T. ☀️

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T. ☀️

T. ☀️

@levantophile

History, politics, culture & religion, with an eye on the Levant 🏺🍇🫒 // Pro-human, liberty-minded civilizationist 🗽🏛️ // From Mount Lebanon 🇱🇧🧉

Mare Nostrum Katılım Aralık 2017
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T. ☀️
T. ☀️@levantophile·
A curated thread, in chronological order, of some of my reactions, commentary, analyses, and other posts about Suwayda since the deadly assault began in mid-July. It also includes broader reflections on the Druze, celebrating their history, culture, and heritage. This thread will serve as a kind of live journal, which I will continue to update over time. Echoing Psalm 137: “If I forget thee, O Suwayda, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Suwayda above my chief joy.” (🧵)
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T. ☀️@levantophile·
Fortunately, none of the kind that targeted Alawites and Druze last year. We never had general mobilizations of tens of thousands of people from across regions to surround, besiege, and massacre another group. There were awful localized massacres but nothing that extreme. There wasn’t even anything like that in the Syrian war. You would have to go back perhaps to how the Hutus mobilized against the Tutsis in Rwanda, or perhaps the events targeting the Rohingya in Myanmar, to find any recent parallels…
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T. ☀️
T. ☀️@levantophile·
A small word of advice: do not try to reason with them by appealing to your innocence, or that of the Druze of Suwayda as a whole - or by reminding them of all the good that you, your father, or other Druze you know may have done for them. If anything, it only seems to deepen their resentment and makes them even more hostile. Even we, as Lebanese Druze, can recount countless stories of solidarity during the Syrian war and the feeling of betrayal afterwards. We took in tens of thousands of Syrian refugees into our areas, sympathized with their suffering, and offered them shelter, stability, and work. In my own extended family alone, I could probably count dozens of Syrians who were employed over the years, most of them coming from Idlib, rural Homs and Hama, or Deir Ezzor - the very same regions from which many of those who invaded Suwayda came. What shocked many of us last summer were the cases of betrayal by people who quite literally lived among us and benefited from our hospitality. Two examples immediately come to mind. First, I know a Lebanese Druze contractor from my area who employed Syrian refugees as workers. He later told us that once the invasion of Suwayda began, a couple of them quietly slipped back into Syria to participate in it. He only discovered this through videos they themselves posted on social media. Think about the absurdity of that for a moment: they were actively earning a living from a Lebanese Druze man and still chose to return to Syria to take part in the massacre of Syrian Druze. Second, last July, the teenage son of a Syrian refugee family living in my village was caught posting threats on social media about “plucking the moustaches” of Druze. This is a boy who quite literally grew up in a Lebanese Druze village, was taught by Lebanese Druze teachers in our local public school, and whose father works as a watchman for our neighbor while the family lives in the basement of their home. People in the village contacted the Lebanese security services, who arrested and questioned him before later releasing him with what I understood to be a stern warning. I genuinely believe that decades of humiliation, violence, and victimhood have left deep psychological scars on many of these people. For some, the result seems to be a desire to reclaim dignity through domination and revenge, by inflicting on others what was once inflicted on them, even against those who treated them with kindness and solidarity. And unfortunately, their religious and ideological beliefs often do little to encourage the restraint of base impulses or the cultivation of mercy, forgiveness, and compassion, though that is a much larger conversation altogether. So here we are. There is little else to say. Perhaps an old Arabic saying captures it best: إن أكرمت الكريم ملكته وإن أكرمت اللئيم تمردا
Firas Kontar@fkontar78

Je ne sais pas quels crimes moi, ma famille, mes proches ou les druzes auraient commis, mais voilà le type de message que je reçois : « Le peuple veut vous brûler vifs et vous donner à manger aux chiens, et heureusement que Charaa est là pour les en empêcher… »

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Rammstein
Rammstein@geopol4285·
@InkOfSyria @levantophile They want to live in Syria that respects them and treats them as equals. Al-Sharaa is building a discriminatory oppressive Syria forcing them to seek semi-autonomy; you all see it and are totally on board. Then make it out to be the decision of the Druze. Backwards thinking.
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T. ☀️@levantophile·
Probably a majority, yes. Tripoli and its hinterland alone are some 40% of Lebanese Sunnis, if not more. Moderate elites retain political power for now, which keeps this under a lid, but for how much longer? (It’s not too different from the Druze revival and growing radicalization being kept under a lid by Jumblatt’s stances and the more moderate older generations.)
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Georges Haddad 🇱🇧
Georges Haddad 🇱🇧@Georges__Haddad·
The next battle is internal. It is not civil war, far from it، but it will be shaped mainly by Christian-Muslim tensions at the fundamental level: will things change constitutionally, or not? Christians have a great card, Muslims, way less, but they have the numbers. Tough times ahead for any "normal, peaceful, and sovereign" individual. If you don't see it, it is either blindness, or a choice. In either way, you're stupid.
T. ☀️@levantophile

Between the growing calls for the release of Ahmed al-Assir from prison, the rising profile of outspoken hardliners like Hassan Merheb, and displays like the one below becoming increasingly common, a new Lebanese problem is rapidly emerging, and it will likely overtake the current Shia Islamist problem in the not-too-distant future. Geagea and Jumblatt’s attitude toward this rise of Sunni hardline politics in Lebanon and its surroundings thus far seems to be: “If you can’t beat them, join them.” Jordan appears to be pursuing a similar strategy of cautious accommodation. But events have a way of taking on a logic of their own, and I fear the outcome may prove deeply unfavorable for Lebanon’s Christians and Druze. One possible scenario is a reconciliation between Shias and (radical) Sunnis, leading them to make common cause in overturning the current post-Hezbollah order, which is largely dominated by Christians and moderate Beiruti Sunni elites. (This, I suspect, is why Jumblatt is hedging, offering only lukewarm support for the government while keeping channels open with the Shias.) Buckle up for an interesting, and bumpy, 2030s.

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T. ☀️
T. ☀️@levantophile·
Unfortunately, yes. There’s an identity and religious revival that has been or is now underway across most communities. I think it’s partly a generational thing, because the Druze and Christian religious revivals have been happening for a few years, and in the Druze case, amplified significantly since last summer. The Sunni Islamist problem is an old one that goes back a few decades, especially in and around Tripoli, but it has been buoyed by the triumph in Syria and the political exit of the Hariri family in recent years.
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HM
HM@hh40691262·
@levantophile Do you think the direction of the new generation of sunnie Lebanese (and Lebanon in general) is religious extremism? I was under the impression that the youth in Lebanon (except maybe the shias) were more secular.
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T. ☀️
T. ☀️@levantophile·
Between the growing calls for the release of Ahmed al-Assir from prison, the rising profile of outspoken hardliners like Hassan Merheb, and displays like the one below becoming increasingly common, a new Lebanese problem is rapidly emerging, and it will likely overtake the current Shia Islamist problem in the not-too-distant future. Geagea and Jumblatt’s attitude toward this rise of Sunni hardline politics in Lebanon and its surroundings thus far seems to be: “If you can’t beat them, join them.” Jordan appears to be pursuing a similar strategy of cautious accommodation. But events have a way of taking on a logic of their own, and I fear the outcome may prove deeply unfavorable for Lebanon’s Christians and Druze. One possible scenario is a reconciliation between Shias and (radical) Sunnis, leading them to make common cause in overturning the current post-Hezbollah order, which is largely dominated by Christians and moderate Beiruti Sunni elites. (This, I suspect, is why Jumblatt is hedging, offering only lukewarm support for the government while keeping channels open with the Shias.) Buckle up for an interesting, and bumpy, 2030s.
نورما قلاوون ❤️🇸🇦🇱🇧❤️@normatoufik2288

طرابلس انها الأرض الطيبة مدينة العلم والعلماء فتحها الصحابي سفيان الأزدي وحررها السلطان الناصر قلاوون وخرج منها العلماء والمشايخ والمجاهدون، نصرت قضايا الأمة في كل الأزمنة والأمكنة،،حاصرها الفرنسيون وارتكبوا فيها المجازر ودمرها حافظ أسد وسجن المئات من شبابها،وبقيت صامدة ثابتة

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T. ☀️
T. ☀️@levantophile·
Tripoli is the epicenter, but it is not only there. It’s everywhere outside the middle and upper class Sunni areas of Beirut. Even the more working class parts of Beirut are going down the same road, slowly but surely. Sharaa (and Saddam) posters slowly replacing the old ones of the Hariris.
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T. ☀️@levantophile·
I agree with the root causes, though I would not omit the triumph in Syria breathing life into Sunni Islamists. Where I disagree is that I’m not sure what share of Sunnis they represent, to be frank, and it is possible they represent the majority sentiment outside Beirut (Tripoli, Saida, Bekaa), as well as in poorer Beirut neighborhoods like Tariq al-Jdide. The old Hariri portraits are slowly being replaced with Sharaa and Saddam ones. And frankly, I would not bet on the moderate elites like Salam and Makhzoumi to hold down the line, though I wish them luck. (It’s not only a Sunni phenomenon, even if the Sunni one is more consequential for the country. There is also a Druze identity/religious revival underway, with Jumblatt increasingly coming across as out of touch, and Christians have already been experiencing a religious revival in recent years too. Both these revivals are naturally accompanied by some level of radicalization.)
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Hassan Jawad
Hassan Jawad@PolitVulpes·
@levantophile The socio-economic and cultural decay of the country is the main driver of this. But I think the larger Sunni community doesn't fall along these islamist lines. Ultimately the healthiest oath is finding a way for these sentiments to be absorbed by the political system.
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T. ☀️@levantophile·
LF-Kataeb Christians are the main political and demographic force within and behind this government, representing a majority of Christians, followed by Beiruti Sunni elites like Salam and Makhzoumi, who represent a large share of Sunnis (though likely a minority). Shias (Hezb-Amal) have a much more limited role in the new government, compared to the past, when they were the clear driving force within FPM Christians as their junior partner. Whatever power or influence Hezb still has is not from within the government but from without, by threatening civil war and the such.
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Guy Nohra
Guy Nohra@GuyNohra·
@levantophile Is there really a post Hezbollah regime and how is it controlled by mostly Christians
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T. ☀️@levantophile·
@sharbeltabet It was clearly not a serious post. I’m just saying Lebanon itself is the miracle 🤦‍♂️
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Charbel Tabet
Charbel Tabet@sharbeltabet·
@levantophile It's a purely catholic matter, decided by the pope. Not you. Mind your business and let the Holy Spirit work. He was beatified at the exact time he should have been beatified.
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T. ☀️@levantophile·
Good news, but he should have been beatified long ago.
L'Œuvre d'Orient@OeuvredOrient

🇱🇧Une grande joie pour le Liban et toute l’Église d’Orient ! Le patriarche maronite, considéré comme le « père du Grand Liban », sera bientôt béatifié selon @vaticannews_fr ✨ Après avoir été déclaré Vénérable par le pape en 2019, un miracle attribué à son intercession vient d’être reconnu. Défenseur des chrétiens d’Orient, artisan de l’unité et de l’identité libanaise, le patriarche Hoyek a marqué l’histoire du Liban moderne.

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T. ☀️
T. ☀️@levantophile·
Not necessarily fighting in most cases (it was a one week battle and logistically complicated to get there), but certainly supporting. There were also pro-Sharaa rallies by Lebanese Sunnis in Tripoli and allegedly some Lebanese from the north who also crossed the border to join the fight.
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Apu (🇦🇷🇨🇦 for 🇮🇱🇮🇷🇺🇦)
Drusos libaneses lamentando que haya tantos ejemplos de refugiados sirios musulmanes ayudados, educados y empleados por drusos en Líbano que apenas se abrieron las fronteras, fueron a participar de las masacres contra los drusos de Suweida (Siria). El islam árabe es un problema.
T. ☀️@levantophile

A small word of advice: do not try to reason with them by appealing to your innocence, or that of the Druze of Suwayda as a whole - or by reminding them of all the good that you, your father, or other Druze you know may have done for them. If anything, it only seems to deepen their resentment and makes them even more hostile. Even we, as Lebanese Druze, can recount countless stories of solidarity during the Syrian war and the feeling of betrayal afterwards. We took in tens of thousands of Syrian refugees into our areas, sympathized with their suffering, and offered them shelter, stability, and work. In my own extended family alone, I could probably count dozens of Syrians who were employed over the years, most of them coming from Idlib, rural Homs and Hama, or Deir Ezzor - the very same regions from which many of those who invaded Suwayda came. What shocked many of us last summer were the cases of betrayal by people who quite literally lived among us and benefited from our hospitality. Two examples immediately come to mind. First, I know a Lebanese Druze contractor from my area who employed Syrian refugees as workers. He later told us that once the invasion of Suwayda began, a couple of them quietly slipped back into Syria to participate in it. He only discovered this through videos they themselves posted on social media. Think about the absurdity of that for a moment: they were actively earning a living from a Lebanese Druze man and still chose to return to Syria to take part in the massacre of Syrian Druze. Second, last July, the teenage son of a Syrian refugee family living in my village was caught posting threats on social media about “plucking the moustaches” of Druze. This is a boy who quite literally grew up in a Lebanese Druze village, was taught by Lebanese Druze teachers in our local public school, and whose father works as a watchman for our neighbor while the family lives in the basement of their home. People in the village contacted the Lebanese security services, who arrested and questioned him before later releasing him with what I understood to be a stern warning. I genuinely believe that decades of humiliation, violence, and victimhood have left deep psychological scars on many of these people. For some, the result seems to be a desire to reclaim dignity through domination and revenge, by inflicting on others what was once inflicted on them, even against those who treated them with kindness and solidarity. And unfortunately, their religious and ideological beliefs often do little to encourage the restraint of base impulses or the cultivation of mercy, forgiveness, and compassion, though that is a much larger conversation altogether. So here we are. There is little else to say. Perhaps an old Arabic saying captures it best: إن أكرمت الكريم ملكته وإن أكرمت اللئيم تمردا

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Ghadi Sary
Ghadi Sary@saryghadi·
The roleplay between the Muslim Brotherhood Shia/Sunni wings has become an old relic. The current US admin is approaching both wings with equal medians despite enormous European/Turkish pull and an oversized MB narrative in D.C. This is what derailed the Dermer Shibbani agreement so far, but I agree this is exactly what awaits district 2 in North Lebanon. The flash floods did not start on Oct 7 and did not end in Hassake. 👀
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T. ☀️@levantophile·
@YouhannaLebnen The realistic alternative to that was being Syrian. Be grateful.
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Mar Youhanna Lebnen
Mar Youhanna Lebnen@YouhannaLebnen·
@levantophile Belated, retroactive excommunication for the morbid abomination he has left us to deal with called Greater Lebanon.
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Rami Zein Eddin
Rami Zein Eddin@RamiZeineddin·
مراجعة نقدية لتقرير تشارلز ليستر في "نيوز لاينز" الذي يدّعي فيه أن السويداء أصبحت "عاصمة للمخدرات في سوريا" أولاً: مشكلة الهوية المهنية للكاتب وتضارب المصالح، وهي نقطة تمس المصداقية من جذرها: 1. الكاتب مصدرٌ لنفسه يستشهد التقرير بـ”بيانات Syria Weekly” — وSyria Weekly هي نشرة إخبارية أسسها الكاتب نفسه أو مرتبطة به مباشرة. هذه دائرية الاستشهاد (Circular Citation) وهي عيب منهجي فادح: المصدر يستشهد بنفسه كمرجع موضوعي. 2. الكاتب يضع نفسه طرفاً منحازاً في الحدث وليس مراقباً محايداً يقول: "في اجتماع يناير 2025 مع الهجري… أخبرني"، و"في اجتماع مع ميليشيات درزية… تجاهل الجميع أسئلتي". الكاتب يُحوّل حضوره الشخصي إلى دليل صحفي، وهو خلط بين العمل الصحفي المهني والشهادة الذاتية الانطباعية. 3. التمويل والانتماء المؤسسي ارتباط الكاتب بمراكز بحثية تتلقى تمويلاً قطرياً-تركياً، بالدليل القاطع، يجعل الموقف المؤسسي لهذه المراكز يتقاطع حرفياً مع خط التقرير: دعم الحكومة الانتقالية في دمشق، تأطير الحضور الإسرائيلي-الدرزي كتهديد، وتصوير قطر والأردن والسلطة السورية كأطراف بنّاءة. هذا ليس نظرية مؤامرة، بل تطابق الأجندات. ثانياً: عيوب منهجية في الأرقام والبيانات 1. رقم 325% لا مرجع له يدّعي التقرير أن تهريب المخدرات ارتفع "أكثر من 325%" لكن: - من أي قاعدة بيانات؟ Syria Weekly (التي هو نفسه مصدرها) - ما المنهجية؟ لا توضيح - هل هي أرقام الاعتراض فقط أم التقديرات الكلية؟ لا إجابة رقم نسبي بهذه الدقة دون منهجية مُعلنة هو ادعاء دعائي لا علمي. 2. رقم "46 مليون حبة كبتاجون" يُقدَّم ليستر هذه الأرقام كـ"بيانات قام بجمعها"، أي أن الكاتب يجمع بيانات عسكرية أردنية سرية بنفسه؟ هذا إما مستحيل التحقق منه أو مستقى من مصدر أردني رسمي ينبغي الإفصاح عنه. 3. رقم "6% من سكان السويداء راضون" - أي استطلاع؟ لا اسم - من أجرى الاستطلاع؟ لا ذكر - في منطقة تحت ضغط عسكري واستخباراتي، الاستطلاعات نفسها مشكوك في دقتها - استخدام رقم بهذه الدقة بلا مصدر هو تضليل إحصائي 4. أرقام الكبتاغون القادم من لبنان الانتقال من 4.3 مليون حبة (يناير-أكتوبر 2025) إلى 22.8 مليون (أكتوبر 2025-أبريل 2026) يُعزى لثلاثة احتمالات يذكرها الكاتب بنفسه ثم يقول "الأرقام تتكلم من نفسها". وهذا تناقض داخلي؛ إذ لا يمكنك الاعتراف بتعدد التفسيرات ثم إغلاق الملف بعبارة دعائية. ثالثاً: التناقضات الداخلية في التقرير 1. الحكومة السورية: ضحية أم مشارك؟ يذكر التقرير أن لجنة التحقيق الأممية وجدت أن قوات الحكومة هي "الأكثر تورطاً" في جرائم الحرب في يوليو 2025 - ثم يمضي طوال التقرير في تصوير دمشق كطرف بنّاء يتعاون مع الأردن ويبني قدرات مكافحة المخدرات. هذان الموقفان متعارضان ولا يُوفَق بينهما. 2. "خارطة طريق سبتمبر" رُفضت… ودمشق ملتزمة بها؟ يقول التقرير إن دمشق وقّعت "خارطة طريق السويداء" في سبتمبر 2025، لكنه أيضاً يقول إن دمشق "تركت الأوضاع تتفاقم" منذ ذلك التوقيت. إذن ما هو مستوى الالتزام الفعلي لدمشق؟ التقرير لا يجيب ويكتفي بتحميل السويداء المسؤولية. رابعاً: مشكلات في بنية المصادر - أكثر من 3 مصادر مجهولة الهوية من دمشق. - أكثر من 4 مرات يعتمد على نفسه كمصدر. - اعتمد على مصدرين محليين "مجهولين" في السويداء. - اعتمد مرة واحدة على مصدر حكومي سوري مجهول. التقرير يفتقر إلى أي مصدر مستقل كليا عن محور دمشق-عمان-الدوحة-أنقرة. خامساً: الموقف الأيديولوجي المُقنّع كتحليل 1. عنوان التقرير فيه حكم مسبق "كيف أصبحت السويداء المدعومة إسرائيلياً عاصمة المخدرات" - العنوان ينتهي إلى استنتاجه قبل أن تبدأ القراءة. هذا صحافة دعائية لا تحليلية. 4. الخاتمة سياسية لا صحفية ينتهي التقرير بأن "الولايات المتحدة في وضع جيد للوساطة… لكن على إسرائيل تخفيف عدائها". هذا توصية سياسية لدولة بعينها، وهو خروج تام عن الصحافة إلى مناصرة سياسية (Advocacy) تعكس أجندة المؤسسات الممولة. سادساً: ما يُسكت عنه التقرير (Omission Bias) يتجاهل التقرير عمداً أو سهواً: - موقف الدروز أنفسهم: استطلاعات رأي محايدة أو تصريحات درزية مستقلة. - دور المخابرات التركية في جنوب سوريا رغم حضورها الموثق. - حجم التمويل القطري للحكومة الانتقالية وانعكاسه على من يدعم من؟ - تاريخ تهريب المخدرات قبل يوليو 2025 بما يُظهر أن المشكلة سابقة للحرس الوطني الدرزي. - الانتهاكات الحقوقية في مناطق الحكومة الانتقالية التي وثّقتها نفس لجنة الأمم المتحدة.
Charles Lister@Charles_Lister

"#السويداء المدعومة إسرائيليًا: عاصمة المخدرات في #سوريا" مقالتي الجديدة، في @newlinesmag noonpost.com/374549/

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T. ☀️@levantophile·
@InkOfSyria And in Lebanon, a country of 4m, the refugee numbers reached as high as 2m.
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T. ☀️@levantophile·
It was never feasible to host every last one in homes immediately because the number of refugees was beyond the carrying capacity of the country. Lebanon and Jordan are not Turkey; 1m is a significant burden. Be that as it may, there were no tents in Druze areas. They were all housed in homes and employed by locals. Some even started their own businesses.
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