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One of the key questions of the new nuclear age is how big China's nuclear arsenal will ultimately grow.
In my new piece for @DefenseOne, I game out potential endpoints. Link in next tweet (free to access, no paywall).
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Jacob Stokes
9.5K posts
Jacob Stokes
@jacobstokes
Senior Fellow & Deputy Director, Indo-Pacific Security Program, @CNASdc. Find me at: @jacobstokes.bsky.social.
Washington, D.C. Katılım Haziran 2009
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So pleased that @selinawangtv included my LOTR reference in her excellent piece detailing how the Iran war is affecting US-China relations.
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@alaynatreene @PressSec Thanks, Alayna. Might you be able to confirm whether she said in Washington, or in the US generally (i.e., could be at Mar a Lago)?
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Trump's China trip will now take place on May 14 & 15th, @PressSec announces
Trump & Xi will meet in Beijing. Leavitt says Trump will host Xi in Washington at a later date
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Jacob Stokes retweetledi
NEWS: Trump - Xi meeting rescheduled for May 14-15
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Bob Mueller guest-lectured in one of the classes I took at @GeorgetownCSS as a student, post his tenure at FBI and pre Special Counsel.
He came off as totally unassuming, warm, and thoughtful--a patriotic man from a more civil time. RIP and thanks for your service.
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Jacob Stokes retweetledi
1/ There are intensifying pressures on the cross-Strait status quo and debates in Washington about how US should respond. To interrogate options for adapting American policy, Jude Blanchette and I convened a diverse group of US experts on Taiwan. (🧵).
brookings.edu/collection/cro…
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Jacob Stokes retweetledi
SCOOP: "The next dates for the Trump-Xi summit will only be proposed after the active part of the Iran conflict is over" via @politico @_AriHawkins @drdesrochers subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2026/0…
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Jacob Stokes retweetledi
We break on China/Taiwan-- buried in IC Worldwide Threat Assessment: “Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification,” said the annual threat assessment, released Wednesday.
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@adam_tooze Nice graphic. What's the source? Credit just says authors.
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Nice graphic illustrating the Biden-era shift in the US alliance system in Asia from hub and spokes to latticework. One thought was that it might be “Trump-proof”. This and more on the Chartbook Top Links today.
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@jacobstokes Russia is, by far, China’s greatest overland pipeline supplier, Kazakhstan is a distant second (and its pipeline carries some Russian crude), and Burmese supplies are negligible. Burmese flows might transit SoH but could also come from Angola
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Trump calls on China to aid with oil convoys in Strait of Hormuz. It’s highly unlikely that Beijing will agree because of political reasons. Additionally, the PRC is less exposed to a SoH crisis than many realize. 1/x
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@Joe_Webster_CRR Genuine question: Would the crude coming through Burma have transited Hormuz earlier in its journey?
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Furthermore, most of the PRC’s oil imports don’t transit SoH (they have overland oil pipelines with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Burma). 3/x
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@ZichenWanghere Important to know, thanks. I still think the lack of a pre-meeting with Rubio and Wang suggests talks on foreign and security affairs topics will be shallower and occupy less time in the leaders session.
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@jacobstokes SCMP reported yesterday Marco Rubio will join Trump in Beijing
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Watch to see if there's an analogous meeting between Marco Rubio and Wang Yi to prepare for the summit.
If not, expect trade, economics, and some tech issues to be the main focus of the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting (as is currently the baseline assumption).
PBS News@NewsHour
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent will meet with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng on Sunday and Monday in Paris for a new round of trade talks, the Treasury Department said, paving the way for President Donald Trump's state visit to Beijing starting March 31. to.pbs.org/4cLw4Uu
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...or if the Indo-Pacific was the US's priority region or China the pacing challenge.
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Among other factors, the National Security Council process has been dramatically scaled back under Trump 2.
NSC process can be genuinely burdensome, even painful. But it also helps identify and then prevent or mitigate in advance these types of issues that cross agencies/depts.
Derek Thompson@DKThomp
Okay good, let's say the WH planned for Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz following the attack. 1. The U.S. sold off its helium reserve before waging a war that they knew would disrupt helium exports to allies, which make computer chips we rely on. Weird decision. 2. The U.S. let oil stockpiles fall to a multi-decade low before waging a war they knew would disrupt oil shipping. Why? 3. The U.S. didn't build any kind of coalition to assist tankers coming under attack in the region, and two weeks into the war they're only now asking allies to reinforce the US Navy. But they knew they'd need to do this for ... "years"? If this is what "a plan" looks like, god forbid we see what unplanned operations look like.
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From @ColinKahl's FA piece. Few know this issue in more depth than Colin. foreignaffairs.com/iran/what-endg…
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"There is a painful paradox here. The display of American military power has been stunning, & adversaries will take note. But the US could emerge from this war militarily overstretched, depleted, out of position, & therefore weaker vis-à-vis China & Russia for years to come."
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Jacob Stokes retweetledi
An important data point in the debate about whether to take Trump's foreign policy statements seriously, literally, or both.
Julia Ioffe@juliaioffe
In retrospect, it seems like changing the department's name to Department of War was a strong signal of what this administration wanted to do, huh
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Another way to view the situation is that Trump sees China as a geopolitical competitor/partner but *not* an ideological rival--if anything, there's an ideological affinity for Xi. That's a major departure from Biden, Obama, and, arguably, Trump 1.
Edward Wong@ewong
Trump doesn’t view China through the same lens of broad geopolitical rivalry that many other US officials do. He sees China as more of a potential partner.
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