忘山

@DtDt666 我到30岁才达成

中国普通人怎么拥有千万资产？ 我的建议: 1、35岁以后再结婚，40岁以后再生小孩，45岁以后再买房。为什么？这三件事，是原始资本积累的最大黑洞。 2、学会理财，尝试以理财为职业，努力管理他人的钱。 你要明白，房贷、彩礼、奶粉、学区房，每一个都是碎钞机。你本金还没滚起来，就已经被负债锁死。顺序决定命运。 3、从现在开始，攒下你能攒的每一分钱，投入到股息率较高的股票中或者直接买入指数（标普或者纳指100），并进行股息再投资。直到你学会更高水平的投资。 别问为什么。 我现在不到40，已经完成目标就是靠这一套。 照我说的做，到40岁，比我只多不少。 世人如此贫穷，皆因聪明人太多，傻子太少。

@hejushang8 让ai分析你电脑系统数据检测下， 我之前就遇到问题了， 检测出来HDMI线出问题了

我的 Dell 显示器用了 5 年了 最近总是莫名出现闪屏 然后我关掉电源 让它休息个 10 几分钟 重新打开就又恢复了 这是什么原理，能自动修复的吗

@ohyishi 似乎人们忘记了以前的事情 @grok 你来科普下拼夕夕曾有一个百人团队专门开发恶意软件事情

不止屏幕会被录下，第三方输入法还会无限读取你的剪贴板… 这些都会造成助记词泄露。

@mcipekci Using a WAF to address security vulnerabilities is the most foolish approach.

Do not trust this, it's really easy to bypass.

@k_firsov I got hit hard by the Fastjson vulnerabilities. I drove the fix across hundreds of applications, but new issues kept emerging shortly afterward.

@stam_325 We still see it in too many apps.

We found a gadget-free RCE in Fastjson 1.2.83 - the final release of the 1.x line, and still one of the most widely-deployed Java JSON libraries in production today, even with 2.x around. No classpath gadget. One payload-> RCE.

@morganlinton Why do I have so many cables

I think I’ve finally optimized my desk.

@elonmusk I used Grok 4.5 and GPT-5.6-Sol to draw a Mona Lisa in Excalidraw, respectively.

Try Grok Build

Elon, the feature I enjoy most in Grok is the multi-agent orchestration. I set up 5 agents with different roles — including one dedicated "Devil’s Advocate" that systematically challenges the conclusions of the other four. This forces deeper questioning and consistently delivers the best answers. What impresses me most is that Grok 4.5 perfectly balances the triangle: speed + reasoning depth + multi-agent coordination. No other model handles this as smoothly right now. Keep cooking, this is genuinely next-level stuff! 🔥

RWT (BSC) — Privileged Burn & Liquidity Drain Attack on PancakeSwap Pair Date (Incident): 2026-07-19 Chain: BNB Smart Chain (chainId 56) Tx: 0x22300140e7c44899c2602382a6e7a4a34a70f47f9736721744bc6434c07171dc Block: 110827952 Time: Jul-19-2026 03:33:50 AM +UTC Status: Success · gasUsed 3,821,339 1. Executive Summary In a single atomic transaction, the attacker: Borrowed 1,000,000 USDT via a Lista DAO Moolah flash loan Traded RWT through the project's unverified transaction gateway, PROTO (0x8812…9f90), repeatedly triggering the logic path: "add liquidity + lock LP to DEAD address + burn RWT from the Pair via privileged function" After each unilateral burn of RWT from the Pair, the USDT remained in the pool while the RWT inventory plummeted, artificially inflating the AMM price Sold the remaining RWT, drained the USDT, and repaid the flash loan Net Profit (L4): 118,069.28 USDT → Attacker's EOA Pre-attack Pair Reserves (L4, block 110827951): ≈ 158,742.65 USDT + 110,156,199 RWT Drain Ratio: Approximately 74% of the Pair's USDT-side liquidity Aftermath: Pair nearly drained; `tradingEnabled` set to `false`; PROTO's role privilege revoked (`latest`=false; was `true` at the time of the incident) Root Cause Classification: Overly permissive `burn(from, amount)` function + Transaction gateway granted a role allowing it to interact with the PCS Pair The balance is destroyed via a privileged function, disrupting the AMM's bilateral conservation (this differs from the classic primary attack vector of "AMM spot oracle manipulation").RWT (BSC) — Privileged Burn & Liquidity Drain Attack on PancakeSwap Pair Date (Incident): 2026-07-19 Chain: BNB Smart Chain (chainId 56) Tx: 0x22300140e7c44899c2602382a6e7a4a34a70f47f9736721744bc6434c07171dc Block: 110827952 Time: Jul-19-2026 03:33:50 AM +UTC Status: Success · gasUsed 3,821,339 1. Executive Summary In a single atomic transaction, the attacker: Borrowed 1,000,000 USDT via a Lista DAO Moolah flash loan Traded RWT through the project's unverified transaction gateway, PROTO (0x8812…9f90), repeatedly triggering the logic path: "add liquidity + lock LP to DEAD address + burn RWT from the Pair via privileged function" After each unilateral burn of RWT from the Pair, the USDT remained in the pool while the RWT inventory plummeted, artificially inflating the AMM price Sold the remaining RWT, drained the USDT, and repaid the flash loan Net Profit (L4): 118,069.28 USDT → Attacker's EOA Pre-attack Pair Reserves (L4, block 110827951): ≈ 158,742.65 USDT + 110,156,199 RWT Drain Ratio: Approximately 74% of the Pair's USDT-side liquidity Aftermath: Pair nearly drained; `tradingEnabled` set to `false`; PROTO's role privilege revoked (`latest`=false; was `true` at the time of the incident) Root Cause Classification: Overly permissive `burn(from, amount)` function + Transaction gateway granted a role allowing it to interact with the PCS Pair The balance is destroyed via a privileged function, disrupting the AMM's bilateral conservation (this differs from the classic primary attack vector of "AMM spot oracle manipulation").

@WuBlockchain not a wallet 0day: they hired the attacker through a vendor — revoke/freeze/audit, no funds lost; hiring pipeline is prod infra.

Consensys Says North Korea-Linked Developer Contributed to MetaMask Code Before Access Was Revoked According to Drop Site News, blockchain firm Consensys accidentally hired a software developer linked to North Korea. The developer, using the alias “Tyler Knapp,” joined through a third-party service provider and contributed to MetaMask-related code, including crypto-to-fiat conversion features. Consensys said it revoked the developer’s access after identifying the security risk and confirmed that no assets or data were compromised, no malicious code was deployed, and users were not affected.

MetaMask almost got hacked. Consensys confirmed they accidentally hired a North Korean software developer using the alias “Tyler Knapp” as a contractor through a third-party provider. Before any real damage could happen, internal security protocols caught the threat. Here’s how Consensys handled it: 1. Immediate Quarantine — Revoked all system and code access within a month of onboarding 2. Product Freeze — General Counsel Matt Corva temporarily paused all product releases during the investigation 3. Deep Audit — Full code review confirmed no backdoors were deployed and no funds or data were compromised 4. Vetting Overhaul — Notified law enforcement and reviewed their third-party contractor processes. A close call, but a strong example of how fast internal response can neutralize a sophisticated Web3 insider threat.

@_AlexBiryukov_ 876 full index · 19 PoCs · 6 deep anchors Logic/Access/Oracle dominate. ENTRY → LIE → AMP → TAKE → EXIT Bonzo / BarnBridge / ATOHook = three ways to lie about truth. money leaves through a door the protocol already opened.

19 DeFi exploits that weren't in the open-source record — now fully reproducible. If you work in smart-contract security, you know DeFiHackLabs — the standard, comprehensive library of reproducible on-chain exploit PoCs. A handful of exploits just aren't in it. We found 19, analyzed each one end-to-end, and published everything: 🔹 Foundry PoCs (offline-reproducible, exact on-chain profit) → github.com/sanbir/evm-hac… 🔹 Loadable PoC bundles → github.com/sanbir/evm-hac… 🔹 Interactive EVM Playground pages — step through each exploit opcode-by-opcode, with the vulnerability and every exploit step marked → crypto.training/hacks All 19, newest first: • BarnBridge SMART Yield (DAO governance capture) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-07-… • Bonzo Lend / Supra oracle (BLS zero-signature price forge) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-07-… • Hinkal (legacy-note multi-nullifier double-spend) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-07-… • Drips DaiHub (uint128→int128 cast) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-07-… • Gnosis Pay / Zodiac Delay (EIP-1271 signature bypass) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-06-… • ATOHook (Solady ReentrancyGuard storage collision) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-06-… • JaredFromSubway MEV bot (residual ERC-20 approvals) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-06-… • BoostHook (leveraged long, no post-open solvency check) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-05-… • Aurellion Labs (unprotected diamond re-init) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-05-… • ONTR (zero-owner onlyOwner free mint) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-05-… • BlastFOMOVault (claimBonus clone-churn) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-05-… • HeisenbergHook (Uniswap v4 fee-path hijack) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-05-… • Sat1Hook (grindable hook identity) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-05-… • QNT Reserve (EIP-7702 + permissionless BatchCall) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-04-… • Yearn stETH Accumulator (missing execute() auth) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-04-… • Blockchain Bets (ERC-1155 stake/transform inflation) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-04-… • TTSwap Market (permissionless initGood mispricing) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-04-… • WUKONG Staking (classical reentrancy in unstake) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-03-… • FoomCash / FOOM Lottery (Groth16 verifier with gamma == delta) — crypto.training/hacks/2026-02-… One recurring lesson: the interesting part of an attack is often not the drain. BarnBridge is the clearest example — the money left through the front door of the DAO. The real exploit was obtaining access: buy ~$2,200 of a dead governance token, stake it with a lock multiplier, and pass a proposal because quorum was measured on raw stake while votes counted multiplied power. So we reproduced the governance capture, not just the payoff. And you can do all of this yourself. github.com/sanbir/evm-hac… is an open-source, fully local EVM Playground. Point it at any exploit transaction — it pulls the verified sources, replays the whole thing opcode-by-opcode, and lets you mark the vulnerability and the exploit execution steps. Then share your PoC however you like — open a PR to github.com/sanbir/evm-hac…, or publish it in your own repo, on IPFS, anywhere. No lock-in: the analyzer doesn't depend on evm-hack-poc or crypto.training. The best way to understand an exploit is to reproduce it. The second best is to make it easy for the next person to. #Web3Security #SmartContracts #DeFi #EVM #Solidity #BlockchainSecurity #OpenSource

FULL coverage note: • 876/876 tag stats from crypto.training/hacks (not a sample) • all 19 new PoCs listed with root class + one-liner • 6 deep anchors (different invariant breaks) top classes: Logic 462 · Access 360 · Oracle 276 chains: BNB 381 · ETH 355 universal path: ENTRY → LIE → AMP → TAKE → EXIT shapes: A) truth forge (Bonzo: BLS identity sig → price 1e30) B) gov math (BarnBridge: raw quorum vs lock× votes) C) composition (ATOHook: rewards[addr] == Solady guard slot) the drain is often a normal withdraw after the lie.

@coinbureau not MetaMask “got hacked.” identity spoof → contractor trust → core/fiat code access. response: revoke + freeze + audit. clean. same class as Contagious Interview: become trusted first. hiring pipeline = prod infra.

🚨METAMASK NEARLY GOT HACKED BY NORTH KOREA Consensys unknowingly hired a North Korean developer using the alias "Tyler Knapp" who contributed to MetaMask's core code for nearly a month. The company detected the threat and revoked all access immediately. Product releases were paused and a full code audit confirmed no backdoors were deployed and no funds were compromised.

@elonmusk 希望elon能和Meta机器人打架

Robot fights are fun 😂

@Teknium 太他妈好用了🥳

Give the Hermes Agent desktop app a try! hermes-agent.nousresearch.com

Root cause isn’t “Uniswap floor got manipulated mid-tx.” It’s cNFT accounting: 1 CryptoPunk → mint 32 units of collateral (totalBalance += amounts), then redeem 1 unit and still get the punk back. Comptroller multiplies floor price × inflated balance → free borrow, 31 phantom units left as cover. Oracle prices one unit correctly. The unit count is the lie.

🚨 @bunker_finance - Loss ~$5.6K (2026-07-16) Token: $bETH (Bunker Ether, price unavailable) Network: Ethereum Type: Oracle Manipulation / Collateral Valuation Flaw (NFT lending) Bunker is a CryptoPunk-collateralized Compound fork. The attacker flash-loaned 1 PUNK from the NFTX vault, redeemed CryptoPunk #1893, and deposited it as collateral (CNft.mint) into Bunker's NFT lending markets. The CNftPriceOracle values the NFT via the NFTX vault's Uniswap floor price, massively over-pricing the single punk. Against this inflated collateral the attacker drained the markets' liquidity — borrowing 1.59 ETH (bETH) + 1,297 USDC in comptroller 0x01a9…0a83, then 1.1 ETH + 50 USDC in comptroller 0x6bc8…4db5 — then withdrew the same punk (CNft.redeem passed the liquidity check) and returned it to NFTX to repay the flash loan, leaving the borrows unbacked. Net ~$5.6K extracted (2.69 ETH + ~1.35K USDC). TX: etherscan.io/tx/0x5b9dc05c2… Attacker: etherscan.io/address/0xeaaf… Victim: etherscan.io/address/0x2e35… ⏱️ Real-time alerts: defimon.xyz

@qqqqqf_ 用起来超级快，用完99元这档， 直接升199元的

100 人民币的 kimi加油包耗时 20 分钟就用完了... 🥲

@jakevin7 已经199元这档了， 99元根本不够用

深度体验了 Kimi K3。Kimi K3 相比 K2.6/K2.7 有明显的代际提升！已经从“能干活”进化到“能扛事”，尤其适合复杂的多步骤 Agent 和内容生产工作流。 拿A/的模型来比的话，仅次于Fable了，完全有Opus的水准了! 接入了Maka后进行了前端功能的开发，k3在前端的表现上非常非常强，在前端能力上完全接近Fable的水平！ Kimi家在多模态上支持一直很好，非常看好它在自媒体场景中的价值！可以从稿件出发，完成分镜、动画、剪辑，以及新闻搜集分析，具备端到端完成视频生产任务的潜力。