Anton Gerashchenko@Gerashchenko_en
I’m not buying the explanation that Russia’s internet lockdown is just an "anti-drone measure."
Yes, there is an anti-drone logic behind it, but it seems much more like part of a stricter mobilization model: first, the state suppresses communications and limits access to keep people within a controlled digital environment, and only afterward will it conduct a new wave of mobilization with less chaos and less room for resistance.
Russia is preparing for a larger war and a broader mobilization.
For the process to go smoothly, the regime needs to reduce information leaks, make summonses digital and unavoidable, and narrow the space for evasion and escape.
That’s why Russia has already launched electronic summonses - to make it harder for men to avoid conscription.
We don’t know exactly where the Kremlin will deploy the next wave of cannon fodder. But we do know that Putin is already expanding the army to 1.5 million active personnel, and the Kremlin has openly justified this by citing threats on the Western flank and the need to create new structures in the northwest.
Analysts have noted that Russia cannot start a second war without withdrawing forces from Ukraine. However, for a limited local operation - for example, in the Baltic region - Russia might need roughly 60-90 thousand troops for a second theater. Not "another Ukraine." Not hundreds of thousands in the first wave. Just 60-90 thousand, if they are supported with drones, artillery, air defense, electronic warfare, engineers, and a functional command structure. For a wider multi-vector operation - around 100-140 thousand.
So, for a localized crisis, Russia doesn’t need "a second army like in Ukraine." It needs a second strike package sufficient to break the first hours of defense.
It’s important not to measure Russia with the old yardstick - number of divisions, tanks, or conventional mass. Russia can enter differently: fewer people, more drones, electronic warfare, long-range fire, mining, and targeted suppression of command.
Estonian intelligence reports directly that Russia is deploying a new branch of unmanned forces, expecting around 190 battalions of unmanned systems. The Baltic Fleet already has a regiment of unmanned naval strike systems. Meanwhile, production of large-caliber ammunition has increased more than 17-fold since 2021. This is preparation for the next war while the current one continues.
To field such a second strike package without reducing pressure on Ukraine, Russia, in my view, would need a new mobilization wave of roughly 180-250 thousand people. In a stronger scenario - 250-350 thousand. That’s why digital control over society is so important for the Kremlin: it makes a new mobilization more manageable.
These are estimates, but if the Kremlin launches a strict mobilization model and a new wave of conscription, it could achieve early operational readiness for a local operation in 12-18 months, reach a plateau of sufficient readiness in 18-24 months, and achieve more sustainable capacity in 30-36 months.
This is much faster than the reassuring "6-10 years" Europe often cites for preparation, because "6-10 years" refers to a large war with NATO, not a short, high-intensity shock. Russia’s ability to rapidly form new structures is already evident - for example, the 44th Army Corps was built in 7-8 months.
Finally, the war in Iran drastically lowers the cost of a major war for the Kremlin and brings it closer. Russia is the main beneficiary of chaos in the Middle East: Brent is around $103 versus the $59 per Urals assumed in the Russian budget. Cuts to expenditures of 10% can be postponed.
Moreover, as The Independent notes, the oil price surge effectively breaks the logic of exhausting the Russian budget: an extra $6-10 billion in less than a month already covers the estimated $6.6 billion monthly cost of compensations and recruitment replacements.
So, as of now, war is becoming cheaper for Moscow, and new escalation is closer than ever.
