squid

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

🚨 Blockaid detected an ongoing exploit targeting the SquidRouterModule on Ethereum and Base. 86 Gnosis Safes drained for ~$3M in ~2 hours. All stolen tokens swapped to DAI via attacker-controlled Uniswap V3 pools. More details in 🧵

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

🚨 Blockaid detected an ongoing exploit targeting the SquidRouterModule on Ethereum and Base. 86 Gnosis Safes drained for ~$3M in ~2 hours. All stolen tokens swapped to DAI via attacker-controlled Uniswap V3 pools. More details in 🧵

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

This incident is unrelated to Squid’s core protocol and contracts. All Squid users and integrators are unaffected and no action is needed. A third-party Gnosis Safe module was exploited today across Base and Ethereum, resulting in approximately $3.2M in losses. The vulnerable contract is verified on Basescan under the name “SquidRouterModule” but this contract was not built, deployed, or operated by Squid. It is a third-party smart-wallet product that chose to integrate with Squid, among other protocols, but has not been in contact with us. The exploit worked because the third-party module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a message was secure. If you pass in this string (which is publicly available in the verified contract’s code), then you can execute an array of arbitrary calldata, stealing funds at will. The victims’ Safes had added this faulty contract as a trusted Safe Module, which gives the contract the ability to spend any tokens in the Safe without signatures. Squid’s own router (0xce16F69375520ab01377ce7B88f5BA8C48F8D666) is architecturally different and was not touched. Squid user funds, approvals, and integrations are fully secure. Early public reporting may reference “SquidRouter” due to the contract’s verified name on Basescan. The accurate framing is: a third-party SquidRouterModule was exploited, not Squid’s Router contract. The contract shares our name but is not our code. We are monitoring the situation and will share updates if anything changes materially.

🚨 Blockaid detected an ongoing exploit targeting the SquidRouterModule on Ethereum and Base. 86 Gnosis Safes drained for ~$3M in ~2 hours. All stolen tokens swapped to DAI via attacker-controlled Uniswap V3 pools. More details in 🧵

We are proud to announce that Squid has raised $6M in funding round led by North Island Ventures and backed by strategic investors! Our new chapter has begun, with more news coming soon. Today we celebrate and say thank you. CHEERS 💫