

Taravello
417 posts

@taravello_
Treasury Management at @kpk_io | Yield Maxi | Opinions are my own






Update on the Kelp DAO rsETH incident. Within minutes, we activated our emergency playbook across the KPK Morpho vaults: • Direct rsETH exposure: Exit agents activated on the rsETH market in KPK ETH Prime, zeroing supply caps and withdrawing available liquidity. Remaining exposure winds down automatically as liquidity returns to the market. • Indirect exposure: As a precaution, we reduced exposure to markets whose collateral assets have Aave exposure, across all our vaults. • Deposits temporarily paused: ETH Prime, ETH Yield, and USDC Prime. The latter two have no direct rsETH exposure. This is a protective measure to prevent secondary effects during an active incident. • Gearbox unaffected: rsETH-related assets were not actively used as collateral, and quotas have been set to zero as a precaution. We will re-enable deposits once the situation stabilises and continue to share updates.


KPK started managing a single DAO treasury. Today it runs Vaults, Funds and Treasury mandates across leading DeFi protocols. The work got broader. The systems got sharper. Now the brand reflects the same thing. New brand, same discipline.

1/ Today we're unveiling Obex's inaugural cohort. 8 projects to join the Sky Ecosystem. $1B in capital deployment begins today. Meet Cohort 1: Maple | Securitize | Centrifuge | Daylight | USDAI | Better | River | TVL Capital 🧵👇

. @Polymarket will turn on fees for most market categories starting March 30th. The fee structure varies and is downward-parabolic, depending on the market state and the per-share price. So users pay the most when shares are priced at $0.5 and pay progressively less at the edges. To estimate annualised revenue, we sampled the last 30 days of volume across different categories and applied the new fee structure. Since the fee structure varies, we take 30% of the peak rate as an average rate for the analysis. In the last 30 days, Polymarket did $9.55b in trading volume, and with the same metrics, we estimate revenue of about $25m, which would be $300m annualised at current volume levels. At a $20b valuation, it would be a 67x multiple; at $9b (ICE investment), a 30x multiple. On the other hand, @Kalshi is running at an annualised revenue of $1.5b (reported by Bloomberg), implying a revenue multiple of 15x based on their recent round at a valuation of $22b. Additionally, the Polymarket numbers are expected to go higher as they launch Polymarket U.S.

Balancer proposes a survival restructuring after the V2 exploit in Nov 2025. - Balancer Labs winds down. Operations consolidate under OpCo - Team cut from ~25 to 12.5. Budget down 34% to $1.9M per year - veBAL... dead. $500K compensation to locked holders over 6 months - All BAL emissions stopped. - 100% of protocol fees now go to DAO treasury (was ~17.5%) - V3 protocol fee cut from 50% to 25% so LPs keep more Annual deficit drops from $2.6M to $700K. Runway extends from 4 years to ~9. Very sad to see as I received the BAL airdrop and had great fun LPying on it. Good times. Though I haven't used Balancer in quite a while.

Update on the Resolv situation. TLDR: kpk's vault architecture worked as designed under real stress. We detected the risk, paused new allocations, and the vault exited automatically the moment liquidity became available. The withdrawal queue design proved itself without requiring any manual intervention. All Ethereum funds fully recovered. Zero loss to depositors. Following the USR minting exploit on Sunday, our Morpho USDC Yield vaults on Ethereum and Arbitrum had limited exposure to the RLP collateral market. When the risk was detected, we immediately set the risk tolerance on the affected market to zero and blocked new allocations. The vault's withdrawal queue was configured to recover the position automatically as soon as liquidity returned. That's exactly what happened. The moment a borrower repaid, a depositor's redemption cascaded through the vault's withdrawal queue, recovering the full amount. Same block, no manual intervention needed. The vault's architecture handled the exit. Result: all Ethereum funds fully recovered. Zero loss to depositors. Concentration limits had already capped our maximum exposure to the market. This is a core part of how we curate: when an individual market fails, the loss ceiling is set at inception, not determined by the speed of the response. Deposits into the Ethereum Yield vault have been re-enabled. The Arbitrum Yield vault is still paused, with ~$1k remaining exposure to Resolv markets. Withdrawals were available to depositors throughout, across both chains. Where we go from here We're using this as an opportunity to strengthen our monitoring and emergency response processes. This includes enhanced oracle divergence monitoring, faster automated exit triggers, and tighter integration with onchain security alerting services. Full documentation of our vault risk framework, including how caps, tiers, and agents work: docs.kpk.io/vaults


2 Easy Rules to Succeed in Crypto: 1) Sell when no one wants to 2) Buy when no one wants to I am becoming increasingly confident we are in (2). I'm starting to buy BTC very aggressively, with enough of a cash buffer to add on dips. Longer-form article/video coming soon! 🐂

Earlier today, a user attempted to buy AAVE using $50M USDT through the Aave interface. Given the unusually large size of the single order, the Aave interface, like most trading interfaces, warned the user about extraordinary slippage and required confirmation via a checkbox. The user confirmed the warning on their mobile device and proceeded with the swap, accepting the high slippage, which ultimately resulted in receiving only 324 AAVE in return. The transaction could not be moved forward without the user explicitly accepting the risk through the confirmation checkbox. The CoW Swap routers functioned as intended, and the integration followed standard industry practices. However, while the user was able to proceed with the swap, the final outcome was clearly far from optimal. Events like this do occur in DeFi, but the scale of this transaction was significantly larger than what is typically seen in the space. We sympathize with the user and will try to make a contact with the user and we will return $600K in fees collected from the transaction. The key takeaway is that while DeFi should remain open and permissionless, allowing users to perform transactions freely, there are additional guardrails the industry can build to better protect users. Our team will be investigating ways to improve these safeguards going forward.

Remember when yall were selling your ETH to buy pixels here?