Some of the paid projects I've worked on since @Web3Bridge involved people I met during the program. Those relationships turned into real collaboration, and I'm grateful for every one of them.
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Joseph
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Joseph retweetledi
Joseph retweetledi
P2P was good… but that’s so 2025.
Ditch the stress. Come onboard Resolva.
Fast and seamless. It’s the Resolva way.
#Resolva #cryptotwitter
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Joseph retweetledi
Security update 🚨
Completed a private Solana audit for CONI Wallet and the results are a reminder of why audits matter:
• 1 Critical vulnerability
• 2 Medium issues
• 6 Low-risk findings
Every bug caught before deployment is a win. The critical issue is already being addressed, and we’re working closely with the team to strengthen the overall security posture.
Now looking to partner with more builders who take security seriously.
Need a smart contract audit or security consultation?
Reach out on Telegram 📩 t.me/Icon0x
Build fast but secure it faster.
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Joseph retweetledi
We got selected for a $10,000 grant from
@avax
No noise. Just building.
With support from @Team1NG & @womenindefi_org, we’ve been heads down building
SliqPay is going LIVE soon.
Care about simpler, faster payments in Africa?
Join the waitlist → sliq-pay-waiting-list.vercel.app
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Day 29/100 of ZK 🔐
Today we finished the core of KZG polynomial commitments by walking through the last two steps: proving an evaluation and verifying it.
Quick recap from yesterday:
* Trusted setup gives us the structured reference string (SRS): powers [τ⁰]₁, [τ¹]₁, …, [τ^d]₁ in G₁ and corresponding powers in G₂.
* Commitment to a polynomial f(x) of degree ≤ d is C = [f(τ)]₁ — one group element.
Step 3: Proving an evaluation
Verifier sends a random challenge a (usually via Fiat-Shamir hash of previous messages).
Prover wants to show f(a) = b.
Compute the quotient polynomial:
q(x) = (f(x) - b) / (x - a)
Since f is degree ≤ d and (x - a) is degree 1, q has degree ≤ d-1.
The proof is simply π = [q(τ)]₁ ∈ G₁ — again, a single group element.
Step 4: Verification
Verifier checks one pairing equation:
e(π, [τ - a]₂) = e(C - [b]₁, [1]₂)
This holds if and only if f(τ) - b = (τ - a) · q(τ), which is true exactly when f(a) = b.
Pairings are bilinear, so the equality checks the polynomial identity without ever seeing f or q.
Why this is so powerful
* Commitment = 1 group element
* Proof = 1 group element
* Verification = 1 pairing check (fast on modern hardware)
* Security rests on the q-SDH assumption (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman) — no known attacks when τ stays secret.
We also talked about why the random challenge a is essential: without it, a malicious prover could precompute fake proofs for fixed points. Fiat-Shamir turns the interactive challenge into a non-interactive hash, making the protocol secure in the random-oracle model.
@Oba_Ddev
#ZeroKnowledgeProof #BuildingInPublic
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Joseph retweetledi
Not bad for my first Rust contest 🎉🎉🎉🤗
Code4rena@code4rena
The results of the $40,000 Rujira Audit Competition are in! Shoutout to everyone who submitted valid findings, especially to @bbl4de_xyz on their first, 1st place finish! Much respect to @RujiraNetwork for their commitment to security! Full list of winners in thread!👇
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Joseph retweetledi
Here is my submission for @nekom0ns ... nekomage
CHINESEWHALESCGT1@ChineseWhales01
///artcontest.exe initiated $1000 prize pool, 4 winners, ends in 4 days ///action> follow nekomons > Qoute tweet this post with your submission > Win prize. Tag your artist friends in the comments. open thread for full details.
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Joseph retweetledi
Joseph retweetledi
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I just want to share what I’ve been up to last month and this month.
I’ve been attending my ZK classes at @Web3Bridge and combining that with BLOK Capital. I’ll be sharing updates about my ZK journey soon, there’s a lot to unpack.
Today is Day 2 of @blok_cap Cohort 1. We discussed the Diamond contract, how it works, and how its functions are structured. The session was led by @mudgen.
Fellow cohort members, I hope you’re enjoying it as much as I am.
We also touched on ERC-8153, which aims to make things easier and more understandable. It was motivated by the fact that ERC-2535 has perceived complexity, high gas costs when deploying diamonds, and complexity in managing function selectors.
#blowthisup #ethereum #Web3 #الرياض_الان
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Day 16/100 of ZK 🔐
Today we focused on XOR, a powerful operator in crypto and ZK circuit design.
Exclusive OR (XOR) is a binary Boolean operator: output is true (1) only when the two inputs differ (one true, one false). Truth table:
* 0 ⊕ 0 = 0
* 0 ⊕ 1 = 1
* 1 ⊕ 0 = 1
* 1 ⊕ 1 = 0
Think of it as a programmable inverter: fix one input (the “control” bit). If control = 0, the other bit passes through unchanged. If control = 1, the other bit gets flipped (inverted). This flip operation is why we call it “bit flipping” in crypto.
Key properties of XOR that matter for ZK:
* Commutative: a ⊕ b = b ⊕ a
* Associative: (a ⊕ b) ⊕ c = a ⊕ (b ⊕ c)
* Self-inverse: a ⊕ a = 0 (flipping twice returns to original)
* Identity element: a ⊕ 0 = a
* Distributive over itself in certain ways, but most importantly: XOR is linear over GF(2) — huge for arithmetic circuits and constraint systems.
Bitwise XOR extends this bit-by-bit across multi-bit values (e.g., 1010 ⊕ 1100 = 0110). In ZK, bitwise XOR gates are cheap to encode as constraints and appear constantly in hash functions, symmetric ciphers, and random linear combinations.
One-time pads (OTP): The standard of perfect secrecy. To encrypt message m with key k (same length, truly random), ciphertext c = m ⊕ k. Decrypt with k ⊕ c = m. Shannon proved OTP is information-theoretically secure, unbreakable if the key is never reused and perfectly random.
But real-world “one-time pads” get attacked hard:
* Key reuse → turns OTP into a Vigenère cipher (breakable via frequency analysis or known-plaintext).
* Poor randomness → attacker can exploit patterns.
* Implementation leaks (side-channels, padding oracles, etc.).
* Key management disasters (predictable generation, storage failures).
In ZK context, XOR gates are everywhere because they’re linear and easy to constrain, while understanding OTP reminds us why perfect secrecy is rare, and why we need zero-knowledge to prove things without leaking the actual secrets.
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