice. Scores of excuses and explanations have been written over the generations in an attempt to resolve this difficulty, yet it seems that many of them have failed to penetrate the true epistemological and phenomenological depth of human nature. To answer this question, we must draw a categorical distinction between two components within the human being: that which is empirical-deterministic, and that which constitutes the autonomous free will. Everything that occurs within a person biologically, physiologically, and psychologically, the mechanisms of the mind, impulses, nervous system responses, and the capacity to endure pain, is entirely subject to the absolute physical laws of cause and effect. Conceptually speaking, there is no difference between a neurological or psychological event taking place inside the human organism and rain falling on a person from the outside: neither of these events is “the human being itself”, but rather “that which is done to the human being”. As such, they are defined as part of the laws of nature, which are themselves the actions and will of God. The only component defined as “the human being itself” is the free will, which is a value-based category entirely exempt from any empirical or causal metrics, the sole domain that is “except for the fear of Heaven”. Therefore, the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart in truth does not touch his free will at all, nor does it compromise his choice. Had Pharaoh let Israel go merely because he could no longer withstand the terrible pressure of the plagues, it would not have been an expression of free choice or a value-driven shift, but rather a mechanical reaction and a physiological surrender of his biological machinery to an external constraint. The hardening of Pharaoh’s heart is not a description of a modification of Pharaoh's will (for he still desired with all his heart to continue enslaving the people), but rather a calibration of his mechanical apparatus: Pharaoh's threshold of mental and physical sensitivity was redefined, granting him the stamina to withstand those colossal pressures, and as an empirical event that “happens to the human being”, it is merely a fact of nature, and as such, it is an expression of God’s Will. Conceptually, there is no difference between God weakening the intensity of the plagues from without, or altering his biological temperament from within, both are events which take place within the empirical realm, and their sole purpose is to neutralize the deterministic impact of the plagues. In doing so, Pharaoh's true domain of choice is actually preserved, enabling him to realize his autonomous, volitional decision to refuse to let the people go. I have found that this profound insight, which categorically separates physiological breaking from ethical decision-making, is precisely and explicitly formulated by the great biblical commentator Sforno, who wrote: “And there is no doubt that were it not for the hardening of the heart, Pharaoh would have undoubtedly let Israel go, but not out of repentance and submission to God, wherein he regretted being a rebel, but rather because he could no longer endure the suffering of the plagues, as his servants said, 'Do you not yet know that Egypt is destroyed?' and this would not have been repentance at all. But had Pharaoh truly desired to submit to God, and return to Him in complete repentance, nothing would have prevented him from doing so”.

I'll avoid the philosophical discussion for now, but in any event we both know that most people asking this question are not approaching from a philosophical contradiction. Regarding your claim that it was in order to make possible punishment - even the way you phrase it proves my point. As you correctly said, hardening Pharaoh's heart allowed the signs to occur (even if I were concede they were punishments, which is not necessarily obvious), but there is no reason to think that they were punishments for Pharaoh not letting out the Bnei Yisrael due to his heart being hardened by God. In other words, the hardening functions as an enabling condition for the plagues to occur, not the justifying reason for them. This avoids any philosophical issues of retribution for the hardening.

But conceptually too, assuming God can direct man’s will is an oxymoron. Causing the uncaused is a logical contradiction (a square circle). The will being uncaused is not an empirical fact of nature to which you can ascribe a temporary cause, it is a logical axiom , and trying to cause it is like trying to draw a square circle.

@Searcherseek Well, in fairness to Nietzsche, it is somewhat up to debate whether he intended to "take down Christianity". (J.M. Kennedy, for example, argues that he did not.)

This is why Nietzsche failed in taking down Christianity. He still valorized suffering, overcoming. He left the main pillar standing.

Really the entirety of עקבי הצאן, but in particular דעת אלהים. Perhaps also זרעונים (in particular למהלך האידיות). His פנקסים are a particular hard read, but give an insight into his unfiltered thought and can be very rewarding. לנבוכי הדור is good for the 'Marc Shapiro' type stuff, but not really his core philosophy.

@YonadavTapuchi I didn't know that. Which work would be Rav kook's truest vision?

דנתי עם תלמיד לאחרונה - מה המאמר הכי יסודי של הראי"ה קוק? מה הטקסט לאורו מתבארים כל יתר הכתבים והשיטה מתבררת? לדעתי זה 'דעת אלהים', הוא טען 'למהלך האידאות'. (זו בעצם חלוקה בין תאולוגיה להסטוריוסופיה...) אני מכיר שהרב ישראלי טען 'אורות התשובה'. מה דעתכם?

@YonadavTapuchi לדעתי, זה כל עקבי הצאן, אבל בפרט דעת אלהים. פינקס טו ופנקס טז הן גם אפשרויות טובות. אגב, הרצי"ה עצמו כתב על למהלך האידיות (בשנת תרע"ב, לפני פרסומם של הרבה מכתבי הרב קוק) ש"הוא שני בערכו למאמר 'קרבת אלהים'".

A God who needs to be proved is no God at all.

@NhavsMaimonides I can't tell whether you missed the point of my comment, or whether you are implicitly strawmanning me with your response. Either way, my original critique of your post stands.

@SiachEved And here I was thinking Nietzsche believed God had literally just dropped dead

Nietzsche said God is dead, and therefore no objective value exists in the world. The truth is God is not dead, and therefore no objective value exists in the world.

@Searcherseek "What explains such a disease on the most beautiful plant of antiquity, on Plato? did the evil Socrates corrupt him? was Socrates the corrupter of youth after all? and did he deserve his hemlock?" - Nietzsche

In retrospect, Socrates deserved to be killed. "Just asking questions". He was a proto Candace Owens.

The difference between Modern Orthodox and Chareidi is that one can choose to be Modern Orthodox.

באמת, אתה צודק. הרידב"ז לא ראה הגרי"א ספקטור כגדול הדור. הוא כתב עליו: "וגם על הוראת שעה הזה (של הגרי"א ספקטור) יצאו אז כל גאוני הזמן,כמו הגאון הק' רי"ל דיסקין והגאון ר' י"ד ז"ל והגאון נצי"ב ז"ל ועוד כל גאוני הזמן, אשר קטנם עבה ממתניו..." "האם באמת ידמה כן כ"ג נ"י (=הרב קוק),שהרב המתיר קשישאי (=הרי"א ספקטור) היה גדול מכ"ת נ"י בתורה וביראה? ואני לא כן בלבי". כבר האיר לזה הרב איתם הינקן הי"ד

@Marco1412851 @NoamFrimer @hador_613 בכלל הביטוי: ״גדול הדור הבלתי מעורער״ לא קיים על אף אחד, בטח לא בימי חייו.

תשמעו סיפור יפה. היתה איתי בלימודים חילוניה מתוקה שקראו לה עומר. יום אחד, באמצע השבוע, באחת ההפסקות, ישבנו על הדשא, אני לא זוכר את ההקשר, אבל עומר סיפרה לנו שאבא שלה הוא הנין של הרב יצחק אלחנן ספקטור. חגי ליפקין ישב איתנו שם וכשחגי שמע את זה נשמטה לו הלסת. אני לא מאמין, הוא אמר, את רצינית? עומר צחקה, היא לא חשבה שזה כזה ביג דיל. כן, היא אמרה, הוא היה רב גדול בליטא, נכון? רב גדול בליטא? חגי הזדקף, הוא לא היה רב גדול בליטא, הוא היה גדול הדור הבלתי מעורער של המאה התשע-עשרה. חגי לא נרגע עד שהוא קם ואמר לעומר בואי רגע. הם הלכו לספרייה של הכולל, ועומר שאלה, מה, אני יכולה להיכנס ככה? והחוותה על מה שלבשה שלא היה בדיוק תפארת הצניעות, וחגי אמר לה, כן, ברור, בואי. הם נכנסו וחגי ניגש לחלק של השו"תים והוציא את ספר באר יצחק, שאלות ותשובות על ארבעה חלקי שולחן ערוך מאת הרב יצחק אלחנן ספקטור. חגי ועומר התיישבו וקראו ביחד תשובה סבוכה מאוד של ר' יצחק אלחנן על מקרה מורכב של אישה שבעלה גויס בכפייה לצבא הרוסי ונעלם. עכשיו תראו חבר'ה. אפשר ללכת עם הסיפור הזה לכל מיני כיוונים. אפשר להגיד שהמפגש של עומר עם הטקסט המסתורי של סבא רבא-רבא שלה טלטל אותה עד עומק נשמתה והצית אצלה תהליך שבסיומו היא חזרה בתשובה. אם נרצה לקחת את זה עוד צעד קדימה נוכל לספר שלא זו בלבד שעומר חזרה בתשובה אלא שהחברותא שלה עם חגי ליפקין הולידה חברותות נוספות ואחר כך סדרת פגישות, בפארק הלאומי, בנמל יפו, ועוד, שבסופן התקדשה עומר לחגי כדת משה וישראל. מזל טוב מזל טוב. אנחנו יכולים לצעוד בנתיבים האלה. אבל אנחנו לא נעשה את זה. אנחנו לא נתדרדר לשם. לא בגלל שזה לא קרה. אולי זה קרה. אולי עומר חזרה בתשובה ואולי היא וחגי התחתנו. זה יכול להיות. אני לא אומר שלא. אבל זה לא מה שחשוב מבחינתי. מבחינתי מה שחשוב זה שיום אחד, באמצע השבוע, במשך שעה ורבע, הבת של הנין של הרב יצחק אלחנן ספקטור, גדול הדור הבלתי מעורער של המאה התשע-עשרה, חילוניה טהורה מכפר סבא, ישבה בכולל של בר-אילן ולמדה בחברותא מתוך ספר השאלות ותשובות שלו, באר יצחק. ואם היינו יודעים בעולמנו הגשמי מה מתרחש בשמי השמיים, גבוה מעל גבוה, אולי היינו רואים אז את ר' יצחק אלחנן מביט עליה ממקומו בגן-עדן ודמעה נרגשת חומקת מבין עיניו השוחקות.

@elongilad You are mistaken, the name Tel Aviv is taken directly from the Bible: יחזקאל ג:טו - ואבוא אל־הגולה תל אביב הישבים אל נהר כבר ואשב המה יושבים שם ואשב שם שבעת ימים משמים בתוכם

9/10 Tel Aviv was named in 1910 — Nahum Sokolov's Hebrew title for Theodor Herzl's 'Altneuland' (Old-New Land). Tel is an ancient mound. Aviv is the season of renewal. A city named for something old and something invented.

1/10 Tel Aviv was named after a season that didn't exist when the Bible was written. 🧵

So you accept that in the view of Chazal יסורין are sent as consequences of sin (so long as man utilises them to assume obligation), and that יסורין של אהבה are sent in order to increase a righteous persons reward in the world to come (so long as he utilises them to assume obligation)?

It falls perfectly into place once understood. The analogy to a freed slave is precise, and more penetrating than anything I could have devised. To serve God out of love, that is, for its own sake and not for reward, is precisely that freedom: a state in which man is no longer bound to confer significance upon the events of the world, even those that befall him. The only absolute is God, all else is stripped of ultimate weight. In that knowledge, one is “freed” from a reality that only pretends to be final. As for the lesser yissurim, they are presented as consequences of sin, but only if one sees them as occasions for the demand of virtue. Hence the dictum that one afflicted by yissurim should improve his conduct, because it becomes the ground upon which man assumes obligation. It’s a punishment for sin when man betters himself as a result of them, but if he doesn’t, they are merely the natural order of things.

On the Anthropocentric Distortion of “Afflictions of Love” One must make a severe and unequivocal distinction between the true religious concept appearing in the words of the Sages and the psychologistic-utilitarian distortions made by those of weak faith. The latter, out of an inability to confront the ultimate religious demand, have turned the service of God into an instrument for satisfying human needs, if not in this world, then in the World to Come. The majority of thinkers, who are immersed in a “religion of interests”, views “Afflictions of Love” (Yissurin Shel Ahavah) as a mechanism for compensation. They claim that suffering “benefits” the individual: that it atones for sins, that it exists to increase the righteous man's reward, or that it is a “test” designed to “prove” his merit. This casts God in the role of a spiritual broker trading in the currency of suffering, or a divine craftsman hired to polish the soul’s imperfections for a fee. In Tractate Berakhot (5a), where this concept is first introduced , it is explicitly stated: “One might think this applies even if he did not receive them with love? Therefore, Scripture teaches: 'If his soul shall make an offering' (Isaiah 53:10) - just as an offering must be with knowledge , so too must afflictions be with knowledge”. It is thus clear: The discussion here is not about the cause of suffering (why God brought them), but rather the status of man in relation to the suffering. The comparison to the guilt offering (Asham) is the decisive key: just as the sacrifice requires “knowledge”, meaning, an intent for the sake of serving God and not for a personal end, so too must the suffering be processed. “Afflictions of Love” are not sufferings that God sends out of love (so to speak, in sentimental human terms), rather, they are sufferings that man accepts with love. And “the love of God” in its purest faith-driven sense is not a psychological feeling of biological emotion- it is the human decision to serve God “for its own sake” (Lishmah). If man suffers, and yet persists in the service of God (“accepts them”), not because of the suffering and not despite the suffering, but because the service of God is the absolute value independent of all things, then these are “Afflictions of Love”. Here, faith is expressed as a value-based decision, not as an instrument for achieving tranquility or reward. Any attempt to find “utility” in suffering is an expression of destructive anthropocentrism that places man and his needs at the center instead of the service of God. He who says, “Suffering is good for me because it purifies me”, is not serving God; he is serving himself. “Afflictions of Love” are the ultimate test of “With all thy soul - even if He takes thy soul” , the standing of man before the God without any expectation of reciprocity, for that standing before God is the whole of man.

Can you elaborate? Do you mean to say that a by-product of accepting the יסורים של אהבה is reward, but not the reason for it? Also, would you accept that Chazal did believe that there are afflictions before the level of יסורים של אהבה which are given due to one's sins? I'm curious as to how you deal with all the statements of Chazal that don't neatly fit into what you expounded above.

@SiachEved Certainly none of those following statements contradict what I wrote, if man “accept them out of love”. But I do see Rashi belonging to the traditional interpretation which Maimonides rejected.