Nige Cook

12 Russian shadow fleet tankers struck by the Unmanned Systems Forces last night: 9 dry cargo ships, 1 tanker, 1 gas tanker and 1 tugboat. That brings the total to 159 vessels in 12 days! 117 of them were struck in the Sea of Azov, and 42 in the Black Sea.

Yesterday, Putin issued a threat against Ukraine’s European allies, calling for an "analysis" of each country’s involvement in every Ukrainian operation "in order to possibly make responsible decisions in the future, if necessary." Judging by the latest news, Moscow is no longer merely waging a hybrid war against the West. It can be assumed that it is preparing the operational environment for a possible direct conflict with NATO, staying below the threshold that would trigger a collective military response. My conclusion is based on three groups of reports that have appeared in the public domain over the past ten days. The first is the IISS report published on July 2. It says that between August 2024 and February 2026, 144 drone incidents took place in 13 countries, each time with tankers from Russia’s shadow fleet nearby. The targets of these drones were NATO nuclear infrastructure sites: RAF Lakenheath, the Île Longue submarine base, and nuclear-sharing air bases in Belgium and the Netherlands. That is, Russia is effectively preparing the theater for future military operations - mapping air defenses and measuring response times. The second group of news involves intelligence warnings. On June 22, Latvian intelligence reported signs of preparations for military provocations against the Baltic states or Poland. On June 26, The Guardian confirmed these assessments, citing two countries on NATO’s eastern flank. A source in one of the countries said Putin may try to test U.S. guarantees toward the alliance’s smallest members. On July 3, The Telegraph reported that the United States has been systematically informing Warsaw about Russian plans. The scenarios range from drone strikes on critical infrastructure and a simulated massive air attack to a limited incursion by Russian or Belarusian troops from Kaliningrad or Belarus, disguised as a navigation error or a rescue operation. According to Polish sources, Moscow’s calculation is that, instead of opening fire, Poland would be forced under U.S. pressure to enter negotiations, and Russia’s central demand for "withdrawing troops" would be an end to Western support for Ukraine. The third group of news concerns legitimization. On June 23, Putin spoke of "retaliation" against countries from whose territory drones are allegedly launched against Russia. At the same time, Russia accused Latvia of providing territory for preparing attacks, while Ukraine’s Security Service exposed a network of 11 people paid by Moscow to carry out anti-Ukrainian actions in Poland. We can see that Moscow is preparing the environment for a direct conflict - building the necessary infrastructure: intelligence, sabotage, and narrative. It is important to pay attention to the method itself. Small provocations and incidents without a collective response show where the alliance’s threshold lies - and move it. Charlie Edwards, co-author of the IISS report, summed it up this way: Russia has publicly demonstrated its ability to penetrate NATO airspace without triggering a collective response, and the gap between the alliance’s capabilities and its political will has become a strategic vulnerability. Thus, at some point Moscow may feel that a limited operation - against Poland or one of the Baltic states - could bring a high return: for example, forcing NATO to negotiate a halt to aid for Ukraine. Signs that the Kremlin is developing escalation decisions would include narratives about "Ukrainian sabotage from NATO territory," the transfer of forces to Kaliningrad and Belarus, the concentration of the shadow fleet near critical infrastructure, and tankers being escorted by warships.

The current phase of the conflict between the United States and Iran is a struggle over control of the Strait of Hormuz. Since April, virtually every action taken by both sides has revolved around the strait. The air campaign that began on February 28 targeted Iran's air force, navy, and air defenses but failed to achieve any political objectives, while a U.S. ground operation has remained out of the question. As a result, the strait has become Iran's only remaining lever of influence and the United States' only tangible way of demonstrating results. The collapse of the memorandum was built into its very wording. The agreement's key provision required Iran only to make its "best efforts" to ensure the safe passage of vessels, free of charge and only for 60 days, while leaving open the possibility of future "service fees." Tehran interpreted this as recognition of its right to administer the strait, with a temporary exemption for international shipping. Washington, on the other hand, viewed it as a return to freedom of navigation. The ambiguity that made the agreement possible also guaranteed its eventual collapse. Iran is not acting chaotically - it is deliberately escalating the situation as a unified state. The theory that negotiations are being sabotaged by rogue hardliners within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) does not fit the facts: every branch of the Iranian government is delivering the same message. Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf has stated that the strait will reopen only on Iran's terms. The authority responsible for overseeing the strait refuses to guarantee the safety of vessels sailing outside the Iranian-designated route. The IRGC has attacked precisely such vessels. Even the "moderate" Foreign Minister Araghchi has voiced no objection to charging ships for passage. The timing of Iran's strikes is also revealing: Tehran responds after U.S. naval escorts guide ships along routes outside the Iranian corridor, rather than before negotiations begin. The United States also wants to be compensated for its role. On Monday, President Trump announced that the United States would become the "guardian of the Strait of Hormuz" and would charge 20% of the cargo's value for safe passage. By Tuesday, however, under pressure from Gulf allies, shipping companies, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), he withdrew the proposed fee, replacing it with large-scale investment and trade agreements from Gulf states. While the direct tariff was abandoned, the underlying principle remained unchanged: someone must pay for maritime security, only now in a different form. Iran does not reject that principle. Araghchi responded that payment should be made to Iran instead: "Twenty percent is too much. We'll be fair." There is little room for compromise in this conflict. If both sides continue insisting on control, the next agreement will have only two possible outcomes: either it explicitly states who controls passage through the strait - forcing one side into a public defeat - or it once again leaves the issue deliberately ambiguous, as the June memorandum did. The most sensible solution would be to return to the principle of freedom of navigation. However, that path would require greater effort from the world's most influential powers. As a result, the most likely scenario is that the conflict will continue in its current form: limited strikes without escalating into a full-scale military campaign. China stands to gain the most from this conflict. The current situation serves Beijing's interests: Chinese tankers continue to transit the strait, the U.S. effort to police it costs Washington both money and credibility, and an increasingly weakened Iran becomes ever more dependent on China. Beijing also has a broader strategic interest in undermining the principle of freedom of navigation itself. For decades, the United States relied on that principle to challenge China's claims in the South China Sea. Now, if Washington itself restricts access to an international waterway while negotiating payment for passage, that argument loses much of its force. China will be able to point to the American precedent when justifying restrictions on navigation in waters it considers its own.

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