Ryan Chan

Why is Xi Jinping purging so many people? The standard explanation is simple: power. He is crushing rivals to stay in office. That's not wrong but it's incomplete. Xi is trying to help the CCP rule forever. Delighted to debut in @ForeignAffairs (w/@shuizaiping2) 1/ Short 🧵

As Xi Jinping’s right-hand man, Cai Qi has access to many of the Communist Party’s secrets. That makes him a person of substantial interest to American officials and to many other foreign governments economist.com/china/2026/04/…

近日，自称曾在县级做过宣传部长的网友，发文讲述：基层宣传工作的重心，其实是控制信息传播和规避舆情风险，而不是单纯做正面宣传。 宣传工作的核心是“舆情灭火”真正紧张的不是事故本身，而是网上有没有传播。有句话概括逻辑：“事不大，网上大，就是大事；事很大，网上没动静，可以先稳住” 县级融媒体都是自己人，但是碰到省级的正规媒体一般会陪同、安排采访路线、提前沟通受访对象待会遇到记者该怎么说。最怕碰到对自媒体发的负面视频火了，这时候能联系就“沟通删帖”最好，不行就向平台举报，再不行就用评论区“带节奏”稀释舆论。 平时大量时间用于写总结、补记录、做迎检材料，有些活动虽然做了，但是忘记拍照了，那就架好机位重新摆拍，或者从类似的活动照片里找几张，换个标题。 每年最头疼的东西是年年底的个“意识形态工作责任制考核”如果本县在意识形态领域出了事——比如有教师在课堂上说了不当言论、有宗教场所违规聚会、有自媒体发了敏感内容且被上级点名——我要写检查，书记要被约谈。 他还说，县里大搞融媒体改革只是“形式大于效果”牌子挂了，人整合了，平台也建了。但本地压根没人看，他们只看野生自媒体号，比如交通事故、邻里纠纷、饭店倒闭，粉丝量是我们官方号的十倍。阅读量上不去，我们只能标题党，刷流量。 他表示：这个岗位，外人看着体面，实际上是个"高危岗位"。你管的事情边界模糊，出了事又责任明确。你每天面对的最大敌人不是具体的某个人、某件事，而是不确定性——你不知道哪里会突然冒出一条视频、一篇帖子、一个举报，让你连夜进办公室。

Good Damien Ma piece on Xi Jinping's efforts to shift the Chinese economy from extensive growth (generate growth by increasing labor, capital and resource inputs) to intensive growth (generate growth by using labor, capital and resource inputs more efficiently). For those familiar with the history of such transformations, this will prove much harder than expected, or as Ma puts it: "Now comes the really hard part: execution." @damienics carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/…

前贴说王沪宁“提出”三个代表思想，在中南海内外赢得满堂彩，简直是从粪坑里掏出了金子。“三个代表”究竟是个什么东东，为何江泽民将之视为自己唯一的思想标签写进党章，对此如此重视，其中颇有玄机，值得讲一段古。 正如美国的中国学新秀杜如松Rush Doshi在《长期博弈》中敏锐观察到的，面对邓的韬光养晦遗训，中国三代领导人经历了“有所作为”到“积极有为”再到“奋发有为”三阶段。 江好名，更好千秋万世之名，收拾掉陈希同团伙、用金钱赎买李鹏团伙后，确想“有所作为”。 他的恩师汪道涵先生（就是王沪宁日记中反复提到的W公）说：“小智善于治事，大智善于用人，睿智善于立法。”江深信其人其言。 “六四”一日屠城，后遗症却多年不去。中共危机重重。 首先要面对的是西方国家经济制裁。但超乎意料的是，台资、日资却在鱼贯而入（这一点至今还少有台湾人、日本人进行反思，全世界以为是美国民主党喂养了中共这条恶龙，殊不知台商日商关键时刻的救命之恩）。 更为重要的是“六四”的血腥带来了中共的合法性危机，一个政权靠血腥的镇压来维持，如何也不能自圆其说。 那江氏如何“有所作为”呢？ 正如王沪宁与下面的这位先生透漏的：“（有些事）不提为妙，放一放吧。搁置的时间越长，支付的成本越低。”（这似乎不合乎常识啊？） 这位先生就是徐曾滇庆。他1984年进入匹兹堡大学攻读经济学博士，偶然在《资本论》英文版第三卷中发现了“三个代表”。 他在其自传中非常有趣的回顾了这个过程。简述如下： 他选修了《资本论》，因其英文有限，拿着中英两部书对照着看，发现两部书有一些差别，英文版的某些段落在中文版上不见了，其中就有“代表先进生产力，代表先进文化，代表最广大的人民”。 徐作为文革过来人，对无产阶级专政理论的危害感触颇深。马克思提出三个代表，没有提及无产阶级，取得政权之后，如果再提阶级斗争不就是在挖自己的墙角，跟自己过不去吗？他对此作了较深入的研究，并写了论文通过了这门课的考试，成绩是A-。 以下照抄徐的回忆，其中信息量不小： “1988年，我第一次回国，在拜见薛暮桥的时候，我提起英文版和中文版的《资本论》不同。他对此很有兴趣，详细地询问了事情的来龙去脉。后来，他向陈云谈起此事，陈云只回答了三个字：“我知道。”再也没有下文了。 1995年8月，和刘吉提及此事，刘吉非常敏感，商量好……事后他向江泽民汇报。 在我临上飞机返回加拿大的时候，接到刘吉的电话，问“三个代表”在《资本论》第三卷的哪一页？因为是科班学的，记忆深刻，我大致上还能记得住，回答之后就登机了。 第二年4月，我回到北京后给刘吉挂了个电话。刘吉听说是我立刻说：“教授，向你致敬！” 隔了半个月，刘吉派车把我接了去。刘吉说：“总书记派王沪宁和我去北欧考察，和社会民主党恢复了关系。当初我们批判赫鲁晓夫全民党和阶级斗争熄灭论，现在看来，批错了。瑞典、丹麦等国社会民主党执政，社会稳定、经济发达、贫富差距很小，他们更贴近真正的社会主义。” 王沪宁说：“我们应当回归马克思，代表大多数人，代表先进文化，代表先进生产力。不应当把民众划分为资产阶级和无产阶级，更不应该搞无产阶级专政。” 他们说，按照无产阶级专政理论，将不断产生新的资产阶级。毛主席说过，每七、八年要再搞一次文化大革命。从1976年文革结束算起，到1995年，快20年了，早就超过了毛主席说的时间跨度。我们遇到一个重大的理论挑战，要不要再来一次文化大革命？ 刘吉解释说：“无产阶级和资产阶级是一枚硬币的两个面。如果说我们代表无产阶级，共产党是无产阶级先锋队，那么，就一定要找出资产阶级来。在取得政权以后，毫无疑问，资产阶级就在党内。势必要清理阶级队伍，把大大小小的干部都揪出来，戴高帽子，游街批斗。文化大革命就是这样来的。在文革中大字报、大批判，造谣污蔑，栽赃陷害，把国家搞得乌烟瘴气，一塌糊涂。搬起石头砸自己的脚。如果不在理论上解决这个问题，难道我们还要天下大乱，再折腾一回吗？” 刘吉说：“提出三个代表，具有划时代的伟大意义。既然我们不再坚持无产阶级专政，当然就不能说是无产阶级先锋队。改变党的性质是顺理成章的事情。” 王沪宁说：“我完全赞成，但是，许多老同志还健在，恐怕他们转不过这个弯来。提出三个代表就翻开了历史的新篇章。从此以后，我们不在群众中划分阶级，既没有资产阶级，也没有无产阶级，当然，更没有阶级斗争。至于说共产党是不是无产阶级先锋队，不提为妙，放一放吧。搁置的时间越长，支付的成本越低。 刘吉说：“总书记高度评价了你的贡献。在我党转型探索中，你参与了其中很重要的一环。这个弯转得很大，只能转好，不能转坏。只能慢慢转，不能转得太急，弄不好会翻车。因此，请你在这个问题上对外讲话要有分寸，尽量少讲一些。如果你有什么新的观点，可以交给我。我会立即送给总书记和常委会。” 这就是“三个代表”的来龙去脉。真正的掏粪工是徐滇庆。老茶没有去查《资本论》原文，读了徐的自传，我相信他是个体面人，不会像滚刀骡子那样满嘴跑火车

【最新消息】伊朗官方电视台确认该国最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊已经身亡。

「在國外，信息渠道是多元和開放的，大家始終有自主選擇和學習的機會。但在國內，文科一旦消失，就真的從各個層面都消失了。」 文字既是溝通的橋樑，亦是思想的武器。它能鐫刻歷史，也能淪為口號。然而，當前中國文科學術的生存空間正劇烈崩塌：人文社科經費一再被壓縮，文章成為搶學術資源而進行的無病呻吟。當研究不再追求真理，遑論對文明有所貢獻。 若文字真的無用，權力何必大費周章地審查、閹割與控制？若文字真的有用，為何大眾卻深陷文科無用的集體迷思？ 點擊連結，閱讀全文，探索中國文科教育如何一步步走入困境：buff.ly/GDtttaf

非常中肯。至少截止目前，確實沒有任何跡象顯示李強會接班🤔

Did Peng Zhen Rebel Against Mao? A startling Chinese-language biography of Mao’s one-time enforcer reveals the folly of hoping that Party officials will break ranks — and the importance of revisionist histories. Read Joseph Torigian's review-essay on Yen-Lin Chung 鍾延麟's new Chinese-language research: chinabooksreview.com/2026/02/19/pen…

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「什麼學術理想，放現在都是笑話。」 ㅤ 中國的商業規模與大國認同，看似步入前所未有的蓬勃發展，處處激盪著「強國崛起」的盛世共鳴。 然而，中國文科學術的生存空間卻在劇烈崩塌。 ㅤ 從2019年至2022年，中國教育部審批裁撤的文科專業高達1422個，復旦更將文科招生比例下調至20%。在這樣的環境下，文科教育逐漸淪為政治工具：課堂上老師只能朗讀PPT以自保，學生則選擇考公務員求個穩定生活。 ㅤ 當「學術自由不能凌駕於國家安全之上」成為官方的絕對口徑，大量學者為迎合政治而炮製空洞理論，真正的研究與批判精神逐漸消失。 ㅤ 更有人直言，中國的社會學、歷史學、哲學等專業只是「生產垃圾」，撤掉也不可惜。 ㅤ 在以賺錢為導向的商業時代，人文理想在當下中國還有存在的必要嗎？當學術淪為工具，文科教育是否只剩下「灌輸」而非「交流」？在全面監視的狀態下，文科精神是否還能找到一條突圍的出路？ ㅤ 點擊連結，深入了解中國文科教育的困境與未來： buff.ly/EDtrAdW

Elite politics in the country, never renowned for their clarity, have grown more opaque under Xi Jinping. To decode China’s governance, analysts are dusting off old tools: econ.st/4kizFem Illustration: Cornelia Li

China’s opacity brings Pekingology back into vogue Enjoyed talking with @S_Rabinovitch for his Chaguan column in this week's @TheEconomist “A photograph may be an early signal that something is up and further study is required.” So concluded Roderick MacFarquhar, a late scholar of Maoist China, in an article in 1971 about how to decode Chinese politics. It was the height of the Cold War and of Pekingology, involving scrutiny of wording and images. Half a century later, MacFarquhar’s ideas again have purchase. Elite politics, never renowned for their clarity, have grown more opaque under Xi Jinping, so analysts are dusting off old tools. Last month’s purge of Generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli exemplified this back-to-the-future trend. The first strong indication of trouble came when they were absent from a television report about a recent Communist Party meeting. That was four days before the defence ministry announced that they were under investigation. Some analysts believe there had been an even earlier visual clue of the coming trouble: General Zhang had turned his back to Mr Xi at the end of a speech nearly a year ago, perhaps hinting at a falling-out between the two. ... That scholars are back to gleaning information from such limited evidence shows how much more guarded the party has become. From the late 1970s on, as China opened up, analysts, business executives and diplomats gained better access to power brokers. They could also triangulate between factions. The Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of power, ranged between five and nine members. Outsiders could hope to connect with a few of them or their subordinates, cobbling together a rough model of policy and personnel. One consequence of Mr Xi’s squashing of collective leadership is that only one person now matters, and he is not spilling the beans. Hence the return to Pekingology. But does it work? Such analysis has many pitfalls. A flaw is that with so few visible dots, there is a strong temptation to connect them all, even when connections may be spurious. ... @guoguang_wu , who worked briefly in government and then as a state journalist in the 1980s, speaks of his own experience in getting things wrong. Now a professor at Stanford, he recalls his political boss receiving a piece of calligraphy from Chen Yun, a powerful leader at the time. Mr Wu assumed that his boss was on excellent terms with Chen. Many years later he learned how mistaken he had been. Mr Wu sees it as a cautionary tale about the danger of “over-interpretation” from superficial information. Still, it is dangerous to go to the other extreme and conclude that nothing is knowable. Mr Wu talks of the importance of focusing on slight changes in wording. The charge sheet against Generals Zhang and Liu mentioned violations of law, not—as in an earlier military purge—mere disciplinary offences. That, to Mr Wu, suggests that Mr Xi perceives the wrongdoing of those most recently purged as much more serious. Neil Thomas of the @AsiaSociety , a think-tank, concurs about the importance of scrutinising language. “It’s all we’ve got to make judgments about activities and intentions, but it has to be handled with great care and intellectual humility,” he says. He thinks analysts can discern Mr Xi’s policy priorities but struggle to judge how or why decisions are made. It is worth revisiting MacFarquar’s essay of 1971. He did not see the analysis of photographs as the sole path to truth, but as “one, rather blunt, instrument to be used along with many others in the dissection of Chinese politics”. Photos, he conceded, often raise more questions than answers. That is a useful framework to keep in mind as Pekingology comes back into vogue among China analysts. Done well, it does not provide definitive answers. But it can help in formulating good questions.

The Chinese leader’s decision to hollow out the team that would advise him if a military crisis occurs is a grave risk—and a worry for Taiwan econ.st/49LYD26

传统的商业认知中，企业通过提供产品获利；但在中国的制度环境下，企业却常被赋予或主动成为一种非市场的角色——政治棋子。 这次季风邀请到乔治城大学麦考特公共政策学院助理教授，冷宁（Ning Leng）@leng_ning ，她的主要研究方向为威权体制下的政商关系、公共服务提供及环境政策。 在她的新书Politicizing Business: How Firms Are Made to Serve the Party-State in China中，冷宁深度访谈了数百位官员与企业家，发现中国政府从未给予企业真正的自主权。相反，企业正被地方政府“征兵”，被迫卷入一场名为“政治服务”的博弈。这种服务不仅是为了经济增长，更是为了完成两项核心政治目标：一是通过劳民伤财的“政绩工程”为官员晋升铺路，二是在社会矛盾爆发时扮演平息民怨的“替罪羊”。 本期节目，季风@HeLiuLeo 和冷宁聊聊： 为什么中国政府始终将企业视为“政治工具”而非市场主体？ 政绩工程通常什么时候会出现？ 为什么冷宁认为中国官员是相当焦虑的一群人？ 当这些带着“政治任务”的中国企业出海拉美，面对当地的民主与法治环境，“搞定官员”的旧模式是否还行得通？ Youtube：youtu.be/5CtOxEK7KXc #季风播客 #政商关系

If you want to understand the context for the Zhang/Liu purges, I recommend starting here.

《中国民主季刊》2026年第一季正式发布。本季汇集众多精彩文章，聚焦重大民主转型问题。许成钢/王天成｜中国与民主资本主义体系：第四次产业革命中的制度竞争；亚当·金/李聿脩｜变化如何可能？中国的公民社会与政治机遇；陈健民/ 胡平/吕频/张艾枚/陈奎德/吴强：知识分子与反抗的共同体等。欢迎免费下载，下载《中国民主季刊》2026年第一季完整版 chinademocrats.org/?p=6153

@PRC_Research @TStranske However, the PRC authorities established precise borders with Russia during the 1990s and 2000s. That said, I believe the notion of "reclaiming the Outer Xing'an Range" is merely a form of populist sentiment among the populace.🤔

@TStranske ...is already experiencing net population outflows; few Chinese would be willing to move to an even colder Far East. In short, conquering the Far East might be entirely feasible militarily, but governing it would be a disaster.

Stalin worried about this as well, which is why he massacred and deported the Chinese and Koreans in the Far East. Today the region is almost as “white” as Moscow, and even if China or other East Asian countries were able to conquer it, they would be unable to hold it for long.

“If the jealousies and insecurities that come with succession politics are dangerous, then it is no surprise that Xi has not picked a successor,” writes @JosephTorigian. foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-jinpi…

@jajia Rilke的詩，孤獨感太強了🥹

小確幸。 誰此時孤獨，就永遠孤獨， 就醒來，讀書，寫長長的信， 在林蔭道上不停地 徘徊，落葉紛飛。