GalANT

📜History point: in 2023, the HMS TAMAR joint the French Jeanne d’Arc task group ⚓️🇫🇷 for a multinational exercise 🤝 La Pérouse 23 in the Bay of Bengal. 🌍⚔️🌏 Will we work together again on La Pérouse 26? #JDA26 #LaPerouse26

Spotted ! 🇬🇧⚓️@WarshipCam @NavyRecognition @hms_tamar The HMS TAMAR (P233) arrived in Papeete this week. This Patrol ship of the Royal Navy is mainly deployed in the Indo-Pacific region.

France has once again demonstrated its ability to project power far away and independently. During this mission, it could easily be imagined that it had to carry out fisheries control missions. 🎣#IUU fishing #illegalfishing

After departing from Nouméa a few weeks ago and crossing the South Pacific, the French FS Vendemiaire ⚓️🇫🇷 arrived in Papeete yesterday. The tyranny of distance, a major challenge in the Pacific region has been overcome. 🌏

To Control the Indian Ocean… Straits Matter Recent sighting of two of three known mine sweeping capable Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) - Santa Barbara and Tulsa - places them near a major checkpoint - the Straits of Malacca. The other key Straits include Hormuz and the Bad-el-Mandeb. All these Straits have significant U.S. naval presence in response to threats from Iran and its proxies (eg Houthis). The placement of LCS in the Straits of Malacca bolsters U.S. presence on the Indian Ocean side and capable to interdict Iranian shipping as well as respond to asymmetric attacks to friendly shipping in the area. …and at least one U.S. nuclear submarine is prowling the waters of the Indian Ocean. Evidenced by the March 4th sinking of Iranian frigate Dena in international waters south of Sri Lanka. news.usni.org/2026/03/16/mid…

It could also be a prelude to Chinese military action on 🇹🇼. 🇨🇳 could be doing technical maintenance in order to be ready for a large scale exercise or operation. As the US keeps its eyes focused on Iran, the timing could be identified as an opportunity.🇮🇷🇺🇸

Another hypothesis could be the recent purges in the PLA, undermining the overall readiness.✈️🇨🇳 Thus, the Eastern Theater Command has changed recently giving a chance to another General to manage plans around 🇹🇼.

✈️🇨🇳 Since two weeks, 🇨🇳 fighter jets stopped operating around 🇹🇼. It is the longest pause in Chinese air activity since many years. No one knows why, but some theories highlight the avoidance of escalating tensions between China and US, and Trump's visit in Beijing the 31/03🇺🇸.

2026 marks 75 years of alliance between the two countries, with 🇵🇭 chairing ASEAN. Missile deployments🚀 are framed as defensive 🛡️, but the strategic signaling is unmistakable: Manila and Washington are reinforcing deterrence architecture in the South China Sea 🌏.

The 14th 🇺🇸🇵🇭🇦🇺 MCA in the Philippines’ EEZ isn’t just another drill, it signals a shift. After the Manila Strategic Dialogue, the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty moves from symbolism to operational deterrence, with advanced missile & unmanned systems deploying in 2026.

It strengthens deterrence by signaling that any coercive action in Philippine waters 🌊 would involve not just Manila 🇵🇭, but potentially Washington 🇺🇸and Canberra 🇦🇺. The Indo-Pacific balance increasingly reflects coordinated partnerships and not only isolated actors🌏🤝

The MMCA demonstrates: ✅ Sustained allied presence ✅ Operational capability ✅ Political unity 🚨 Two PLA Navy ships 🇨🇳 shadowed near the disputed Scarborough Shoal without interference, a reminder of the ongoing strategic rivalry.

🇺🇸🇵🇭🇦🇺 have completed the 14th Maritime Cooperative Activity. It took place inside the Philippines’ EEZ, reinforcing commitment to international law & regional cooperation in the region for a FOIP🌊⚖️, focused on conducting visual information drills and replenishment-at-sea.

Why this matters: Hai-Kun won’t match PLA nuclear submarines in speed ⚡ or endurance ⏳, but it doesn’t need to. The Hai-Kun could threaten Chinese maritime communication routes and strategic naval units and raising the cost of coercion🚢

🛠️⏳ Launched in 2024, the program hit early technical setbacks ⚙️ but is now moving forward. Taipei still targets 8 submarines by 2027, though industrial 🏭, budget 💰 and political hurdles 🏛️ make that timeline ambitious

🇹🇼⚓️ Taiwan’s first indigenous submarine, Hai-Kun (SS-711), completed its 6th sea trial off Kaohsiung. The phase focused on shallow-water pre-immersion testing 🧪, assessing sonar 📡, propulsion ⚙️, and velocity control systems ⏱️

China wants a military base in the Pacific Islands. But countries in the region are traditionally allied with Western powers. @ConnellyAL explains how China is using pushy diplomacy to try and break the status quo. Find out how Western powers are trying to counter China’s influence: econ.st/3O9Oq7c

🇫🇷 is reinforcing the third way, distant from the US-China competition, underlining its role in the region, and reaffirming international law ⚖️ with the right of navigation 🚢 and overflight ✈️

It shows that France 🇫🇷 can operate independently, while still working with its allies and partners across the globe. With ORION 26 in Europe and JDA in the Indo-Pacific, France is demonstrating it can run two major exercises simultaneously, across two theaters 🌍⚔️🌏

Jeanne d’Arc 2026 will consist of two major exercises this year: ➡️Balikatan 26 ➡️La Pérouse 26 In an increasingly unstable region, it matters. France is quietly reminding everyone: it is a resident power of the Indo-Pacific and not just a spectator.