Harry Halem

@ka_grieco It doesn't suggest anything. One can use JASSM for targets without any air defense considerations. B-52s are missile trucks in any event. If you were right we'd have seen an air campaign akin to Rising Lion.

@WarIntellectual According to Caine, US only began using B-52s overland about a month into the war. That suggests it took time to degrade Iranian air defenses, and we don’t know the mix of JDAMs vs JASSMs over course of war.

A few observations on Caine's briefing today. The numbers are striking. The questions they raise are more interesting. A 🧵.

@ka_grieco We were dropping JDAMs under 48 hours into this war. JASSM use is a specific targeteering question, not a strategic or operational indicator in this campaign.

3/ The fact that B-52s were still using JASSMs overland tells you something. JASSM is a standoff weapon. You use it when you don't want to fly into defended airspace. Where is that airspace?

@JulianWaller Interesting piece. Found the tangible evidence for IRI Shahed tech iteration and raid complexity a bit thin though - which reinforces the overall point!

Lots of great, concrete detail here on what exactly Russia can and may be providing btw, in terms of ISR and TTPs too.

👇🏻

Highly recommend this @WarIntellectual for @RiddleRussia on the evolution of war in Ukraine and how both parties are adapting to it ridl.io/can-the-russia…

All wars must end. But they can escalate before they end. RU still has opportunities to push Europe, which is weakest link in UA-Europe-US chain, especially with its objectives still expansive and talks largely incoherent./25

US refusal to designate a contact point for talks, and acceptance of multi-track, allows RU to manipulate pace and UA to wriggle out from constraints. Unlikely this changes before 2H2025, making a deal harder./24

This NYT piece on US Ukraine-Russia policy in 2025 provides a useful opportunity to take stock. Its blind spots help us think about trajectories in 2026. The US made two mistakes, overestimating Russian openness and Ukrainian capacity./1 nytimes.com/interactive/20…