Joequant

a short war. It's either because the Israelis really believed that they could get a short war or alternatively they figured that once the US dropped bombs that the US would be committed to a long war even if they didn't want it.

Rather than try to get the political support for a long war, the US started on day one announcing that this was a short war, which means that you are going to have a total disaster in about a month. I think that the Israelis managed to get Trump to attack Iran by promising him

What is remarkable about the Iranian war is that the Trump and the US/Israeli forces on day one promised a short war. Usually in this type of war, one side is able to put in overwhelming military force and the other side just extends the war for as long as possible.

@Economyimprover en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation… Pakistani forces were able to very quickly eliminate the Bengali nationalist forces by martial law, but this just set the stage for a somewhat more prolonged fight.

@joequant Bangladesh Independence war?? How so

This is not a new military strategy. It is a very old one. Look up every colonial war in the last several hundred years. Heck. Just look up the American Revolution. The British managed to hold all of the major American cities, attacked the capital, and won most battles.

@gaijinthoughts @HQuestion2 My guess as an outsider is that the Iran war is something of a big game changer.

@HQuestion2 Japanese voters are quick to turn on PMs. Voter behavior + the LDP shifting blame onto PMs for the country's continued decline cause such sharp drops in PM approval.

PM Takaichi’s support has fallen 23.5% in 2.5 months. Disapproval has more than doubled from 15.0% to 35.9%. news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/article…

@AngelicaOung Iran. The big support for Takaichi was that she was going to fix the economy. The Iran war makes this much more difficult. Also a pro-US, pro-military, anti-China policy doesn't look that great given that Japan gets 90+% of its oil from Middle East.

WoW…how did it fall so fast?

@Why__Knot @johnkonrad And I think that the US is more likely to have "regime change" before the Iranians.

@joequant @johnkonrad The Iranian Air Force will still be destroyed in the future. The Arabian navy will still be destroyed in the future. The Iranian regime has been completely devastated. Desertions and structural failings are happening in the chain of command now. It is not a good situation

Only if the United States lets them. The US Navy can close the strait at anytime to anyone paying the enemy.

@RnaudBertrand @BrianMcDonaldIE The thing is that everyone in China would prefer good relations with both Russia and US, and I assume things are the same with in Russia WRT to China and the US. It's crazy that no one in the US seems to be interested in having good relations for the sake of good relations.

@BrianMcDonaldIE "What’s almost universally agreed, however, is that Russia is not going to join a US-led coalition against China. The Moscow–Beijing partnership is far too important for that." That was my point: a so-called "reverse Kissinger" is delusional.

Arnaud is 100% right about the basic structure of the trade relationship. Russia and China are economically complementary in a way Russia and the US simply aren’t. China needs huge volumes of energy and raw materials and Russia produces them. And beyond economics there’s also geography: Moscow has little interest in a hostile China on its vast eastern border. That alone makes the strategic partnership extremely valuable. But the picture also isn’t quite as smooth as he suggests. There's also a fair amount of unease in Moscow about how the relationship works in practice. Russian officials and companies regularly complain that Beijing drives a very hard bargain. Gas pricing negotiations are a good example, where China has pushed for steep discounts. The slow progress on projects like Power of Siberia-2 has also caused frustration. And in the consumer sector there’s irritation that Chinese carmakers mostly prefer exporting vehicles to Russia rather than localizing production the way German and Korean firms once did by building factories. More broadly, Russia can’t change its geography or its cultural history. Because of that, there will always be different schools of thought in Moscow. One camp argues that Russia should eventually restore working relations with the US and Western Europe once the current confrontation subsides. Another believes China should be Russia’s principal strategic partner as part of a broader Eurasian alignment. And a third view, which you hear quite often, is that Russia should ultimately try to remain neutral between major blocs and avoid becoming a frontline state in great-power rivalry once the Ukraine conflict ends. What’s almost universally agreed, however, is that Russia is not going to join a US-led coalition against China. The Moscow–Beijing partnership is far too important for that. At the same time, it’s equally wrong to assume Russia wants to become permanently dependent on China. There is plenty of concern in Moscow about excessive economic and technological reliance on Beijing. Historically Russia has preferred room for manoeuvre between major powers rather than permanent alignment with one. From that perspective, the ideal outcome for Moscow would be something closer to strategic flexibility: strong ties with China, but the ability to reopen practical relations with the West if circumstances allow. Close to many, owned by none, as it were.

@GlennLuk Yeah. The reason I am an industrial maximialist is that I can *FEEL* the economic growth that happens when you build the new infrastructure. The location of the links make a lot of sense once you live here.

The economic value of high fixed-cost infrastructure projects is determined by its usage. That so many recent infrastructure projects see heavy upfront usage is fairly dispositive evidence that they will be productive over their long useful lives. It also indicates that there is still a lengthy pipeline of productive infrastructure project opportunities that have yet to be built.

Two things to note: 1) “current Pearl River crossings are saturated” (despite certain folks constantly asserting how China ran out of ‘productive’ infrastructure opportunities decades ago - the ~50 km Zhongshan-Shenzhen bridge just opened up in 2024 and serves ~100k crossings per day i.e. more than the ~2.6 km Holland Tunnel) 2) integrated road-rail link: car, HSR and intercity rail links all on one line

@GlennLuk @DasLittleBodhi The thing about the bridge is that it makes it practical to live in Zhuhai or Macau and then commute to HK.

@GlennLuk @DasLittleBodhi This also has the effect of focusing developing in Hong Kong toward Lantau and the Western areas near the airport. They've also streamlined the international crossing. Right now I just badge across with my card, and they are working on biometrics so that I just walk across.

@GlennLuk @DasLittleBodhi The reason they worked on the Zhuhai-HK-Macau link first is that it pushes new development in Gongbei and Lantau. Qianhai-Zhuhai is going to be cool but it connects two districts that are already developed.

@GlennLuk @DasLittleBodhi The big point of the Macau-HK bridge wasn't so much to connect Macau and HK but rather to connect HK with Zhuhai. Basically it connects Lantau Island straight to Zhuhai and a stone throw from the Zhuhai high speed rail.

@Why__Knot Or maybe you have a terrible insight into how other people think? The thing is that if I managed to be convinced that the Iranians are the good guys then it's possible that a lot of other people see things the same way.

@joequant I’d like to offer you the charitable interpretation that you have simply been overwhelmed by the propaganda you’re reading and are not overtly immoral; but that charitable interpretation is less and less viable given you are spreading things you know to be false.

Look. More and more people are starting to think that the Iranians are the good guys and the US/Israelis are the bad guys. So just look at what the Iranians are bombing. Military/economic targets designed to minimize loss of life. Compare that to what the Israelis are doing

@policytensor The trouble is that if you enjoy escalation dominance than why escalate. In fact "escalate to deescalate" is usually invoked as a result of internal political issues.

Escalate-to-deescalate can only work if you enjoy escalation dominance, which is not just a function of capabilities but largely a function of the balance of resolve: you must be prepared to bear the costs of escalation more than the enemy. The doctrine assumes and works on a specific asymmetric information theory of the conflict: the diagnosis is that the enemy was insufficiently informed of your superior resolve. Escalation therefore serves as a corrective: “Look, I am way more resolved than you think. See how much I am willing risk here. Are you?” The attacks on energy infrastructure do not fit the bill. What seems to have happened here is simpler. Israel stuck gas infrastructure to impose costs on Iran bc it does not give a shit about the Iranian retaliation on the gulf. This threw a wrench into US efforts to control escalation, prompting the WH to order Israel to stop.

@Why__Knot Must really annoy you that more and more people are coming around to my way of thinking...... :-) :-) :-)

@joequant They are strong enough to: - take out all the senior leadership in one swoop - take out the acting leadership in a second swoop - take out others methodically - destroy the navy/Air Force - neuter Iranian offenses In days. But continue to spin. Desperately.

So this is where reality hits fantasy. The US claims that they've destroyed the Iranian military. GREAT!!!! Then just send in the US military march to Tehran and unblock the straits. The longer the US waits before taking military action, the longer people will start thinking

what I really think.

What's actually crazy is when someone is telling me that not only am I wrong (which happens a lot) but somehow I *know* that I am wrong. The thing is that I can't promise you that I get my facts right. I might be crazy. The thing that I can promise you is that I will tell you

@Why__Knot So just ignore me and win the war.

@joequant Except that US is winning this war, in every meaningful way. Propagandists desperate to paint Iran as some kind of victor do crazy mental gymnastics; yourself exemplar.

@CarlZha Ten years? A lot of us are shocked at how incompetent the US has been over the last three weeks.

I think the biggest shock to Chinese leadership over the last 10 years is the dawning realization that they had VASTLY overestimated intelligence and compentency of American leadership