Hasan Cheema Punjabi

Pakistani military junta's mouthpiece @mosharrafzaidi says, "Pakistan will come to the 'aid' of Saudi Arabia whenever needed." However, it's just unsolicited political rhetoric to stay relevant. This is why Pakistan is irrelevant in the U.S./Israel–Iran conflict, and why Pakistan cannot come to Saudi Arabia's "aid": 1. Pakistan does not have the capacity to "aid" Saudi Arabia. Saudi air defense mechanisms are far superior to those of Pakistan. Saudi Arabia needs defense against Iranian loitering munitions and ballistic missiles. Pakistan, in its May 2025 conflict against India, was badly exposed, lacking robust capacity to tackle Indian drones and missiles. Indian drones and missiles struck Pakistani military bases essentially uncontested. The only Pakistani air defense mechanism that worked for Pakistan was engaging and shooting down Indian fighter jets, which is not a requirement for the Saudis. So Pakistan will look clueless regarding Saudi defense requirements. 2. Pakistan cannot carry out preemptive strikes on targets in Iran. Pakistan has no real options beyond producing statements and symbolic gestures, mostly for self‑promotion. The goal is to appear relevant and suggest that it is ready to honor its defense pact with Saudi Arabia, even though there is no actual requirement and practical involvement is highly unlikely. 3. Pakistan cannot take any military action against Iran that would bring Pakistan into the direct firing line of deadly Iranian missiles. Pakistan's missile defense system is not good enough to handle an Iranian missile and drone barrage. The U.S. and NATO will not come to Pakistan's aid, and China won’t either. Pakistan will be on its own. Pakistan knows what’s at stake here. 4. Pakistan's internal sectarian fault lines and the insurgency problem in Balochistan are another hurdle to any action against Iran. Pakistan and Iran also have history. Iran, in collaboration with India, has been backing the insurgency in Pakistan's Balochistan province bordering Iran for strategic interests, but Pakistan has always avoided naming Iran, including when it busted Iranian intelligence rackets in Pakistan. Iran was always referred to as a "neighboring country" in dossiers. Pakistan never had the stomach to engage in active conflict with Iran. 5. Pakistan cannot afford to open another front when it already has two fronts open: one very volatile with Afghanistan and another with India that always remains a ticking time bomb. 6. Pakistani military dictator Asim Munir has already consolidated power, rewritten the constitution, technically secured a ten-year extension, and a lifetime position. His priority is regime stability. A conflict with Iran would carry unpredictable risks. This caution was evident in May 2025, when Pakistan avoided proportional retaliation after Indian cruise missile strikes, opting instead for limited artillery rocket responses to avoid escalation. Kashmiri militant groups have also been visibly pressured to halt operations in order to prevent further confrontation with India. There has not been a single attack in Kashmir since the April 2025 attack on Indian tourists in Pahalgam, which essentially confirms that the Pakistani military tightened its screws on Kashmiri insurgents, paralyzing them from carrying out any operations to avoid any military conflict with India. India has choked Pakistan's water. The Pakistani military does not even talk about it anymore. 7. Saudi Arabia does not want Pakistan to strike Iran. Saudi Arabia will unlikely strike Iran itself too. Saudi Arabia will avoid any direct confrontation with Iran. The economic and security costs would be enormous, and escalation could once again activate the Houthis. For that reason, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to pressure Pakistan into military action against Iran. Iran would also limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia to the U.S. base in Riyadh, U.S. diplomatic facilities, and oil facilities to put pressure on Trump, not wild and random strikes as we have seen in the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The most Pakistan can do here is send some unbidden personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia to ‘help’ shoot down drones, again, not out of necessity, but purely for optics and PR. Pakistani military is a PR army. Follow @pakistanwalli for local perspectives from Pakistan and the region!