Policy Tensor
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@policytensor
Anusar Farooqui, Founder and CEO, Systematic Portfolios LLC. Words: https://t.co/ATzak2R4A0
The repudiation of international law and embrace of Genghis Khan-ism by the countries that were formerly at the forefront of championing the liberal order will inevitably raise questions about the continued survivability of many smaller states who benefited from that system.
The Israeli Strike Near Iran’s Reactor is an Ominous Signal The US and Israel find themselves cornered with dwindling options and growing desperation. This is evident in their attacks on Iran’s electrical grid and their calculated attempt to shift the Overton Window toward the nuclear threshold. The statement by Trump advisor David Sacks, suggesting Israel could escalate the conflict with nuclear options, coincides with a missile strike landing just 350 meters from the Bushehr reactor. This isn’t just a warning; it’s a veiled threat. It’s a trial balloon designed to gauge the global reaction to such a catastrophic possibility. A direct hit on an Iranian reactor would inevitably force Iran to retaliate against Dimona, leading us into a spiral of nuclear escalation, but what if Dimona be empty? As global opinion is being tested, this "window" is being meticulously shifted and calibrated. Currently, US-Israeli options, beyond aerial bombardment, include sector-specific ground operations. But what if these operations end in disaster? Even a NATO intervention might change nothing. In Libya, European NATO forces depleted their ammunition in about 10 days during a low-intensity conflict. Today, Rheinmetall claims European stockpiles are bone-dry. While I usually take Rheinmetall’s claims with a grain of salt, this time it actually makes sense. We are looking at a scenario of severe ammunition shortages against a heavily entrenched and well-armed Iran. Any landing operation would be a bloodbath. I believe that, faced with mounting internal and external failures, the US and Israel will gradually push the Overton Window to a choice between total defeat or the use of tactical nuclear weapons, in the event of a catastrophic failure of ground operations. Tactical nuclear weapons are strictly forbidden for use, yet their radiation dissipates within weeks in the current environment. Even so, it would constitute a grave war crime. I do not believe the U.S. would embark on such a path, but I cannot say the same for Israel. Ending the war with Iran still possessing enriched uranium would be equivalent to admitting that Netanyahu, instead of increasing his people's security, did the exact opposite. The internal pressure would be immense. If nothing goes as planned and the death toll rises, I feel this window can shift much faster.
Kind of amazing that in all of this, the US is also still physically blockading Cuba, creating an energy crisis on the island.
Every single day that this war goes on, the more the economic damage just compounds. This is the key line right here from @tracyalloway bloomberg.com/news/newslette…
I was interviewed by a German podcast today. It will come out early next week. One of the things we talked about the risk of nuclear escalation. I do not think there is a real risk of nuclear escalation here. By way of “credentials” let me offer the following. I might be one of the most informed analysts on nuclear strategy because I have read basically everyone serious on the subject. I was also the only one to predict the most recent nuclear crisis (newstatesman.com/world/europe/u…). I believe that was before the IC concluded the same, as was later revealed by Burns and Jake. So I know at least as much about these issues as the Blobheads platformed by the papers; probably a lot more. OK, with that nonsense out of the way, let me explain why the risk of nuclear escalation is low, whether by the US or Israel. First use — breaking the nuclear taboo — is the most escalatory signaling option available to any nuclear armed state. The only scenario in which first use is a real possibility is if the existence or independence of the power is on the line. If Iran had a nuclear weapon when it was attacked with the clear aim of destroying it, there was a real possibility of first use. But neither Israel, nor the US face an existential risk from this going south. So the case for first use is ipso facto weak. There are predictable consequences of first use by any power. The most certain consequence is that Israeli or US first use in Iran will immediately lead to nuclear proliferation by at least the Turks and the Saudis (with an immediate Pakistani nuclear weapons deployment in the kingdom), if indeed not others, especially Egypt. So first use is certain to destroy Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly. First use by any power is the system will make it especially hard to deter resort to nuclear weapons. There is a real genie out of the bag associated with first use in a world with many nuclear armed states. Unless Israel is willing to kill fifty million Iranians in an all-out attack, Iran will eventually recover and almost certainly proliferate. Even now, the odds of near-term Iranian proliferation has risen dramatically, as @NicoleGrajewski and @nktpnd explain in FA (foreignaffairs.com/iran/stunning-…). With first use against Iran, Iranian proliferation is merely a function of whether they can physically proliferate; the political decision is moot. This raises the obvious risk that Iran will justly retaliate against first use by Israel. Now you have to understand: Iran can survive a nuclear war — Israel cannot. Two or three weapons will actually kill Israel as a nation. So the risks associated with first use are especially high for Israel, in a way that is simply not the case for larger states like Iran, the US, Russia, India, China, even Pakistan. Lastly, of course, is the likelihood that any state that resorts to first use will become a pariah. Despite the depth of Western hypocrisy regarding Israel, there are definite limits to the manufacture of consent. And if anything qualifies, it is first use in the absence of clear existential risk. Even if nuclear threats are being made, they are not credible for these reasons.
At least two secretive ships have left a Chinese port for Iran since the war began. Similar shipments last year included “1,000 tons of a material that could be used to make a main ingredient for a solid propellant of some 260 midrange missiles.” wsj.com/world/how-chin…
You have US officers sitting in IDF combat cells (and vice versa). Air campaign is tightly coordinated bw the 2 militaries. US military was - before yday - responsible for Iran's southern flank & waters. And as others have pointed out: no chance Bibi does this without Trump greenlight But we're supposed to believe US didn't know about South Pars strike ahead of time.
Iran has demonstrated what they need to demonstrate (escalation dominance, clear and present danger to global economy, able to harm US + ally assets in theatre). It has little inventive to keep this up for much longer.
U.S. missiles that hit Iran likely were fired from Gulf countries that have taken the brunt of Iranian drone and missile attacks—although none acknowledges allowing use of their land or airspace on.wsj.com/4rLLyvx
