Alexander Titov

Some thoughts on Putin's motives behind the invasion of Ukraine. There's a well-established pattern here. It looks irrational only if you value economy and well-being over great power nationalism and security. The Kremlin has different priorities. theconversation.com/ukraine-putin-…

My interview with TRT World about how futile are the hopes that Ukrainian deep strikes against Russia will quicken the war's end. Quite the reverse, this will escalate Russia's response. youtu.be/Q8sudE9gX98?is…

My piece published in the Independent today. #comments-area" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">independent.co.uk/travel/europe/…

Some thoughts on the current stay of play in the Russo-Ukrainian war. As always, read behind the headline: Ukraine war is not going well for Russia – how dangerous is this for Vladimir Putin? theconversation.com/ukraine-war-is…

My interview on the latest in Russo-Ukrainian war: when both sides claim they're winning, there's little chance for compromise. youtu.be/TPaTZC8_47I?si…

My interview about the G7 summit and Russia. The question was why the Europeans weren't at the negotiating table. The reason is simple - they don't really want to negotiate but want the Kremlin to accept their and Ukraine's demands. The rest is just noise. youtu.be/cGYoY-kPk5g?is…

La mia intervista sul Fatto Quotidiano

I'm in Beijing for a couple of weeks now which overlapped with both Trump's and Putin’s visits here. Some thoughts on the Sino-Russian relations and what multipolar world actually means in practice. youtu.be/oANKouqsk0U?si…

Takes like this betray a complete misunderstaning of Russia's foreign policy priorities. The only country Moscow would fight to save is Belarus - an absolutely essential, strategic ally. Distant second is Kazakhstan but this would depend on circumstances - their relations are important but not as close. Even the rest of ex-Soviet republics are not its top priorities. To talk of 'losing' Venezuala or Cuba as a humiliation for Russia is totally misguided - they are a nice accidental partners, but hardly essential. Iran is more important as a strategically independent anti-Western power, but only if it is capable of remaining a great power itself. Moscow knows it cannot keep Iran a great power through aid alone, but can only provide marginal support. As Trump Out-Putins Putin, Russia’s Global Influence Erodes nytimes.com/2026/03/06/wor…

Just published my take on the fourth anniversary of the war in Ukraine: after four years of war, exhaustion on both sides is the main hope for peace theconversation.com/ukraine-after-… via @ConversationUK

Some more thoughts on the war anniversary, this time in a TV interview format youtu.be/x76BQq3BjR8?si… via @YouTube

Some thoughts on negotiators from Russia, Ukraine, US begin talks in UAE youtu.be/SDbD8wjbXMc?si… Bottom line, I'm very sceptical that any real breakthrough is possible, because neither Russia nor Ukraine is in a bad enough position to accept a deal they don't like.

Happy birthday everyone! We’re 180 today. In 1845, Queen’s College Belfast was founded by Queen Victoria, alongside our sister colleges in Cork and Galway. By 1849, we had 3 administration staff, 20 professors and 195 students. In 1908, Queen's College Belfast became Queen's University Belfast and we’ve come a long way since then. Now we have over 4,500 staff and over 26,000 students from more than 120 countries. Plus, we’re the 2nd oldest university in Ireland and the 9th oldest university in the UK. So, thank you to all our students, staff, alumni and friends of Queen’s who have made this the special place we all know and love today. Here’s to the next 180 years! Check out even more fascinating and historic moments in our timeline: ow.ly/T0ss50XLkKj #LoveQUB | #LoveQUB180 | #NorthernIreland | #Ireland | #Belfast | #Galway | #Cork

Quick update on the peace negotiations with Ukraine, which are apparently '90% ready'. youtu.be/r5oIFJ03J0U?si… Even without the question of territories, I very much doubt that key issues have actually been resolved. The devil is always in the detail, and, for example, the Europeans, Ukrainians and Russians have profoundly different ideas about what they have 'agreed to' with the Americans on things like security guarantees. Ukraine wants the US and its allies to go to war with Russia if it attacks again; Moscow, however, is adamant that Ukraine stays neutral, with no foreign troops or weapons being supplied to Ukraine. Regarding money, the EU is in a difficult position regardless of what it does with the frozen Russian funds. If it spends Russian money now, it will still have to spend hundreds of billions of euros on rebuilding and maintaining Ukraine after the war. And if it doesn't want to spend its own money during the war, it may find it more difficult to justify doing so afterwards, especially if Eurosceptic parties gain power in France and elsewhere.

A few thoughts on Trump's Ukraine-Russia deal. youtu.be/kU6KN6DdkT8?si… Ultimately, battlefield realities will be decisive in determining which 'national security interests' are prioritised in any settlement. It's very hard to negotiate successfully when there's deep discord in Kyiv due to corruption and the frontline is crumbling, and when your biggest backer, the US, is no longer willing to support you. The only hope for Ukraine is that the Russian economy suddenly collapses - a very long shot indeed. Dum gramen crescit, equus in moriendo quiescit: While the grass grows, the horse starves.

My brief interview about the latest peace proposals from the US for Ukraine. youtu.be/4FnxTGexLZ0?si… Although it comes at the most difficult moment for Ukraine — the front is collapsing in places, Zelensky has been severely weakened by the corruption scandal, and Europe has no money to support Kyiv in the long term — it is not desperate enough to agree to a plan it does not really like. Europe still supports Zelensky, and the Ukrainian army can retreat much further if necessary. Plus, the hope that sanctions will finally break the Russian economy keeps alive the hope of a better deal later on. This is extremely unlikely, but that's the strategy of Ukraine and the EU — slowly retreating and hoping for a Russian economic collapse. I imagine they will try to delay the US plan by making changes that Moscow will find unacceptable, which would take everyone back to square one. This would probably work; otherwise, the US would be forced to suspend military aid to Ukraine and accept responsibility for its defeat. In any case, if a deal on these points were to be formally agreed — which would be highly favourable to Russia — there would be plenty of opportunities to derail it during the implementation phase. Therefore, the base scenario is for the war to continue until Moscow takes over the rest of Donbass and some other territories, which would take at least six months to a year.

I gave a quick update on the latest state of play in the war in an interview the other day. youtu.be/3mdOQXumo6Y?si… Trump has adopted the US's default policy on Russia: sanctions and threats to force Moscow to end the war on Western terms. This policy is limited by the potential impact on the oil market: if Russia is forced to sell significantly less oil, the price will rise accordingly. However, now is a very good time for that, given the current supply glut and low oil prices. It is also limited by how much the US is willing to jeopardise its relations with other powers, such as China and India, for the sake of Ukraine. For example, the US could stop all trade with China by imposing tariffs on its purchase of Russian oil, but would that really be worth it? Trump tried to use this as an excuse with India to pressure it into agreeing to a trade deal that India does not want, but so far, to no avail. However, the biggest change Trump made was to stop US funding for Ukraine, and this policy is still in place. This puts enormous pressure on the Europeans, who are unable to replace the lost US funding with their own money without facing significant political issues at home. The British case is indicative of this problem: despite being the loudest supporter of Ukraine, the UK has not given Kyiv more than the £3.5 billion it had previously earmarked per year. This is not surprising, given that the increasingly unpopular Labour government is looking to fill a £20 billion hole in next month's budget with tax increases and welfare cuts. France cannot pass any budget at all, and I doubt Italy's coalition would survive if Meloni agreed to spend Italian money on buying weapons for Ukraine, as this would lead to the League quitting the government (and spending Italian money on weapons for Ukraine is incredibly unpopular in Italy). The Germans have already committed more than anyone else to Ukraine and cannot be the sole source of funding for Kyiv. Smaller countries such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands have already given an additional $2 billion to the PURL programme, which was set up to purchase US weapons using European funds. This leaves the frozen Russian funds held in Belgium, which should provide enough funding for Ukraine for 18 months to two years. However, this option also carries costs in terms of the euro's international credibility and ultimate liability to Russia's legal claims. As there don't seem to be any alternatives, this will happen at some point. However, this would only allow Ukraine to continue for a couple more years, and it's unclear what would happen after that. This essentially sets a deadline for Ukraine and the West to achieve a breakthrough in the war or to settle it on Moscow's terms. Incidentally, this also raises the question of where the money for Ukraine will come from when the war is over. Previously, the frozen Russian funds were earmarked for Ukraine's reconstruction; now they'll be spent on the war, Europeans will also have to fund Ukraine's post-war economy and reconstruction. As far as Moscow is concerned, it can respond to US pressure in two ways: adapting to sanctions and increasing military and economic pressure on Ukraine. Its greatest leverage remains on the battlefield, and even though progress has been slow, Russia has a plausible path to achieving its minimal war aim of seizing the rest of Donbass. The best Ukraine and the West can hope for is to freeze the conflict along the current lines of control. With several deadlines looming, it does look like the war is in its final stretch. Will Russia be able to defeat Ukraine militarily, or at least take over the rest of Donbass, before the sanctions have an unsustainable impact on its economy? Can Ukraine maintain the front line before it runs out of money, manpower and Western support? Either way, there's at least another year of this war left, if not more.