Institute for the Study of War

NEW: Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian air defenses. Other Key Takeaways ⬇️ - Russia’s additional revenues from rising oil prices are likely insufficient to fundamentally change the course of Russia’s growing economic issues. - Senior Russian bankers continue to express worries over economic issues that will continue to mature throughout the 2026 fiscal year, despite increased Russian oil revenues. - Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Orikhiv. - Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 268 long-range drones against Ukraine overnight.

NEW: Iran’s counterproposal to the United States reportedly includes a three-phase plan that seeks to quickly end the war, guarantee no future combined force strikes on Iran, and address the Strait of Hormuz in the first phase, while delaying talks on Iran’s nuclear program to a second phase. Full update⬇️ Iran appears to be offering the possibility of discussing nuclear issues at a later date in order to push the United States to end the war and lift its naval blockade. The United States has reportedly responded to Iran’s counterproposal, according to Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei.

NEW: Russian forces in April 2026 suffered a net loss of territory controlled in the Ukrainian theater for the first time since Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast. Other Key Takeaways: The relative decline in the rate of Russian advances may be related in part to annual seasonal patterns. The rate of Russian advances has slowed in 2026 compared to 2025, but the changing character of the war, particularly Russia’s increased use of infiltration tactics over the course of 2025, makes year-on-year comparisons difficult. The Kremlin uses Russian infiltration tactics in part to exaggerate Russian control of terrain. ISW has reviewed and refined its mapping data and methodology, identifying and rectifying some data artifacts that did not affect the visible map geometry but did affect some calculations of area. These changes have not affected ISW’s previously assessed trendlines of the Russian rate of advance. Russian milbloggers identified problems with the Russian air campaign and assessed that Russian forces may not be able to take advantage of reported increased bombing capabilities. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian air defense system during their April 30 to May 1 overnight strike against Krasnodar Krai. Russian forces launched 163 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

NEW: Iran does not appear to have altered its negotiating position over the management of the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program in its latest proposal. Some elements of the Iranian regime may calculate that Iran can impose sufficient economic and political costs on the United States to coerce the United States to make concessions. Other Key Takeaways: Iran is taking steps to try to withstand the US naval blockade. Iran has reportedly begun reducing its oil production as its storage capacity reaches its limits. Iran is likely reducing oil production rather than halting it because shutting down oil production could cause significant damage to Iranian oil fields. Hezbollah may be domestically producing first-person view (FPV) drones. Hezbollah posted footage on May 2 showing Hezbollah fighters domestically producing drones, but it is unclear if the drones in the video are FPV drones. Hezbollah’s video comes after an Israeli military official told the Associated Press on April 30 that Israel believes that Hezbollah is domestically manufacturing FPV drones.