Cathal Mc Daid

322 posts

Cathal Mc Daid

Cathal Mc Daid

@mcdaidc

Science, Security, Sports.

Katılım Ekim 2013
47 Takip Edilen753 Takipçiler
Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
(7/x) But all societies will need to have defences in this area. More details in the report - enea.com/insights/rider… . This is a rapid area - within last week the EU & China have both issued reports or guidelines at how telecom operators can detect UAVs. Expect this to continue
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Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
(6/x) Ukraine is also grappling how best to deal with the threat. Even yesterday, reports discuss changing SIM card sales and specific data disabling, due to Russian mobile controlled drones being dropped by 'mothership' drones behind Ukrainian lines united24media.com/latest-news/ho…
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Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
@h51un6 Thanks. I didn't mention LightBasin or the related GTPDoor due to lack of time. GTPDoor in particular, using GTP-C, would have been in scope as part of recent understanding of the deeper 'layers' of core security & attacks Could only fit in so much in 30 minutes & left a lot out!
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h51un6
h51un6@h51un6·
Hi @mcdaidc Thank you for your presentation at the VB conference, I really appreciate it. I noticed that you didn't mention the Light Basin activity cluster. Didn't you mention it because these attackers go through the GRX instead of attacking the devices?
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Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
Excited to announce that next week I'll be presenting the fascinating History of Signalling Security—from #SS7 to modern-day 5G challenges! Join me @virusbtn as we dive into the last ten years of many scary headlines but little concrete facts.
Cathal Mc Daid tweet media
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Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
@shashj Different method but same principle of how niche or unusual comms equipment can lead to less security is in Ukraine. Recommendations are to use ordinary phones and SIMs, unusual/different or 'hardened' devices stand out and draw attention info.enea.com/tracking_on_th…
Cathal Mc Daid tweet media
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Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
@drogersuk @GunshipGirl You could confirm it if you do manage to talk to this person, and get them to confirm what time/date they got a call from "you" + the spammer may have left a recorded message in that attack. That's if they would talk to you-sadly these attacks reduce the trust in telecom networks
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Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
@drogersuk @GunshipGirl What this most likely is, is that a spammer has spoofed your number to ring this 07 number. 07 never answered that call, but sees a missed call coming from the spammer using your number , and decides to ring you "back". 07 ringing you isn't part of the attack, its a side-effect.
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Beth Maundrill
Beth Maundrill@GunshipGirl·
⁉️Question for cyber peeps ☎️I had a missed call from an unknown number. Ignored it. They called again. It was an 07 no. so I did answer. They said "hi who is this?" I hung up. 📱Then text me "Who is this, had a missed call from you" Anyone know what kind of scam this is!?
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Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
@domi007 @nerfux @adaptivemobile @EneaAB @5G_Security_ Thanks. IPSec helps, but as you know its rarely implemented anyway, and wont solve 100% these cases. You're right the 3GPP security model assumes these links are safe, but we also assumed the same once for SS7 links. So this model doesn't account for supply-chain/internal attacks
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Domonkos Tomcsanyi
Domonkos Tomcsanyi@domi007·
@mcdaidc @nerfux @adaptivemobile @EneaAB @5G_Security_ Certainly nice way to inject traffic, but if the attacker is already on the same switch with the gNB then the 3GPP assumed security model is already broken. I still recommend to everybody to use IPsec on the backhaul, could be a savior in such cases.
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Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
12/12 Note this is one *possible* way it could have happened, other methods like a local 3G/4G radio voice interception using Fake Base Stations are possible, but they would require a SS7 link. 2G radio interception may also be possible although more likely to be noticed
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Cathal Mc Daid
Cathal Mc Daid@mcdaidc·
11/12 Lastly, while SS7 security has improved greatly since then, some elements of this would have made it more likely to succeed. The targeting of an outbound roamer for example is more likely to succeed that a subscriber at home.
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