
放假不大雨,大雨不放假。
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放假不大雨,大雨不放假。
@gentleflyman








A Ukrainian station for FPV drone control has directional antennas that can be moved by remote controlled servos. Control stations are safely separated from the operator. Directional antennas send and receive signals in one direction, as they form a narrow lobe (signal pattern).








Russian blogger Alexander Karchenko describes how increased Ukrainian mid-range UAV attacks this year are decimating Russian logistics: 1/ [Russians are hit by Ukrainian “Hornet” strike UAV]






Tokyo Just Carved Abe's Taiwan Doctrine in Stone — and Beijing Can't Do a Thing About It. While Beijing was still mid-tantrum over Sanae Takaichi's "existential threat" doctrine on Taiwan, Tokyo quietly hosted exactly what the Chinese Communist Party would have killed to prevent: the inaugural "Shinzo Abe and Modern Japan Research International Forum," themed "Abe's Grand Strategy and the Taiwan-Japan Relationship as the Cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific." Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te headlined the opening by video on June 9, 2026 — and his message was unmistakable. Abe's strategic estate is now an institution, and the first island chain is hardening into a permanent geopolitical fact. This is not nostalgia. This is doctrine being canonized. On September 21, 2025, the anniversary of Abe's birth, Taiwan's National Chengchi University inaugurated the world's first permanent research center named after the assassinated former premier — an unprecedented honor a sovereign democracy bestows on a foreign statesman. Less than seven weeks later, Takaichi — Japan's first female prime minister and holder of a Diet supermajority — told parliament that a Chinese use of force against Taiwan would qualify as "a survival-threatening situation," the most explicit statutory linkage of Taiwan's fate to Japan's national survival ever uttered by a sitting Japanese PM. Beijing erupted: economic coercion, scrambled diplomatic channels, and on November 8 the now-infamous "dirty neck" post by Xue Jian, China's Consul-General in Osaka — a remark Washington formally characterized as a threat against a sitting allied head of government. Tokyo did not flinch. On December 4, 2025, Japan and Taiwan signed a Digital Trade Agreement — the first major bilateral accord after the row, a calculated middle finger to Beijing's pressure campaign. Six months on, the Abe Center stages its inaugural Tokyo forum with Lai opening it. The signal to Zhongnanhai could not be more brutal: coercion failed. Lai's remarks were tight and surgical. He praised Takaichi for "continuing Abe's vision" via the upgraded Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy she unveiled at Vietnam National University on May 2, 2026. He named the first island chain. He named shared security challenges. He embedded Abe's signature line — "A Taiwan emergency is a Japan emergency" — into the historical canon. This is no longer one man's brave aphorism. It is Japanese governing doctrine under a prime minister with the political capital to enforce it. Abe served 3,188 days — the longest tenure in Japan's constitutional history — and used that time to dismantle the postwar pacifist firewall: collective self-defense unlocked, CPTPP delivered, the Quad revived, FOIP exported globally. Takaichi inherits this scaffolding and is welding Taiwan into the deterrence architecture in ways Abe himself could only signal. Layer on the US-Taiwan Reciprocal Trade Agreement signed February 12, 2026, Taiwan's $250 billion commitment to US semiconductor and AI investment, and TSMC's Kumamoto build-out — and the trilateral US-Japan-Taiwan industrial bloc is now physical infrastructure, not whitepaper. Beijing's playbook — punish Japan, isolate Taiwan, peel Tokyo from Washington — has produced the opposite outcome on every axis. Each act of coercion accelerates institutional binding. Each diplomatic outburst hardens Japanese public opinion. Each Taiwan Strait incursion makes Takaichi's existential-threat doctrine more defensible at home. The Abe Forum in Tokyo is not a conference. It is a tombstone — for the strategic ambiguity Beijing once exploited, and for the illusion that Japan's Taiwan posture can be reversed by tantrum. But the coercion failure is the easy half of the story. The hard half — why Beijing's loss is now structural, irreversible, and accelerating — needs a longer canvas. Full intelligence brief below ⬇️

前几年,美国大使馆的微博贴过一篇有关明恩溥的文章。他从美国到中国,在山东农村传教,算是最早的美国汉学家之一。但他不是书呆子汉学家,而是有中国基层生活经验的洋鬼子,所以当时中国文人那种对民间恶劣习俗的掩盖和信口开河的涂抹糊弄不了他。看一下他写的《中国人的性格》,就知道现在中国社会的各种问题清末时就盛行,当时还没有共产党这种东西。庚子拳乱后,明恩溥也是劝说美国政府将庚子赔款用于中国教育的主要人物之一,后来的清华大学等就是这么建起来的。他是真爱中国的美国人。 当今中国,有耐心读书的人不多,大多只读标题。把明恩溥《中国人的性格》各章标题抄录于下,习惯读标题的读者从中可以看到当代中国人的性格跟光绪年间相比有多少长进: 第一章 保全面子 第二章 节俭持家 第三章 勤劳刻苦 第四章 讲究礼貌 第五章 漠视时间 第六章 漠视精确 第七章 易于误解 第八章 拐弯抹角 第九章 顺而不从 第十章 思绪含混 第十一章 不紧不慢 第十二章 轻视外族 第十三章 缺乏公心 第十四章 因循守旧 第十五章 随遇而安 第十六章 顽强生存 第十七章 能忍且韧 第十八章 知足常乐 第十九章 孝悌为先 第二十章 仁爱之心 第二十一章 缺乏同情 第二十二章 社会风波 第二十三章 诛连守法 第二十四章 相互猜疑 第二十五章 誠信匱乏 第二十六章 多元信仰 第二十七章 中国的现实与时务 英文各章标题: 1.Face 2.Economy 3.Industry 4.Politeness 5.The Disregard of Time 6.The Disregard of Accuracy 7. The Talent for Misunderstanding 8.The Talent for Indirection 9. Flexible Inflexibility 10.Intellectual Turbidity 11. The Absence of Nerves 12.Contempt for Foreigners 13.The Absence of Public Spirit 14.Conservatism 15.Indifference to Comfort and Convenience 16.Physical Vitality 17.Patience and Perseverance 18.Content and Cheerfulness 19.Filial Piety 20.Benevolence 21.The Absence of Sympathy 22.Social Typhoons 23. Mutual Responsibility and Respect for Law 24.Mutual Suspicion 25.The Absence of Sincerity 26.Polytheism, Pantheism, Atheism 27. The Real Condition of China and Her Present Needs

Mech & Aero is an area where, beyond a point, you learn only by doing and working in the ecosystems where state of the art/contemporary work is happening. There are no online resources where you can stay abreast of even 10% of what’s happening at near state of the art. The observed insights, the iterated methodologies, the analysis parameters all remain trade secrets. It diffuses entirely on a need to know basis. Two men of similar acumen would see significant divergence in their additional know why if they work in two different ecosystems in two different countries. This is true even in computational engineering domains.

















