Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative

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Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative

Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative

@TDSI_TW

臺灣國防研究倡議 Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative

Taiwan Katılım Ekim 2025
2 Takip Edilen693 Takipçiler
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K. Tristan Tang
K. Tristan Tang@KTristanTang·
A highly consequential PLA event that some noticed, but few fully appreciated its significance—largely overshadowed by developments in the Middle East. In my latest analysis for China Brief Notes @ChinaBriefJT at The Jamestown Foundation @JamestownTweets, I examine a key development on April 8, when PLA convened the first session of the training program for all senior officers (第一期全军高级干部培训班). This event stands out for several reasons. It suggests that the current wave of purges may be reaching a critical juncture—and that Xi Jinping may now be moving to reassess the remaining senior leadership within the PLA. jamestown.org/xi-signals-rea… Executive Summary: (1) Xi Jinping’s distrust of senior military cadres was on display on April 8, as he presided over the opening ceremony of the first session of a senior officer training program—the first time he has chaired this kind of event. (2) Xi’s remarks, which emphasized political theory and regulations, suggest that he will use the training program to evaluate whether his remaining generals are suitable for promotion or whether they require further investigation. (3) Large-scale promotions remain unlikely in the near term, and those in most key positions will likely continue to operate in an acting capacity for at least the next several months, given Xi’s lack of trust in senior cadres.
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K. Tristan Tang
K. Tristan Tang@KTristanTang·
My latest analysis of the military components of China’s new Five-Year Plan has just been published in China Brief @ChinaBriefJT by The Jamestown Foundation @JamestownTweets. Many thanks to Arran Hope @Arranjnh and the China Brief team for their support and careful editing. jamestown.org/new-five-year-… Takeaway: By comparing the defense components of the 13th through 15th Five-Year Plans and factoring in recent developments in the PLA and China’s defense industry, I argue that this latest plan is not just about addressing the many unfinished reforms of the past decade—it also introduces more concrete implementation and supporting measures. Given that much of the PLA’s progress over the past ten years has been achieved despite inefficiencies and uneven reform, if this new plan is implemented more effectively, the pace of capability growth could be significantly more pronounced than before. Executive Summary: (1) The Outline of its 15th Five-Year Plan contains new development priorities for the PLA through 2030, as well as a high degree of continuity with directives from previous plans. (2) This iteration adds a section on military governance, in addition to the recurring focus on combat capability and military–civil fusion, and emphasizes military theory, military governance, and “spin-on” mechanisms for facilitating the integration of civilian technologies into the PLA. (3) The repeated appearance of policies that have existed for years highlights the limited effectiveness of past reforms. The Outline’s release has been accompanied by a number of specific regulations and implementation mechanisms to further obligate compliance with policy directives. (4) If fully implemented, the defense-related aspects of the 15th Five-Year Plan could significantly grow the PLA’s combat capability, especially in military–civil fusion and joint operations and exceed prior observed growth.
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《新聞週刊》就「史詩怒火行動」(Operation Epic Fury)採訪TDSI共同創辦人溫約瑟。 Newsweek Interviews TDSI Co-Founder @JosephWen___ on Operation Epic Fury. 1/2
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Although Changping is administratively part of Beijing, it directly borders the Zhangjiakou region, making the "general area" description plausible to the recruits while maintaining a layer of location masking. Report Link: tv.cctv.com/2026/03/19/VID… 3/3
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This discrepancy suggests a standard operational security practice within the PLA: recruits are not informed of their precise coordinates. Instead, they are only given a general vicinity. 2/3
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The first batch of spring 2026 recruits has officially arrived at the camps of the ISF Engineering Maintenance Specialist Training Battalion. In the broadcast, an interviewed recruit stated that their camp is located in Zhangjiakou, but the actual site as being in Changping. 1/3
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CCTV7 has reported on PHL-191 from Unit 31622 conducting drills on a newly constructed improvised runway at the 2nd Integrated Training Base. This report also indicates that the training base may have been renovated to include an improvised runway. 1/3
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K. Tristan Tang
K. Tristan Tang@KTristanTang·
Updates on the PLA Delegation at the 2026 Two Sessions Comparison of 2026 and Previous Press Releases on the Formation of the PLA Delegation at the Two Sessions On March 3, 2026, the PLA delegation to the 4th Session of the 14th National People’s Congress was established. The structure of this year’s press release is consistent with previous years. At 467 Chinese characters, its length is also within the typical range. Remarks by delegation head Zhang Shengmin, CMC vice chairman, suggest the PLA may place greater emphasis on defense-related objectives in the new Five-Year Plan than in previous Five-Year Plans. At the same time, political expectations for delegation members during the Two Sessions appear more explicit, including calls to demonstrate “political enthusiasm.”
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K. Tristan Tang@KTristanTang

Monthly Update on PLA Air and Maritime Maneuvers Around Taiwan In short: PLA air and maritime activity around Taiwan has declined, but this does not necessarily imply that combat readiness has been seriously weakened by the recent purges. Rather, it appears to reflect a shift in training planning toward exploring joint operational modes. Observations: (1) Overall Trend: In February 2026, detected PLA aircraft sorties and naval vessels reached their lowest levels in recent years. Total sorties and median line crossings were less than half their February 2025 levels. Monthly detected sorties totaled 190—the lowest monthly total since 2023—and median line crossings totaled 147, the lowest monthly figure since March 2024. PLA naval vessels numbered 183, marking the lowest monthly count since February 2024. (2) Special Trend: There were 11 days in February 2026 with no detected PLA aircraft sorties around Taiwan, compared to none in February 2025 and only 1 day in February 2024 and 2023. Also, only 2 days in February 2026 recorded more than 30 detected aircraft sorties, compared to 6 days in February 2025. Naval vessel counts exceeded 10 on just 1 day, versus 4 days in 2025 and 1 day in 2024. (3) Preliminary Assessment: The recent decline likely reflects training adjustments rather than a serious post-purge drop in combat readiness. Despite lower overall air activity, two peak periods involved Joint Combat Readiness Patrols, and a separate patrol was conducted during the Lunar New Year—the first such holiday patrol in recent years. PLA Navy vessels also remained active around Taiwan. Baseline readiness therefore appears intact; otherwise, activity would have been uniformly lower, with fewer patrols overall. (4) For related analyses, see: K. Tristan Tang, “The PLA’s Joint Operations Training Reform Remains in an Exploratory Phase,” China Landpower Studies Center @CLSC_USAWC, the U.S. Army War College, February 12, 2026: ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Rece… K. Tristan Tang, “Purges, Training Reform Affected Pressure on Taiwan in 2025,” China Brief @ChinaBriefJT, Jamestown Foundation @JamestownTweets, January 24, 2026: jamestown.org/purges-trainin…

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Joseph.W 約瑟
Joseph.W 約瑟@JosephWen___·
今年臺北國際書展,正副總統的書單中有三本書重複,其中一本為小子拙作《請支援搜尋!你也可以用公開資訊破解共軍行動》。 再次感謝@ChingteLai賴總統、 @bikhim蕭副總統的推薦、也感謝我在 @TDSI_TW 的三位優秀夥伴馮艾立、吳浩宇、@KTristanTang 還有許多前輩們的支持。
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Joseph.W 約瑟
Joseph.W 約瑟@JosephWen___·
歡迎一道加入青年國防研究的世界。 臺灣勵志協會 將與 臺灣國防研究倡議@TDSI_TW 共同舉辦「臺灣國防研究青年工作坊」,將結合公開情報與科普兵推進行兩天一夜工作坊。 歡迎高中二年級至大學二年級的朋友們參與,名額只有16人,我也會擔任講師。 報名連結請見下文,或掃描海報QR Code🙏
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