BEUGRE DADIE

🔴🇱🇧🇮🇱✝️ Au Liban, des soldats israéliens se moquent des rites chrétiens dans une église.

A l’attention de l’AFP et du Monde du silence, mutique : Le nouveau président iranien vient de nommer Ahmad Vahini comme ministre de l’intérieur. Petit détail : celui-ci est recherché par Interpol pour son rôle dans l’attentat de lAMIA à Buenos- Aires qui fit 95 morts . Un rien.

This is what Benjamin Netanyahu did to Christians in Lebanon in just over a month.

War on weekend, peace on weekdays Crazy times

The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem ended in a complete disaster because King Guy de Lusignan and Renaud de Chatillon did exactly what Trump and Netanyahu are doing right now. The Kingdom of Jerusalem did not fall because Islam was stronger than Christendom. It fell because two men — King Guy de Lusignan and Renaud de Chatillon — decided that provocation was a strategy, that the rules didn't apply to them, and that they could drag a fragile coalition into a war of their choosing on a timeline no one else had agreed to. At the Battle of Hattin in 1187, Saladin didn't defeat Jerusalem. Jerusalem defeated itself. Renaud de Chatillon was a maximalist operating on the logic that audacity is its own deterrent, that if you push hard enough — raid the caravans, strike the convoys, threaten the holy cities — the adversary will eventually capitulate rather than escalate. Renaud raided Muslim pilgrimage routes under active truce, attacked caravans Saladin had personally guaranteed safe passage, and treated every ceasefire as a staging period for the next provocation. He was not reckless by accident. He was reckless by doctrine. He believed the enemy's restraint was weakness. Saladin personally beheaded him after Hattin — a gesture he extended to almost no one else — because some men are too dangerous to ransom. Guy de Lusignan was legitimacy-challenged, politically dependent on his maximalist partner, and structurally incapable of restraining him because restraint means losing the coalition that keeps him in power. Guy didn't want to march into the waterless plateau above Tiberias in the July heat. His best commander, Raymond of Tripoli, told him it was a trap — that Saladin had designed the siege of Tiberias specifically to pull the Crusader army into terrain where it would die of thirst before it could fight. Guy knew this. He marched anyway. Because Renaud and the hawkish barons had made backing down politically impossible. The Crusader army did not lose at Hattin. It suffocated, on its feet, in the sun, before Saladin's cavalry closed in. The structure is identical. A dominant power whose strength is real but whose strategic position is more fragile than it appears. A political leader whose survival depends on a partner he cannot control. A partner whose entire identity is built on escalation and who has long since foreclosed the diplomatic exits. A patient adversary who has read the terrain, prepared the trap, and is waiting for the coalition to march into it of its own free will. Hattin was not a battle. It was the terminus of a political logic that had been running for years, and everyone involved could see where it was going except the people with the power to stop it. Jerusalem fell three months later. The Kingdom had hollowed itself out before Saladin needed to strike it. Some defeats are not inflicted. They are chosen, incrementally, by men who confused audacity with strategy and called the result God's will.

JD Vance: Trump says to Iran: “If you commit to not having a nuclear weapon, we are going to make Iran economically thrive.”