David A. Dayton, PhD

It is noteworthy to me that official Chinese statements, before and after the visit, have been calling (aspirationally) for "predictable" and "stable" U.S.-China relations. If this was the goal, then I think we are going to need to distinguish “predictability” from “stability." I notice that a lot of people in the media, here on social media, and among the commentariat are either conflating the two or else using them in the same sentence, as in: “President's Trump's visit has brought greater predictability and stability” to relations between Washington and Beijing. But I'm sorry, these two words are NOT the same thing. We might now get greater predictability— which is an achievement with a president as mercurially unpredictable as Trump. But we should have no illusions that this has “stabilized” U.S.-China relations because all of the things that made them unstable in the first place are still with us: (1) clashing security concepts, (2) obvious differences of political system and ideology, (3) contending economic interests, (4) technology competition as emerging and foundational technologies, from AI enabled applications to quantum, become inherently dual use, and (5) combustible domestic politics where there is, frankly, little benefit on either side in advocating for a "stable" relationship. In analytical terms, I suspect Beijing is pleased, not least because China will settle for a more predictable relationship with Donald Trump. But we are nowhere near “stable.” And I thought much of the visit was well-done performance art, directed at specific domestic audiences, on both sides. Incidentally, I am quite sure that Xi Jinping did not, in fact, say that “America is the hottest country in the world,” as the President told the press gaggle on Air Force One. So we should take much else that Xi is alleged to have said with a heaping dose of salt.

American staff took everything Chinese officials handed out - credentials, burner phones from WH staff, pins for delegation - collected them before we got on AF1 and threw them in a bin at bottom at stairs. Nothing from China allowed on the plane. We’re taking off shortly for America

As Trump heads to China to meet Xi, it’s time for a reality check on the Chinese economy. We’ve endured years of breathless talk about the “Asian century” and China’s inexorable rise. Elites couldn’t stop praising the “China model” with its state-led efficiency, gleaming infrastructure, and unstoppable momentum. That narrative has aged disastrously. So much so all the old pro-engagement business leaders have begun changing their tune to save face (Dimon, Dalio et al.) Even with reported 5% annual growth, China is not closing the gap with the US in nominal USD terms. Its GDP as a share of America’s peaked at 78% in 2021 and has fallen to just 64% in 2024. Yes the renminbi’s sharp depreciation against the dollar is true, but it begs the question of why did the currency weaken enough to slash China’s relative GDP by 14 percentage points in three years? Currency collapse is not a sign of strength. The RMB has recovered some ground over the past 18 months, yet deflation and chronic overcapacity will cap any sustained rally. With PPP adjustments, the gap closes but the US is still richer than China. Don’t listen to the blackpillers saying the US is collapsing or the “dollar dominance is ending.” Both countries have debt problems but China knows how to creatively hide it. Markets tell the starkest truth. US equities (S&P 500) have surged from ~$45 trillion in 2021 to $55–60 trillion. Chinese indices (CSI 300 + Hang Seng) have slid from ~$13 trillion at their peak to around $10 trillion. If this were just a currency story, America’s market values wouldn’t be booming while China’s shrank in absolute terms. The bottom line: China’s slowdown is structural. America is in much better shape and barring some epic self-cucking, the US should still be dominant

Americans need to contend with how poorly liberalism is designed to handle this. Libs simply cannot bring themselves to admit that the relationship between a Chinese citizen (or diaspora) and the Chinese Communist Party is not the same as the relationship between an American citizen and the US government. There is no wall. There is no Constitution telling the state it cannot compel the individual. In China the individual exists to serve the Party. We wrote the opposite into our founding document. Government cannot force your speech, your allegiance, or your silence. But liberalism’s one non-negotiable commandment is: Thou shalt not notice cultural or political differences Especially if noticing them might make you sound mean and do mean things such as pass an exclusionary law. So we’re told we must pretend every Chinese immigrant or student carries the exact same relationship to their government that Americans do. We must also somehow ignore the United Front Work Department’s explicit doctrine of using overseas Chinese as instruments of influence. We must treat espionage, propaganda, and infiltration as isolated “bad apples” instead of state policy. You realize that China doesn’t have to beat us in a fair fight? It simply has to walk through the door that’s propped open with our own suicidal ideology. Every time another Wang or Fang or CCP-linked “community leader” gets caught, the libs and progressives will shrug and do nothing. They refuse to even acknowledge the asymmetry. Which is exactly how Beijing turns American values and systems into fatal vulnerabilities.

Trump’s Trillion-Dollar China Trap In recent months, the United States has reminded the world of something fundamental: it still possesses unrivaled capacity to project raw power anywhere on earth. That display has likely forced many countries to recalibrate their posture in the ongoing U.S.–China rivalry. Xi Jinping, meanwhile, is dealing with headaches on every front: slowing — or vanishing — economic growth, rising unemployment, messy internal politics, and a disillusioned bureaucracy. He badly needs to stabilize U.S.–China relations, create a more receptive external environment, and protect China’s export markets. Exports have become the last major pillar holding up the Chinese economy, as investment slows and consumption remains weak. That is why Trump is likely to receive one of the most pompous receptions of his life after he lands in Beijing. Xi is not playing from strength, contrary to what many “strategists” keep insisting. Which makes this reported idea — allowing China to invest $1 trillion in the United States — so dangerous. For Beijing, this would be a gift. These investments would not be neutral capital from a market economy. They would be wedged deep into American politics, the economy, and society. They would be structured to create leverage — concentrated in targeted communities, targeted industries, and targeted constituencies. In time, they would be weaponized. Think of TikTok. It is only one company, one app, one social platform — yet Trump has found it politically impossible to shake off. He is willing to ignore legislation passed by both the House and the Senate because the platform has embedded itself into American politics and public life. Now imagine that logic multiplied across factories, jobs, supply chains, local tax bases, governors, mayors, unions, congressional districts, and campaign donors. Beijing understands leverage. It would not simply invest. It would design dependency. Trump being Trump, perhaps this is exactly the sort of grand, theatrical “deal” he finds irresistible: a trillion-dollar headline, ribbon-cutting ceremonies, cheering workers, and the appearance of historic statesmanship. But strategically, it would be a massive error. America should welcome manufacturing investment. It should not invite the Chinese Communist Party to build political tripwires across the American industrial base.

Mr. Bet-David, it’s far worse than you think The obvious FARA violations (like this one) and overt “agents” are just the tip of the iceberg Hidden is the more sophisticated, layered operation that doesn’t cross the threshold. The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) is a Leninist concept put into practice. Xi Jinping called it a “magic weapon” to co-opt, influence, and mobilize non-Party actors - elites, diaspora communities, businesses, academics, and officials - without always crossing into formal foreign agency that triggers registration. UFWD (and related bodies like the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office) runs through proxies: community associations, business councils, cultural groups, and personal relationships. These often operate in the gray zone, by building “friendships,” offering market access, or leveraging family/economic ties, rather than direct payments or orders that meet FARA’s legal threshold (acting at the direction/control of a foreign principal for political activities). US intelligence and congressional reports describe it as systematic: targeting local politicians in Chinese-American enclaves, shaping narratives via seemingly independent orgs, and creating networks of influence that don’t require registration because they’re framed as “people-to-people” engagement. When people hear “spy” they think James Bond. That’s not the case at all with Chinese espionage - it’s far more subtle than that. Furthermore, American elites in finance, business, and government have deep economic entanglements through family in China, board seats, consulting gigs, or investment access. All of this creates aligned incentives without formal recruitment. Just to throw out some names: Feinstein, Kissinger, Neil Bush, McConnell etc. The hidden part of the iceberg is the systemic, non-registerable influence at higher levels.