Muneeb

“There is a war coming, Ned. I don’t know when, I don’t know who we’ll be fighting, but it’s coming.” Robert Baratheon was, in many ways, speaking to today’s geopolitical circumstances.

@afsharehman478 Got it, thank you.

@iammuneeb6 Confirmed news..tc

Has the reopening of educational institutions in Punjab been officially confirmed? I need to travel from one province to another.

@afsharehman478 Okay, thank you.

@iammuneeb6 1st April but not sure (it’s in news)

It somehow feels like −5 C in Upper Dir.

In the midst of war and uncertainty, I realized that I have pending work to complete.

All roads lead to Chabahar.

Recent U.S. remarks on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program once again reflect a flawed assessment, reminiscent of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment. Pakistan poses no threat to the U.S. homeland; its nuclear doctrine remains India-centric.

Tulsi Gabbard’s statement reflects a persistent flaw in US threat assessments: substituting worst-case speculation for grounded analysis. Pakistan’s deterrence posture is India-centric. Folding it into a US homeland threat narrative is misleading. For those interested in the longer argument, I addressed this framing in detail in my rebuttal of an article by Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi: thefridaytimes.com/26-Jun-2025/re… The claim that Pakistan is pursuing capabilities to target the US ignores decades of evidence: its nuclear program, doctrine, and missile development have remained India-centric. Even its longest-range systems are calibrated to deny India strategic depth, not project power beyond the region. What is being read as “expansion” is more plausibly a response to India’s growing reach, ballistic missile defence, MIRVs, and an expanding network of overseas bases in the Indian Ocean. Deterrence adapts, folks! it does not operate in a vacuum. Equating Pakistan with North Korea, or folding it into a generic US homeland threat narrative, is counterproductive. It obscures the real driver of instability in South Asia: a deepening security dilemma shaped by asymmetries and unchecked capability growth on one side. There is no evidence that Pakistan is designing missiles to reach beyond targets associated with India’s present or future capabilities. A more serious conversation would move beyond worst-case speculation and engage with the regional logic that actually drives nuclear decision-making in South Asia.

@famguye Acha

Played a T20 match in Ramzan, and now I can’t move an inch.

Stay tuned to @CSSPR_UOL for a conversation on the Iran war.

@famguye 😆😆

@famguye Specific military actions, but it may not change the overall direction of the war.

Boss, Yeh tactical victory kia hoti ha?

have all been targeted so far. What else remains for face saving? They are unlikely to use tactical nuclear weapons, but more intense bombing may be the next step, perhaps, starting today.

For now, an operational victory has been made impossible for the US and Israel. However, they are still looking for a tactical victory. But what options do they have? Military targets, headquarters, energy infrastructure (to some extent), decapitation strikes, and even civilians

Primarily because of doctrinal priorities and financial constraints. Doctrinal priorities: focuses on sea denial, missile capability, modern frigates, and A2/AD. Pakistan focuses on sea denial strategy, making it costly for an India to operate freely, instead of sea control.

@RealSahibzada, tu bhi mar le. Kab tak single leta rahega.

Pakistan demonstrated willingness to engaged. The dots here should be connected to the scale of the strikes. For now, no HVTs are being targeted in Kandahar, but the option remains open for the future.

which is a de facto regime, not a de jure one. Acting like one (formal), despite that, Pakistan remained open to dialogue. Indispensable question: are de facto and de jure regimes treated the same, even in the context of truce agreements?

Ignoring the broader context of the conflict leads to a flawed assessment. One must connect the dots between the conditions agreed in Doha, the subsequent violations, and Pakistan setting a new precedent. Indeed, this new precedent was effectively imposed on Pakistan by the IEA,