kacang2

@jukan05 No more ship shipment eh, time is just that important.

@DiligentPlane ESPP auto sell.

Who sold 8.18M shares of $MU in the first 40 minutes of trading today? That’s 7.5B in shares

@jukan05 It’s what memory companies does too 2 years ago. Only when the price hikes are huge enough that they can enjoy 70%+ margin then only it made sense to expand.

I don’t understand why Murata would say this. Are they basically saying, “We’re not going to expand capacity, so we’ll just let others take our market share”?

@damnang2 Got to eat gukbap at busan eh

I’m in Busan. Why?

@jukan05 Dont consider, just do it

South Korea’s Financial Services Commission chairman: We are considering restricting single-stock leveraged ETFs to professional investors. biz.chosun.com/stock/stock_ge…

@jukan05 @citrini For your sake, please rebound

@citrini Sir, am I fucked up?

I know technical analysis is astrology for men, but SK Hynix either bottoms at 1850 or the gaps that need to be filled will wipe out an entire generation of leveraged up Koreans.

@PolarisLog I remember one Vice President of Hynix that pushed for Solidigm acquisition was fired. I wonder where he is now.

과거에 메모리 3사가 충분한 돈이 있었는데 일부러 증설을 안 했다는 말들이 보이는데 이게 말이 안 되는 게 SK그룹은 몇 년 전에 망할 뻔했습니다. 하이닉스는 역대급 적자에 인텔에서 인수한 낸드(솔리다임)에서 10조씩 적자가 나오는 상황이고 SK온에 대규모 투자를 하는데 돈을 못 버는 상황이라 진짜 망하는 줄 알았습니다. 친척 중에 SK하이닉스 다니는 동생이 있어 매일 걱정해서 밥 사 주고 술 사 주고 “잘될 거야” 한 지가 몇 년 안 되었습니다. 삼성은 그나마 현금이 있어서 버텼는데, SK그룹은 다운턴이 몇 년만 더 길었어도 망했을 수도 있습니다. 결론은 일부러 증설을 안 했다는 건 말도 안 되는 소리입니다.

@ContrarianCurse I think what will drive common people to do is to hold their Apple devices for longer and change the batteries only.

@BenBajarin Yes, Micron has stopped supplying mNAND since 2023 due to pricing.

I don’t know who needs to hear this but Micron is not the main memory supplier to Apple.

@jukan05 Congrats! You deserve it!

I’ll use this year’s bonus to buy it.

@Mr_Derivatives Its because you chose the wrong ticker. $KSTR

$KWEB Chinese stocks have been absolutely brutal in the last 9 months. Just brutal…

@jukan05 Not surprised lol.

SK Hynix triggered a volatility interruption in pre-market trading.

@DrFrederickChen I was expecting 4F2 will stay for some time before transition to IgZO.

@bobnorman_ch Yeah so I had to question

Another tailwind for Macronix.

Bbg compilation of analyst commentary on $ABVX

@rickyho_1989 Having access is one thing. Actually using it to fix the problem is another entirely. Access without decisive action doesn’t restore confidence. Markets price in uncertainty faster than regulators can tweet reforms.

Indonesia is becoming famous for its deep-fried stocks. What is frustrating is that the exchange and regulators possess far more information than any market participant. They have access to broker-level transaction data, beneficial ownership records, and complete trading audit trails. They have the tools to investigate unusual trading patterns and determine whether trading activity reflects genuine market interest or something else. Markets can tolerate volatility. What they struggle to tolerate is a loss of confidence in price discovery. The longer questions around market integrity remain unanswered, the harder it becomes to convince serious global investors that the market deserves their capital.

@rickyho_1989 Why would you buy Indonesian banks if you can get Memory companies at ~9x forward PE.

Valuation-wise, Indonesia is arguably one of the cheapest equity markets in Asia today. Many well-known blue-chip companies are trading at what can only be described as crisis-like multiples despite maintaining healthy balance sheets, dominant market positions, and attractive dividend yields. BBCA trades at roughly 11x forward earnings and 2.6x book value. Bank Mandiri trades at around 6x forward earnings and 1.2x book value. BRI trades at approximately 7x forward earnings and 1.3x book value. Astra sits at 6x forward earnings. Kalbe trades at 9x forward earnings. Amman trades at roughly 10x forward earnings. The list goes on. Many of these companies also offer high single-digit dividend yields, with some names approaching double-digit yields. On paper, this should attract significant investor interest. Yet share prices continue to drift lower. The obvious question is: where are the buyers? Where are all the investors who have spent years believing Indonesia’s long-term potential? Indonesia’s weight in MSCI Emerging Markets remains only around 0.5-0.6%, remarkably small relative to the size of its economy, population, and long-term growth aspirations. More importantly, where is Danantara? It was presented as a potential new source of domestic capital and a stabilizing force for Indonesian financial markets. If the local market is trading at distressed valuations, this should be the type of environment where a large domestic institutional investor helps establish confidence. The problem, however, is that cheap valuation alone is rarely enough. Markets ultimately pay for growth. Indonesia’s core challenge today is not valuation. It is earnings growth. Aggregate earnings growth for the market has slowed materially, with many sectors struggling to generate meaningful expansion. Compare that with South Korea and Taiwan, where investors are being offered direct exposure to AI, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, memory, and high-performance computing. Foreign investors are naturally willing to pay higher multiples for companies whose earnings are compounding rapidly. Currency concerns add another layer of complexity. Investors are not simply underwriting Indonesian corporate earnings. They are also underwriting the rupiah. If currency depreciation continues to offset equity returns, valuation discounts can persist far longer than expected. There is also a credibility issue that should not be ignored. For years, many foreign investors have complained that parts of the Indonesian market function primarily as distribution channels rather than genuine capital formation venues. Domestic equity sales teams routinely promote names that later become exit liquidity for local institutions seeking to reduce exposure. Over time, repeated experiences like this erode trust. The persistent allegations of wash trading, questions around effective free float, concentrated ownership structures, and concerns over genuine liquidity have further damaged confidence. Investors do not simply buy low valuations. They buy governance, transparency, liquidity, and confidence in future earnings. This is why cheap markets can remain cheap for years. A stock trading at 6x earnings can still fall to 5x. Valuation itself is not a catalyst. The harsh reality is that Indonesia does not have a valuation problem. It has a growth and confidence problem. Until investors see stronger earnings growth, more credible policy execution, better market governance, improved liquidity, and a clearer path for capital to generate attractive real returns, low multiples alone will not be enough to attract meaningful foreign capital back into the market. Cheap without growth is a value trap. Cheap with deteriorating confidence is even worse.

Just saw SGD/IDR cross the 14,000 mark and it hits heavy. When I moved to Singapore to study back in 2011, it was sitting at 7,000. Seeing the rupiah lose half its value against the dollar in 15 years is tough to watch. Really hoping for stronger macro policies to steady the ship for the future. 📉🇮🇩

@zephyr_z9 Here’s the prepay, now don't you dare delay.

DAMN