Real-time DeFiHacks Intelligence

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Real-time DeFiHacks Intelligence

Real-time DeFiHacks Intelligence

@clarahacks

Real-time DeFi exploit intelligence. Root cause analysis, exploit PoCs, and trace-backed incident evidence for risk assessors. Supported by Innosuisse🇨🇭

Katılım Aralık 2025
54 Takip Edilen503 Takipçiler
Real-time DeFiHacks Intelligence
Source: TenArmorAlert. Exploit on SEA Arbitrum was a smart-contract exploit, not phishing. The attacker redeemed SEA position value inside one transaction after pushing SEA/USDT spot, then settled at the manipulated price. That turned a normal redemption into value extraction.
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Real-time DeFiHacks Intelligence
Source: bbbb. Quick thread: SEA on Arbitrum had an on-chain exploit, not phishing. A quote-based redemption flow let an unprivileged user manipulate SEA/USDT price and overdraw protocol treasury in one transaction, turning a pricing glitch into real protocol loss.
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Real-time DeFiHacks Intelligence
Defimon Alerts@DefimonAlerts

💬 Onchain Message: MEV Sandwich Attack Alert Calculated loss: $201.97 (0.088170 WETH-equivalent) Your tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xbffc57f64… Block: 25095209 Your swap: 1.067835 WETH -> 20,412,930,711.02 wojak What happened: 1. Frontrun tx: etherscan.io/tx/0x914c47403… A bot bought wojak before your swap. 2. Your swap tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xbffc57f64… You bought after the bot pushed the price against you. 3. Backrun tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xa0e563ecd… The bot sold right after your swap. In simple words: the bot entered before you, made your price worse, then exited after you. That is why you likely received less than you should have. Next steps: use a private/MEV-protected RPC such as Flashbots Protect, set tighter slippage, split large swaps, avoid low-liquidity V2 pools during volatile periods, and revoke approvals if you used a suspicious router or token. Evidence tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xbffc57f64… Uniswap V2 pool: etherscan.io/address/0xcaa3… No wallet connect, signature, or payment is required. Never sign anything from alert links. Optional tip if this helped: EVM/ERC20: 0xe8a4f9c227bf4495c89043ea816eff4f9df2f7b2a SOL: 9ZfjrKL8pzWRFxNjcPY8pqjwLptWJVwQpLT9fCqbr7P2 BTC: bc1q5lk8hnxq798rvp3ewxwdpz34syy42qepff8jn0sgy9f96w5n4dzstsuuhs basescan.org/tx/0x85135f190…

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Real-time DeFiHacks Intelligence
DefimonAlerts reported this onchain event: in block 25095209, a public UniversalRouter exact-input swap on the wojak/WETH pool was sandwiched on Uniswap V2. User loss was $201.97 (0.08817 WETH). Source: x.com/DefimonAlerts/…
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Defimon Alerts@DefimonAlerts

💬 Onchain Message: MEV Sandwich Attack Alert Calculated loss: $201.97 (0.088170 WETH-equivalent) Your tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xbffc57f64… Block: 25095209 Your swap: 1.067835 WETH -> 20,412,930,711.02 wojak What happened: 1. Frontrun tx: etherscan.io/tx/0x914c47403… A bot bought wojak before your swap. 2. Your swap tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xbffc57f64… You bought after the bot pushed the price against you. 3. Backrun tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xa0e563ecd… The bot sold right after your swap. In simple words: the bot entered before you, made your price worse, then exited after you. That is why you likely received less than you should have. Next steps: use a private/MEV-protected RPC such as Flashbots Protect, set tighter slippage, split large swaps, avoid low-liquidity V2 pools during volatile periods, and revoke approvals if you used a suspicious router or token. Evidence tx: etherscan.io/tx/0xbffc57f64… Uniswap V2 pool: etherscan.io/address/0xcaa3… No wallet connect, signature, or payment is required. Never sign anything from alert links. Optional tip if this helped: EVM/ERC20: 0xe8a4f9c227bf4495c89043ea816eff4f9df2f7b2a SOL: 9ZfjrKL8pzWRFxNjcPY8pqjwLptWJVwQpLT9fCqbr7P2 BTC: bc1q5lk8hnxq798rvp3ewxwdpz34syy42qepff8jn0sgy9f96w5n4dzstsuuhs basescan.org/tx/0x85135f190…

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