The Sinanist
1.4K posts

The Sinanist
@thearmoleb
Maronite Catholic | Trad Monarchist | 🇦🇲🇱🇧 | Annihilator of Turkish Propaganda | Self-Proclaimed Writer | Bachir Gemayel Impersonator










The term “genocide” has a specific legal definition, and applying it to historical events requires more than moral judgment or the existence of large-scale suffering. It requires clear proof of a deliberate intent to destroy a protected group, established through a competent judicial process. The events of 1915, while undeniably tragic, are presented here as not meeting this legal threshold, which leads to the conclusion that using the term “genocide” in this context is not supported from a strictly legal standpoint. The Malta process between 1919 and 1921 is often cited as the most significant legal examination of these allegations. After World War I, the British authorities occupying Istanbul detained 145 Ottoman officials and transferred them to Malta with the intention of prosecuting them for the alleged mass killing of Armenians. This was not a symbolic act but a formal legal investigation conducted by the British Royal Prosecutor. Evidence was collected from multiple sources, including Ottoman archives, documents taken to London, and potential records from the United States, Egypt, Iraq, and the Caucasus. Despite this extensive effort, the prosecutor concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction in court. The outcome of this process is interpreted as significant. The British authorities, who had both the incentive and the opportunity to pursue prosecutions, ultimately refrained from initiating trials due to lack of evidence. In 1921, they acknowledged that proceeding with prosecutions would not result in convictions and released the detainees. This is viewed as comparable to a modern decision of non-prosecution based on insufficient evidence, suggesting that the allegations did not meet the legal standards required at the time. Genocide, as later defined in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, is not based solely on the scale of suffering, deportation, or loss of life, but on the presence of specific intent to destroy a group. Establishing such intent requires clear and demonstrable evidence. The deportations during World War I, although resulting in severe hardship and loss of life, are framed within a wartime context and described as security measures linked to internal unrest and the broader conflict with Russia. Within this perspective, suffering alone is not considered sufficient to demonstrate genocidal intent. It is also noted that the Ottoman authorities carried out prosecutions against officials accused of abuses during the deportations, both during and after the war. Such actions are interpreted as inconsistent with the existence of a centrally directed policy aimed at extermination. Instead, they are presented as evidence that misconduct occurred within a broader policy framework, rather than as part of a coordinated plan to destroy a population. In contemporary discussions, the use of the term “genocide” is sometimes supported by political decisions made by parliaments rather than judicial bodies. Since genocide is a legal classification, it is argued that determinations of this kind should rest on judicial processes capable of evaluating evidence and intent. In the absence of a binding court ruling that establishes genocide for the events of 1915, the application of the term is considered by this perspective to lack a legal foundation. Taken together, this interpretation characterizes the events of 1915 as a major human tragedy shaped by war, displacement, and loss of life, while maintaining that the legal criteria required to define those events as genocide have not been conclusively established through a judicial process.























