나랏일이 항상 걱정인 시골_한량

🫤A person claiming to be a “loyal subordinate of General Zhang” sent a letter to Cai Shenkun @cskun1989, who had previously accurately revealed the news of Zhang Youxia’s arrest, saying that Zhang was detained because he advocated taking Taiwan, while Xi Jinping, out of cowardice, would rather flip the table than take action. Below is the full text of the letter. Cai Shenkun personally believes the letter shows heavy signs of AI generation and does not appear genuine, but he nonetheless published the entire text. An English translation follows: “Zhang Youxia Advocated Sending Troops to Taiwan; Xi Jinping, Cowardly, Turned Inward” — A purge born of fear Xi would rather flip the table than make a move. On January 24, 2026, news of the arrests of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli was made public. In the eyes of many who understand how the system works, this was a textbook example of an extremely high-risk purge—one driven not by anti-corruption, but by fear: a preemptive political cleanup fueled by personal emotion and political instinct. Few people know that recently, at a very small, closed-door meeting, Zhang Youxia unusually proposed to Xi: “Why not take advantage of the uncertainty in the Russia–Ukraine war and the situation in Iran to act proactively—at least seize a few small islands around Taiwan?” His reasoning was simple: “Rather than sitting around waiting to die, it’s better to fight a limited war that can deter the United States, Taiwan, and the international community—at the very least to buy breathing room and time for internal consolidation.” This was neither war mania nor ideological zeal for ‘national reunification.’ It was a “strategic delay plan” put forward by a veteran military commander who clearly understands that the domestic economy is severely imbalanced, local finances are on the brink of exhaustion, and the stability-maintenance system is riddled with cracks—shift pressure outward tactically to buy a time window and avoid total collapse. Xi Jinping’s reaction, however, surprised everyone. He neither rejected the idea on the spot nor expressed support. Instead, while publicly talking at length about “strategic stability” and “patience in struggle,” he privately began arranging Zhang’s arrest. Some say this reflected Xi’s “clear judgment.” But those who truly understand this power struggle know the truth: Xi was acting not out of strategy, but out of fear. He feared losing a war; feared that once fighting began, the U.S. military might intervene or even carry out a decapitation strike against him personally. He feared an uncontrollable expansion of the battlefield if Taiwan were attacked. And he feared even more that Zhang might mobilize other forces within the military, shattering an already wavering chain of loyalty. So he chose to flip the table inward—to chop off the hands that wanted to move. He would rather endure panic within the Party, chilling disillusionment in the military, and deep suspicion throughout the grassroots system than tolerate anyone who did not act solely on his direct orders proposing an independent course at a critical moment. And this precisely exposes the final illusion within the system: Xi is not a strategic leader; he is a coward and a lonely ruler clinging to power through fear. Zhang may not be a hero, but at least he still had ideas. Xi may still control power, but he has lost all trust. This is the true picture of the Chinese Communist regime in early 2026: no strategy, only instinct; no unified goal, only reflexive self-preservation. One wonders whether the next person who “dares to think”—and who poses a potential threat—is already on the purge list. — A loyal subordinate of General Zhang