Mateus R Campos | マテウス・カンポス
58 posts
Mateus R Campos | マテウス・カンポス
@MateusR1Campos
Java Backend | Spring Boot | Agricultural engineer
@thiarioli @Morett_the_best Queria entender como vocês lidam com o volume de PRs, code review, deploy, herança de contexto, e também como outros times estão trabalhando.
تايب سكربت تتخلى رسمياً عن جافاسكربت. الإصدار القادم (7.0) تمت إعادة كتابته بالكامل بلغة Go، وسرعة الـ Compile تضاعفت 10 مرات. لسنوات، كان الـ Compiler الأساسي (tsc) مكتوب بـ TS نفسها ويشتغل على بيئة Node.js. هذا كان قرار استراتيجي ممتاز في البداية عشان يقنعون المطورين يتبنون اللغة، بس هندسياً؟ كان كابوس للمشاريع الضخمة. الـ JavaScript بطبيعتها Single-threaded، ومقيدة جداً في عمليات الـ CPU المكثفة. في المشاريع الضخمة، لما الـ Codebase يتجاوز مليون سطر، الـ Build time يصير كارثة. المطور يغير سطر كود في واجهة معينة ويروح يسوي قهوة لين الـ Type checking يخلص. الانتقال للغة Go (Native port) نسف هذي المشكلة تماماً. اللعبة هنا في الـ Multi-threading. مترجم اللغة صار يستغل كل الـ CPU Cores في جهازك دفعة واحدة (عبر الـ Goroutines). كودك الكبير يتقطع ويتم تحليله بالتوازي. الـ Overhead حق محرك V8 اختفى من المعادلة. التأثير مو بس في راحة المطور. في بيئة الـ Enterprise، هذا يعني أن الـ CI/CD Pipelines في السيرفرات بتخلص أسرع بكثير. فاتورة الكلاود لعمليات الـ Build رح تنزل بشكل ملحوظ للشركات.
‼️🚨 BREAKING: An AI found a Linux kernel zero-day that roots every distribution since 2017. The exploit fits in 732 bytes of Python. Patch your kernel ASAP. The vulnerability is CVE-2026-31431, nicknamed "Copy Fail," disclosed today by Theori. It has been sitting quietly in the Linux kernel for nine years. Most Linux privilege-escalation bugs are picky. They need a precise timing window (a "race"), or specific kernel addresses leaked from somewhere, or careful tuning per distribution. Copy Fail needs none of that. It is a straight-line logic mistake that works on the first try, every time, on every mainstream Linux box. The attacker just needs a normal user account on the machine. From there, the script asks the kernel to do some encryption work, abuses how that work is wired up, and ends up writing 4 bytes into a memory area called the "page cache" (Linux's high-speed copy of files in RAM). Those 4 bytes can be aimed at any program the system trusts, like /usr/bin/su, the shortcut to becoming root. Result: the next time anyone runs that program, it lets the attacker in as root. What should worry most: the corruption never touches the file on disk. It only exists in Linux's in-memory copy of that file. If you imaged the hard drive afterwards, the on-disk file would match the official package hash exactly. Reboot the machine, or just put it under memory pressure (any normal system load that needs the RAM), and the cached copy reloads fresh from disk. Containers do not help either. The page cache is shared across the whole host, so a process inside a container can use this bug to compromise the underlying server and reach into other tenants. The original sin was a 2017 "in-place optimization" in a kernel crypto module called algif_aead. It was meant to make encryption slightly faster. The change broke a critical safety assumption, and nobody noticed for nine years. That bug then rode every kernel update from 2017 to today. This vulnerability affects the following: 🔴 Shared servers (dev boxes, jump hosts, build servers): any user becomes root 🔴 Kubernetes and container clusters: one compromised pod escapes to the host 🔴 CI runners (GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins): a malicious pull request becomes root on the runner 🔴 Cloud platforms running user code (notebooks, agent sandboxes, serverless functions): a tenant becomes host root Timeline: 🔴 March 23, 2026: reported to the Linux kernel security team 🔴 April 1: patch committed to mainline (commit a664bf3d603d) 🔴 April 22: CVE assigned 🔴 April 29: public disclosure Mitigation: update your kernel to a build that includes mainline commit a664bf3d603d. If you cannot patch immediately, turn off the vulnerable module: echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf rmmod algif_aead 2>/dev/null || true For environments that run untrusted code (containers, sandboxes, CI runners), block access to the kernel's AF_ALG crypto interface entirely, even after patching. Almost nothing legitimate needs it, and blocking it shuts the door on this whole class of bug...
🚨do you understand what the Head of Anthropic Coding Agents just dropped. 30 minutes. more value than 100 paid courses. not a course. not a tutorial. how top AI researchers actually build. here's the part nobody is talking about: > real workflows. not theory. > vibe coding from the source. > how they think, build, and ship with agents. watch this before you write another prompt. before you build another agent. before you touch another tool. 30 minutes. bookmark it. watch it today. this one changes how you use AI for good.