



U.S. Naval War College
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@NavalWarCollege
Official Twitter account of the U.S. Naval War College. The views from the faculty ≠ NWC, DON, DOD official positions. Following, RTs and links ≠ endorsement.
















































Rolling off the CMSI ramp! Impactful new @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Report #55 from @us_awc #China Landpower Studies Center Research Director Joshua Arostegui! digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-… “Loading the Well Deck: The PLA #Navy’s Maturing Role in Projecting Joint Ground Forces” illuminates how: ⚓⚓⚓ China’s Navy is actively validating its “access without basing” model at commercial ports across Southeast Asia (Sihanoukville, Cambodia + Port Klang, Malaysia) & Africa (Tanzania + Mozambique). ⚓⚓⚓ The PLAN is learning by doing, logging critical sets & reps in “navigating foreign port bureaucracies, coordinating local tug and stevedore services, and testing the physical load limits of regional piers—intelligence and experience that are vital for future naval operations requiring rapid, sustained access abroad.” ⚓⚓⚓ “Big #Army” entrenchment is yielding to joint efforts, including with a PLAN Exercise Commander. 17 curated photos paint a vivid picture! From CMSI Director @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (ret.): China PLA Watchers: Can the PLA project joint combat power across Southeast Asia & Africa without building a network of military bases? CMSI’s latest China Maritime Report (CMR) examines the untold story of the growing ability of the PLA Navy (PLAN) to transport, deploy & sustain PLA Army (PLAA) forces well beyond the 1st Island Chain. Drawing on a detailed examination of multinational exercises conducted between 2023 & 2025, this report shows how Beijing is transforming routine overseas engagements into laboratories for expeditionary warfare. At the center of this effort is the Type 071/YUZHAO LPD, which has evolved into a test platform for loading heavy ground forces, refining joint logistics, & validating the command relationships necessary for such operations. What emerges is evidence that the PLAN is increasingly comfortable moving PLAA armored vehicles, artillery, engineers, & support units across long distances. The report also explores China’s emerging model of “access without basing.” The PLA appears to be developing the ability to deploy combat power to foreign commercial ports using local infrastructure & stevedore services to support PLA deployments across Southeast Asia & to Africa. These developments are rooted in Xi Jinping’s 2015 directive that the PLAA expand beyond its traditional role as a force focused on China’s borders & prepare to protect the PRC’s overseas strategic interests. This report demonstrates, the PLAN’s growing role in transporting & enabling army forces suggests that PLA joint expeditionary capabilities beyond the First Island Chain are no longer a future aspiration—they are an emerging operational reality. Check out the graphics included in the report...









