Dr. Siraj Baloch

“Geostrategy Triumphs Over Geoeconomics” Geopolitics and geostrategy often triumph over geoeconomics. All these countries, including the top ones, may have ample resources to sustain themselves economically, but without strong military and deterrent forces, they could remain vulnerable to preemptive and preventive strikes. The UAE is one example of such an apparent eventuality. Geostrategy/geopolitics matter far more than the money one may have. #Iran #IranWar‌ #IranRevolution2026‌ #UAE #economy #geostrategy

🛡️ DRDO Chairman Kamat confirmed: India is “ready” for Agni-VI ICBM development witch’s a nuclear-capable beast with speculated 10-12,000 km range & MIRV warheads. Enough to reach Europe, US & Canada. Govt nod pending. Who is this really for? Pakistan & China are already covered by existing arsenal. In a nuclear South Asia, after Op Sindoor’s boldness, a Hindutva-driven push for global strike capability? The West watching this “minimum deterrence” stretch? #AgniVI #StrategicShift m.economictimes.com/news/defence/d… @RadioactiveFrnd @orfonline @EconomicTimes @bttn_quetta @ciss_ajk @ciss_ajk @dratiaalikazmi @arooj_kaz

BTTN Summer Internship, 2026. BTTN invites applications for its 6-week #Internship Program designed for final year university students and recent graduates interested in #Policy Research, Strategic Affairs, and National Security Studies. Students from Balochistan are invited to submit their CVs along with Cover Letters to our official email address: bttn@bttn.org.pk #strategicstudies #outreach #socialresponsibility

I argued in my article that India’s pursuit of Agni-VI, with potential intercontinental range, reflects an ambition that goes beyond South Asia—reshaping deterrence equations involving major powers like the U.S. and China. stratheia.com/indias-alarmin…

foreignaffairs.com/india/why-next… "Risk Of Escalation in South Asia" Although many security analysts may argue that including this piece titled "Why the Next India-Pakistan War Will Escalate" reflects that terrorism may lead the two South Asian nuclear rivals to the brink of a serious military crisis, quickly reaching up the escalation ladder to a nuclear level. However, fighting and containing terrorism should not be made a pretext to wage a preventive strike, as India did in both the 2019 and May 2025 crises. This is potentially irrational and dangerous. It is fraught with weaknesses that may escalate to a dangerous level. The Herman Kahn and Rodney Jones conceptual escalation ladders may not be directly applicable to the complex South Asian nuclear environment, where a persistent conventional force asymmetry could escalate to the nuclear level. Using terrorism as a pretext to strike a nuclear Pakistan means that India is putting itself into a “commitment trap” and “escalation trap.” India must contain terrorism within its borders by addressing its intelligence failure, governance issues, and, more importantly, enacting a counterterrorism strategy to address such issues within India. It should be India’s internal issue. India may bring this issue, which Pakistan commonly faces, to the negotiating table as part of CBMs. The article does not say anything about this imperative that is good for the South Asian strategic stability, potentially preventing a serious military crisis because of a false pretext of terrorism. The article is also silent without mentioning that Pakistan suffers from the menace of terrorism much more than India does. Has Pakistan ever made terrorism a pretext to launch a preemptive strike against India and its handlers? Pakistan can, but Pakistan has not, and this shows a great deal of strategic restraint, but restraint should not be considered a weakness. It is part of the strategy to signal to the other side not to do things that may exceed the bounds of restraint. Although the article mentions somewhere in conclusion about the possible risk of escalation to a nuclear level, it does not specifically mention how and why nuclear deterrence has been playing a direct and indirect role in preventing both large-scale and limited war in South Asia. The article also skips to mention why India showed restraint not to take military action against Pakistan after the car bomb explosion in New Delhi in November 2025 that killed about 10 people. Was it because India realized that terrorism can not be made a pretext for waging a preventive strike (illegal) against Pakistan? Or was it because of nuclear deterrence playing in the background, deterring India to be more cautious that time around, having learned its lesson in May 2025? The role of the third party is important and therefore cannot be ignored, as India does. Ironically, on the one hand, India does not recognize the third-party role, but on the other hand, it does not talk to Pakistan and share information on issues concerning India and Pakistan. The burden of responsibility is on the Indian shoulder, much more than on Pakistan. The article does not critically analyze this imperative. The article also does not elaborate on how and why Pakistan proposed the Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), which India declined, and how this relates to broader strategic stability in South Asia, as well as to crisis management and crisis prevention mechanisms. The efforts for crisis resolution (the ultimate way forward) are not mentioned in the article at all; one wonders why. The article could have been more balanced and interesting if this could inculcate all these missing imperatives. @ethrelkeld @ForeignAffairs #India #Pakistan #SouthAsia #May2025Conflict #Escalation #deescalation #risk #nuclear #Kashmir #flashpoint

“Indian ICBMs (Agni-VI) – A Global Security Threat” India’s development of Agni-VI, an ICBM with a range of 12000km-16000km, goes beyond Pakistan and China. It now clearly threatens the US, Canada, Europe, and the entire American Continent. India, with increasing ranges of its ICBMS and SLBMs, has become a global threat. The international community, including the US, needs to question India about such strategic ambitions. This is no longer consistent with India’s declared minimum deterrence; it goes far beyond such a perceived nuclear policy. It is no longer security. It is dangerous hubris, an escalation dominance, prestige, and power projection, at both the regional and global levels. Pakistan is watching; the Chinese are watching; the global community is concerned about this, and the US must take action now rather than never when India becomes a strategic Frankenstein against the US's vital security and geostrategic interests. @MalluChique @RealBababanaras #India #DRDO #ICBMs #SLBMs #Threat #US #Canada #EU #global #power #prestige