Oleksandr

@DarRamesnis "EU bottle cap judges you... UNWORTHY!"

From now on, EU bottle caps will measure people's IQ.

@0x_RRP @geogvma cultural victory in 2-3 turns

@geogvma >peremoga >zrada oh well, at least they've stopped masturbating to apparatchik and maskirovka for a while

Громадо, цього тижня маємо потребу у 252021 гривню! Це дрони, екофлоу і планшети! Завдяки ВАМ маємо вже 51%! Лишилось зібрати 123817 гривень Банка: send.monobank.ua/jar/BQjWbpver Решта реквізитів: bit.ly/weekly-ukraine… Дякуємо! ❤️🇺🇦

@DruzheKarlik все ще дивуюсь, що вони досі не додумались робити просто ші-генеровані бінарі по промптам. Слабенькі якісь

це ж короче слабоумні вважають цього додіка інтелектуалом гггг

@masinto мене лякає термін "мініпомешкання", враховуючи, що навіть квартири по 15 кв.м так не називали наче ще. Аж згадався той ютуб канал з японськими квартиро-кімнатами по 7 квадратів

Russia steals the childhood of Ukrainian kids

@wku3r 🎮?

@wa_ca_bi інструкція по пошуку: x.com/spacesexdragon…

@wa_ca_bi можна ще звернутись адресно: x.com/LyrYevhen/stat…

У мене мінімум довіри до такого процесу збору фідбеку, виглядає як шось чисто для галочки, щоб потім казати «ну нам ніхто нічо конструктивного не написав, одні емоції» 😐 Але все ж накатала сюди листа, і всім раджу витратити трохи часу та написати таки

@LyrYevhen і саме так я сьогодні дізнався, що за моїм округом обрали Юзіка 🫠 як же гарно, що не можна було голосувати по своєму округу при зміні місця голосування. Звісно ж:

Дружнє нагадування: ви маєте повне право вимагати у депутата, якого обрали від вашого округу, пояснень за його голосування за законопроєкти Список отут: w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09…

@z__balo ого, гетманцев був проти ПОДАТКІВ

От ви всі такі ага, значить ми не будем заводити стосунки, виходити заміж і народжувати дітей! А тим часом була і така хуйня, яку можна ще спробувати напхати в наступну редакцію

@0x_RRP оце так покемон виліз. Народилась десь у нас, емігрувала, захищала дурачків з вікілікс, 6-січневих і, звичайно ж, педофілів. Послужний список кейсів просто відбірний en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marina_Me…

пам'ятаєте, у нас були такі експерти, які визначають, чи онліфанс порушує суспільну мораль, і отримують за те зарплату ну от з доброзвичайністю буде те саме, але в ролі онліфансу всі 🧚🏼‍♀️

@wku3r пані, це якийсь self-victimblaming. Як на мене - це не ви винні в тому, що вони користуються вашою доброзичливістю. В ідеальному світі, це звісно вирішується ескалацією або зміною роботи. Але щось цей світ знову кудись не туди звернув, що ми настільки тримаємось за ті роботи

@masinto "привести у відповідність сучасним нормам", дуже да

@paniksz просто трошки прикро, що треба робити роботу за них, але схоже що все ж прийдеться

@paniksz "ми тут налили води на цілий том кодексу. Громадо, будь ласка пишіть ПРЕДМЕТНІ скарги" щось мені підказує, що якщо в то все вчитуватись, щоб саме предметно по поличкам все розкладати - то це вже буде більший об'єм роботи, ніж робила більшість депутатів, коли за це все голосувала

Шановні, є можливість напряму, цитую, «зіпсувати відносити зі спікером» і «влізти в радівські внутряки зі своїми комсомольськими думками»

@0x_RRP @DanLinnaeus "realpolitik" 🚮

@DanLinnaeus fucking hell. tl;dr?

Maybe Israel shouldn’t buy Russian grain harvested on occupied Ukrainian territory. But note two things carefully here: the diplomatic timing, and more importantly, the legal context. Might there be anything to the notion that Zelensky’s ire with Israel is a realpolitik extension of his defense cooperation with GCC countries? You know, when in Rome… Let’s look at the integrated issue. When Zelensky is asking Israel to reject Russian grain shipments on the basis that it comes from occupied Ukrainian territory, he is placing Israel in a clear double bind. First, the less compelling but still real piece of the puzzle: Zelensky is pressuring Israel to take actions against Russia, when Israel’s pragmatism is a longstanding necessity despite considerable frictions. The Jerusalem-Moscow channel, diminished as it is since the fall of Assad on Syrian airspace deconfliction and related Golan issues, still carries weight on Iran-related issues, the status of Russian Jewry, and UN votes touching Israel. Ukraine, having watched every third country invoke some version of “but we need Moscow” to justify sanctions evasion, is understandably uninterested in granting Israel a bespoke exemption. That is coherent on Kyiv’s part but it is also a real input into Jerusalem’s calculation. Israel has loudly protested Russian aggression in Ukraine at the UN and other forums, despite a reluctant vote that it was compelled to cast on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion alongside Washington in the first months of Trump’s presidency. The year before, on the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion, Israel’s ambassador to the UN Gilad Erdan delivered a scathing defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and condemnation of UN gridlock: “Mr. President, for the past two years, Israel has stood alongside the people of Ukraine in solidarity, both on the ground and here in the United Nations. This is the moral thing to do, especially as a country that knows exactly how it feels to be aggressively invaded, to have our towns and cities attacked, and for our civilians to be the targets of indiscriminate missile fire. The State of Israel has always, and will continue to, remain committed to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Still, a year later, amid diplomatic maneuvering of the new Trump administration, Israel was compelled to align with Washington against the standing resolution condemning Russia’s aggression. This was a casualty of major power sharp elbowing and jockeying for position over the Russo-Ukraine war, one that Israel did not relish. An Israeli official told Jewish Insider there was “a lot of pressure from the U.S., they really insisted… It came at all levels, at the U.N., in Washington and in Israel,” and said the resolution “is not our position.” These are typically understood as second order frictions born of the UN’s structural vote trading dynamics, rather than of genuine Israel-Ukraine misalignments. But they bore a real cost on relations. Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel Yevgen Kornichuk said: “It would be like if Ukraine would vote against returning the hostages to Israel… This is really harming our relations,” and rejected the US-pressure justification by noting Jordan and Egypt managed to support both resolutions. On the fourth anniversary in February 2026, Israel voted in favor of a resolution supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while the US abstained. Foreign Minister Sa’ar announced Israel would send 117 power generators to Ukraine, with Ukraine recently abstaining from a UN ICJ vote against Israel and designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization. Ukraine for its own part has voted alongside the EU against Israeli interests more routinely. UN Watch noted that Ukraine has not voted with Israel once in the last decade on UN resolutions targeting the Jewish state, and voted against Israel 75% of the time, abstaining the rest. Kornichuk’s own justification has mirrored Israel’s 2025 reasoning almost exactly: “we have to vote like Europeans because we intend to be part of the EU.” That said, with Ukraine’s entry into the GCC defense ecosystem in the wake of Iranian aggression, they now appear to be extending the same logic -- effectively placing Israel in a diplomatic vice. If Israel were to formally block the Russian grain on the grounds that goods originating from occupied territory cannot enter international commerce, it would be articulating a principle that the EU, ICJ, and UN bodies have explicitly applied to West Bank settlement goods. The 2019 CJEU Psagot ruling requiring distinct labeling of settlement products, and the July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion calling on states not to render aid or assistance to the occupation, both rest on exactly the legal logic Ukraine is invoking. It matters less that Israel’s legal position is that Judea and Samaria or West Bank isn’t occupied in the Geneva sense -- because there was no prior legitimate sovereign (the sui generis argument), whereas no one disputes Ukrainian sovereignty over Kherson or Zaporizhzhia. Israel can claim the underlying territorial status is different without conceding the consumer facing point, but the reality is that Israel’s positions on this are hotly contested, and adopting Ukraine’s logic against Russia would be cited back at Israel within the week. It's not just that Israel can’t articulate the principle without manufacturing its own precedent risk, it’s that, as Eugene Kontorovich argues, the principle itself is contested and selectively applied. Israel’s reluctance isn’t just self-interested precedent management; it’s a refusal to ratify a legal asymmetry that operates almost exclusively against it. The norm Ukraine is invoking, that goods from occupied territory cannot enter international commerce, exists in robust form almost exclusively in EU practice toward Israel. Ukraine is hardly unaware of the bind it is forcing by pressing the issue. So the timing is notable. Ukraine has protested over third country grain purchases from its occupied territory, as heatedly in some cases as it is now against Israel, more often quietly through diplomatic channels at first, as it claims to have attempted with Israel. There are outliers. Turkey, Bangladesh, India, UAE and Saudi Arabia among them, not to mention the more obvious actors like Iran and Syria. But the emergence of Ukraine’s participation in Gulf countries’ defense is hard to miss in this context, especially in the case of Saudi Arabia and UAE. In September and November 2025, Lloyd’s List documented the bulk carrier Krasnodar sailing directly from the Avlita Grain Terminal in occupied Sevastopol to King Abdullah Port and the Port of Jazan, confirmed by satellite imagery and AIS data. Ukraine raised the matter on the sidelines of the IMO convention and reportedly received assurances. Since then, billions of dollars in contracts for Ukraine’s drone defense and offensive systems have begun pouring out of GCC countries into Ukraine, at a time when Kyiv must consider how to balance away from a politically fragile and dwindling US portfolio in European matters. In late March, Zelensky signed 10-year defense cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, with further security talks underway with Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Ukraine has deployed more than 200 counter-drone specialists across the Gulf, with personnel confirmed in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan, and Ukrainian specialists have directly participated in shooting down Iranian Shahed drones in the region, not as training exercises but as active defense support. The total scale is “several billion dollars” across all partners for 2026 according to Ukraine’s Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, with UAE pre deal inquiries about 5,000 interceptor drones and Qatari interest in 2,000 units. Ukraine’s GCC pivot comes with pressure for alignment. When in Rome do as the Romans do, goes the adage; when in MENA, complicating Israel's standing is the tradition after all.

@shodyvyshsia x.com/_glnc/status/2…

@Gandrushka @masinto 6500 слоп-родин are ready with a million more on the way

@masinto на фоні - два мужика в плавках купуй квартиру в нашому жк "слоп хаус резорт преміум жлоб"