Nico | mpc/acc

982 posts

Nico | mpc/acc banner
Nico | mpc/acc

Nico | mpc/acc

@cryptopapi997

padawan & co-founder @Arcium | crypto, both -graphy and -currency.

Katılım Mayıs 2020
1.3K Takip Edilen6.7K Takipçiler
Nico | mpc/acc
Nico | mpc/acc@cryptopapi997·
@radrdotfun could you elaborate on the term "semi-trustless ZKP verification"?
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Radr Labs
Radr Labs@radrdotfun·
Due to some unforeseen FUD regarding our semi-trustless ZKP verifications we have moved all of our ZKP verifications on chain. Encrypt the money, this is now live. radrlabs.io
Radr Labs tweet media
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Noah 🎈
Noah 🎈@redacted_noah·
The number one reason @solscanofficial and @heliuslabs orb markets are painful for devs is overuse of collapsing UX. You have to uncollapse 2-5 things just to ctrl-f for an account when debugging. Solana explorer is goated bec everything is immediately visible.
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Nico | mpc/acc
Nico | mpc/acc@cryptopapi997·
@redacted_noah read this as "engineered outage" which sounded like the craziest growth strategy ever lmao
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Noah 🎈
Noah 🎈@redacted_noah·
The engineered outrage growth strategy is getting super annoying, and shows how broken social media has become. The best way to market and gain reach is to rage bait, preying on the shittiest of human emotions.
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Arihant
Arihant@arihantbansal·
is npm down?
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Nico | mpc/acc
Nico | mpc/acc@cryptopapi997·
@sjdedic can only reiterate this - we've had you guys onboard since the very start and it has proven to be a fantastic decision. can highly recommend any founder to work with you guys too.
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Simon Dedic
Simon Dedic@sjdedic·
If you’re a founder looking to raise talk to Simon and the Moonrock team. They’ve been incredibly supportive - constantly not just before the round closes to secure an allocation.
Santiago R Santos@santiagoroel

@sjdedic @hosseeb @notthreadguy If you’re a founder looking to raise talk to Simon and the Moonrock team. They’ve been incredibly supportive - constantly not just before the round closes to secure an allocation.

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Francesco
Francesco@fcesco·
@alessandrod hey chad could you guys check solana-instructions? Seems like there’s a dep conflict and our stuff using solana crates does not compile anymore
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spacemandev
spacemandev@spacemandev·
how many <encrypted> credits do you think dying your hair @Arcium purple is worth ? asking for a friend
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Nixen
Nixen@nabeelm777·
@candyflipline @arcium Had the same issue. In my case, I am running docker on my mac via colima and arcium expects a docker socket to connect to. In my case, I had to point it to use docker socket under colima with following command export DOCKER_HOST="unix://$HOME/.colima/default/docker.sock"
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chris
chris@candyflipline·
ok, @arcium refuses to be installed on my mac. yes, my docker is running. but we still have 3h of stream, so i'm ssh into my linux VM to keep the fight going
chris tweet media
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Aursen
Aursen@exoaursen·
Amid the liquidation waves, there’s no better time to announce that I’ve joined @JupiterExchange. Excited to push the edge of @JupiterExchange, building alongside some of the sharpest minds in the ecosystem 🔥
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Yannik Schrade
Yannik Schrade@yrschrade·
wow, Comic Con is in NYC right now. That’s amazing! don’t think there is any other crazy news though
Yannik Schrade tweet media
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Nico | mpc/acc
Nico | mpc/acc@cryptopapi997·
in the case of arcium, one of the nice things about MPC is that there's been countless papers written about this problem if you substitute the words "user" and "offchain service" with "player 1" and "player 2", which then centers around cheating detection. To utilize this for the blockchain case, we need to expand this to publicly auditable & identifiable cheater detection, as by default cheating detection just tells you misbehavior occurred (but not by who), identifiable cheatER detection let's you detect by whom it occurred (but not prove it to 3rd parties, which in this case would be the blockchain) and ideally make it dishonest majority (technically not a must, but in the goal of trust-minimization). then, if at most n-1 nodes are maliciously trying to decrypt to a wrong plainext (or more generally calculate an incorrect computation) the honest node will still be able to detect this, post a proof onchain, and get the remaining nodes punished (e.g. via slashing). in a sense this makes it a bit akin to PoS, except your trust assumption is 1/n instead of 1/2 or 2/3 (depending on implementation). from a user standpoint, this means, similar to PoS, that you can choose products where you have confidence in the cluster size relative to the trust assumption with the added benefit that if the size is too small for your liking, you can choose to participate and thru that have a guarantee of correct execution (since you'd be the 1 honest node out of n).
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Nitanshu (priv/acc)
Nitanshu (priv/acc)@NitanshuL·
There's an interesting problem with privacy protocols which actually encrypts user data. (applicable where proof of decryption is infeasible to calculate) Problem statement: Whenever a user makes an onchain decryption request to decrypt certain ciphertext, The async offchain relayer submits the corresponding signed/attested plaintext onchain within the requested callback as a parameter. The issue arises when the plaintext provided by the relayer doesn't matches the expected plaintext by the user. @encifherio We're planning to deploy a dispute resolution protocol onchain (similar to that of BoLD of @arbitrum) where challenger and the proposer (relayer) would come to an agreement on the execution of a certain instruction (disputed instruction) onchain via binary search. The onchain execution of the disputed instruction will reveal the malicious party. for non interactive privacy preserving compute techniques these sort of dispute resolution make sense as you can compile down the whole singular execution runtime into a different ISA supported by SVM runtime. btw curious to know how does it plays around in case of interactive privacy preserving compute ? (any thoughts here @cryptopapi997)
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Nico | mpc/acc
Nico | mpc/acc@cryptopapi997·
perfect fairness *in general* is provably impossible in the dishonest majority and therefore 2 party case (courses.grainger.illinois.edu/cs598dk/fa2019…). however, you didn't specify what "combined" means in your case, as some simple computations are an exception to this rule (like Yao's classic millionaire's problem for example) as shown by eprint.iacr.org/2008/303. if you're ok with using a blockchain or some other means of a public "bulletin board" there's a variety of protocols that leverage this, though they're usually quite high overhead, like eprint.iacr.org/2017/1091.pdf more practical is usually non-perfect/economic fairness assumptions, this is what we opted for in the case of Arcium as outlined here x.com/cryptopapi997/… but there's a whole bunch of different notions of fairness with different tradeoffs. stumbled across this literature review of the field the other day, might be helpful for you too since the perfect solution for your case would prob come down to the details of how alice and bob combine their data, if it's always exactly 2-parties, is there some notion of a trusted bulletin board, is there a way to economically measure the worth of data, is gradual release possible etc etc: publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000162986/151…
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Auryn
Auryn@auryn_macmillan·
@yrschrade The issue I'm hinting at is that the 𝑡th party can withold their share from the others while revealing the information for themselves.
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Auryn
Auryn@auryn_macmillan·
Trustless Information Escrow, does it exist? Say Alice and Bob each have a piece of information that is only valuable if combined with the other's information. Can Alice share their information with Bob in such a way that guarantees Bob will also share their information with Alice?
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Nico | mpc/acc
Nico | mpc/acc@cryptopapi997·
one of the biggest drawbacks w conf transfers on Solana is that you can't transfer from a smart contract with them by default, as you need someone to hold an Elgamal privkey to decrypt things and to generate some proofs for every transfer. with arcium you get permissionless & trust-minimized MPC compute linked to smart contracts that allows you to control and utilize private state, so this fits perfectly to allow conf transfers to work with smart contracts too. We add some other QOL improvements too, but this is the main unlock
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harshbajpai
harshbajpai@bajpaiharsh244·
Today I learnt that Aptos also has some cool work on privacy! From a quick read, it looks like the following: - addresses in a transaction are visible but not the amount - every encrypted transfers is a zk proof of validity, which emits encrypted new balances of a sender and recipient - the encrypted new balances can then homomorphically added to the existing encrypted balance ps: Why not also allow sender and recipient to be hidden? Is there some regulator advantage to it? @sneha_bb had pointed me recently to check this out, it came again in an interaction on x, this is very impressive!
harshbajpai tweet media
alin.apt@alinush

@portport255 @rpranav @bajpaiharsh244 @Aptos Yep! There's a lot more [cryptography] where that came from btw: alinush.github.io/aptos-crypto

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