Ola Rifai | عُلا الرفاعي

Open access to "The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries," by my amazing mother, Rosemary Sayigh, who turned an impressive 99 this month. Published in 1979, it went thru several reprints & translations and remains a landmark book: michaelharrison.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

@mark_berlin2 Congratulations for the article and for Manchester United- what a game!

Getting notified that your article was accepted is a great way to start the weekend! Now let’s hope Manchester United doesn’t ruin the rest of it

Syria: Between the First Republic and the Third, what is Lost? My piece on the 80th anniversary of #Syria’s independence for @SyriaCentre ⬇️ css.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/2026/04/16/syr…

My latest take for @CambridgeMENAF on What the #war in Iran and in #Lebanon mean for #Syria manaramagazine.org/2026/04/syria-…

📌 The decisive question is whether more moderate officials within the movement and the broader Shiite community will think rationally and rescue the community from this suicidal attempt. Or whether they will hammer the remaining nails in their coffin.

My take on what a potential #US_Iran War would mean for #Syria @SyriaCentre⬇️📌 css.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/2026/02/27/wha…

📌 Hezbollah now faces extremely limited choices. and by launching those six rockets, it may have hammered the first nail into its own coffin.

📌 Lebanese history demonstrates that militias rise and fall according to shifting political circumstances. The so-called al mared al shyy’ Shiite giant emerged from oppression, marginalisation, and also as a result of occupation. But over time, it became a source of instability

My take on the recent developments in #lebanon #Hezbollah #iran @SyriaCentre css.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/2026/03/02/the…

📌 Such a transition could contribute to rebuilding social cohesion and reducing sectarian polarisation within Lebanon and beyond. Alternatively, the conflict could spiral in the opposite direction, triggering broader sectarian fragmentation across the region.

📌A potential shift toward Amal, appears plausible. Despite a long history of rivalry between Hezbollah and Amal, the latter may position itself as a state-oriented ☂️ capable of facilitating de-escalation, gradual disarmament, and reintegration into institutional framework

📌 Today, however, many feel it no longer delivers security or prosperity. Mass rallies, slogans, and portraits may project unity, but they conceal a growing crisis of trust between the party and its social base.

📌 For many Lebanese Shiites, support for Hezbollah was never purely ideological or religious. It was rooted in survival. At a particular historical moment, Hezbollah provided social services, economic empowerment, and a sense of dignity to a long-marginalised community.

📌The government must carefully weigh the risks of action against the risks of inaction. It should focus on consolidating the country’s transition away from conflict and preventing any slide into a new and potentially even more destructive phase of war.

📌 whose leadership has repeatedly stated that Lebanon would stand by Iran in the event of war. Under such circumstances, Assad loyalists could find both the motivation and the networks to re-engage and may seek renewed empowerment.

📌 Therefore, the current government must prioritise risk management. It should maximise efforts to secure borders, contain militias, and prevent external actors from instrumentalising Syrian territory as a proxy battlefield.

📌 If regional chaos spills into Syria, the consequences could be lethal: renewed identity clashes, accelerated radicalisation, and the collapse of fragile stabilisation efforts.