Dankrad Feist
5.7K posts
If you want to understand why this feels like a big deal to me
Only two or three years ago it felt like EF had absolutely no idea what was going on on chain and frankly didn’t give af
Vitalik and dankrad called DeFi an ouroborus ponzi , in general the people at EF seemed ivory tower and out of touch
Protocol development focused on academically cypherpink goals with little thought or input from actual users
Now there’s a real DeFi guy at the EF, improvements that are related to real usage
I know some old guard people will complain but this to me feels like things are moving in the right direction.
𝕯𝖆𝖓𝖌𝖊𝖗@safetyth1rd
On the one hand yes it’s weird that a lot of senior guys have left the EF On the other hand we now have an actual DeFi guy @ivangbi_ at the EF And actually useful ux/security improvements like clear signing Maybe change is a good thing.
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Dankrad Feist retweetledi
Exactly.
Of course the fight is to keep it this way, as much as possible. And extend to more RWAs when we have the chance.
Haseeb ＞|＜@hosseeb
Stablecoins are actually super cypherpunk. CT has broken your brain on this. The idea that anyone at any time, with just a mobile phone, can hold and send dollars instaneously to anyone in the world, no KYC, no nothing--that was literally the cypherpunk dream.
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@josephdelong @MonetSupply The inherent oracle dependence is sufficient for the argument though?
Custodial may be too strong a word but it is limited at the security of a multisig.
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@MonetSupply I honestly don’t know enough. Maybe my information is outdated
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All onchain lending is custodial. Why are we larping decentralization when it comes to the security?
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@CantelopePeel You might have principles but they are bad principles if they result in NK hacking together billions in funding for its nuclear program.
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@dankrad you lack principles. the jurisdiction is enumerated by the rules of protocol. thats the point of all of this work we are doing
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I think it's great that the security council stepped up and stopped NK.
The interesting question is what the line will be in the future. Personally I think it will be great if crypto projects start establishing their own jurisdictions and clearly define how they make decisions like this.
Steven Goldfeder@sgoldfed
Surely one of the most complex decisions ever made in Arbitrum governance history but a few things worth noting: 1. To all those screaming for the past few days “Arbitrum has a centralized sequencer so they can move funds”, take a few minutes to learn how Arbitrum works. The sequencer has absolutely no power to move funds and was not the one who acted here. 2. The decision to act was made entirely by the Arbitrum Security Council, a group of 12 individuals elected by the Arbitrum DAO (the annual election is currently underway — vote now!), which required 9/12 of them to agree. The council is independent from the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs (1/12 of the elected members is an OCL engineer), and came to this decision by themselves after much deliberation. You may not like the existence of security councils and you can form your own opinion on whether you agree with their actions, but this process was extremely distributed and coordinated by independent actors, and ina world where security councils exist, Arbitrum’s is a masterclass on how a truly independent security council should operate. 3. For many, the ultimate goal is to get rid of the security council entirely, but this is complicated. Technically it’s easy — the security council is elected by the DAO and operates at its pleasure, and the DAO can turn it off at any time. But the harder question is _should_ the DAO do that? L1s have the ability to hard fork. Security councils control the analogous power for the L2. If you get rid of it, you lose the ability to hard fork. You can still update the chain via DAO vote but that’s a slow process and you can no longer do fast emergency actions (which includes both actions like the security council took today as well as the ability to quickly upgrade the code in case an exploitable vulnerability in the software stack is discovered). As I’ve said many times, the best path that I see to getting rid of security councils is for the L1 itself to take on this burden for its most important L2s (as defined by objective criteria). In that case, in the case of a vulnerability or an exploit the conversation for L1 and L2 will be identical — does this warrant an L1 hard fork. I’m hopeful that we can reopen this conversation in the coming weeks.
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@C1aranMurray @neha I see you think about Tempo a lot. Will be happy to have your inputs when we decentralize.
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Let's not conflate long run *opt in* consensus at the protocol development level with highly constrained short run consensus enforced by pseudonymous entities operating under protocol rules.
There's a snowball's chance in hell Ethereum and delegated PoA system will be treated the same by regulators. We already know this from a codified rules perspective. What you seem to be arguing is that states will be ineffective in enforcing these rules. *Incredibly* naive.
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@neha @C1aranMurray "That's how MSB works"
"We shall see"
What consistency
And it is not how it works. If you thought about who a court can order to do things you would realize.
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@dankrad @C1aranMurray I don't _want_ that to be true.
But unfortunately, I think it is. We shall see.
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@neha @C1aranMurray Just because you want that to be true doesn't make it true.
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@dankrad @C1aranMurray no, it will be subject to all of them. that's how MSB works.
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@dankrad Security councils don't work without identity and states are quite adept at cooperating on these things. They could also just ban the token of any L2 that doesn't bend the knee.
Either you don't have the power to do these things, or you do, and states will bring you to heel.
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@C1aranMurray If the security council is sufficiently distributed across jurisdictions then it won't be individually subject to any
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@dankrad That's a one way ticket to having to register as a MSB and science knows whatever else in every jurisdiction they have users. Nation states don't let other institutions set the rules on their turf.
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Your infrastructure was compromised, so own up to it.
"Yeah but we didn't think anyone would RELY on that infrastructure" isn't an excuse
Trust in LZ will tank, and it deserves to, after this.
LayerZero@LayerZero_Core
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Ah right, the post did say that if you read it carefully:
"Rather, the attacker was able to gain access to the list of RPCs our DVN uses, compromise two of them – which were independent nodes running on separate clusters without direct connection to each other – and swap out binaries running the op-geth nodes. Because of our least-privilege principles, they were unable to compromise the actual DVN instances."
But yes they aren't upfront about it
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@dankrad @LayerZero_Core @Daryllautk it had to have been an internal RPC that was compromised, which is no different than LZ's own systems being compromised
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@hasufl @donnoh_eth Proof latency is still more of a bottleneck than L1, but at some point L1 will be the lower bound (and we should push it towards finality in seconds)
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@donnoh_eth arent the two main bottlenecks
1. hetereogenity of L2 bridges
2. slow finality of the L1?
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call me old school, delusional or whatever you want but i still do believe the single most important job of an L2 is to provide a strong and secure default bridging infra to its users and apps. every time users are pushed to 3rd party bridges like L0 it is a failure for such L2
Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl
This doesn't even consider that 2/3+ of user assets on L2s are not minted by the rollup bridge at all, but by third-party committee bridges. It was a funny time while we all thought that the L1 bridge is the most important part of a rollup.
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@LayerZero_Core @Daryllautk now that I think of it, this explanation does not make sense
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Dankrad Feist retweetledi
If you have WETH on Aave V3 Core, withdraw now, ask questions later.
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Tempo’s answer to privacy is disappointing. Not because no sophisticated cryptography is used (unlike ours). My disappointment comes from a half-baked answer to the structural problem of adding privacy to public chains.
Prividiums - what Tempo’s Zones are - work great in a 1-m architecture: 1 operator, many participants.
The 1 payroll operator that sees all data. The many employees that receive payments and only see what they’re supposed to. Fine.
The design breaks horribly in a multi-operator architecture (n-m): Multiple operators, many participants.
What if multiple banks transact with each other? Create a new Zone for every bank connection?
A shares one with B, a separate one with C, because neither should see the other’s flows.
That’s 45 Zones for 10 banks, 4,950 for 100 banks, 499,500 at only 1k.
Welcome to fragmented liquidity.
This needs to be v.01 of Tempo’s privacy ambitions, not the final answer.
Tempo@tempo
Blockchains still broadcast every transaction publicly. Every stablecoin payment leaks the amount, the sender, and the recipient. We’re excited to share that Tempo is building Zones for businesses that need privacy: private blockchains that are interoperable with the rest of Tempo for stablecoin use cases like payroll, treasury, and settlement.
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