Takeshi Kajimoto

我目前也不认为日本有立即拥有核动力潜艇的必要。核反应堆的安全、人员培养、维护设施、退役处理和事故责任，都是必须严格讨论的问题。 但是，如果反对核动力潜艇，就应当反对所有国家在缺乏透明度、安全保障和责任制度的情况下发展核动力潜艇，而不是只在日本讨论这一问题时，才突然把它说成“军国主义复活”。 苏联和俄罗斯的核潜艇发生过严重事故，中国自己的潜艇发展也并非没有事故和安全疑问。今天，中国仍在扩大核动力潜艇力量，并从核动力潜艇发射远程弹道导弹。在这种情况下，只用“和平宪法”和“专守防卫”来谴责日本，并不能构成完整的安全论证。 核动力不等于核武器，核动力潜艇也不自动等于侵略战争。真正需要回答的问题，是它承担什么任务，是否携带核武器，如何接受文官统制，发生事故由谁负责，以及国家是否具备长期维持和安全退役的能力。 如果这些问题不谈，只把“日本”“核动力”和“军国主义”三个词放在一起，那么这不是安全批评，而是在利用历史改变日本人的政治判断。这样的宣传越多，越容易产生相反的效果。

【日本の市民団体複数が原潜保有反対の共同声明】日本政府が潜水艦に使う次世代動力源の候補の一つとして原子力を検討していることに対し、日本の市民団体複数が14日、原潜保有に反対する共同声明を発表した。声明は、日本が長年にわたり核兵器の廃絶を訴えてきたこと、「原子力基本法」においても原子力の利用を平和目的に限定してきたことを指摘し、「原子力潜水艦の保有はその立場を自ら否定するものだ」とした。 共同声明の発表に参加した非政府組織（NGO）「ピースボート」は自らのウェブサイトに、「日本の与党や政府の有識者会議から、日本の原子力潜水艦の保有に向けた提言が出されている。これは、大変危険な動きだ。原子力潜水艦は、長距離を潜行し攻撃するためのもので、平和憲法のもとで政府が維持してきた『専守防衛』を大きく逸脱する」と掲載した。j.people.com.cn/n3/2026/0715/c… #原子力潜水艦 #平和憲法 #専守防衛

一九四八年的审判，审判的是战争责任；一九七二年的联合声明，规定的是两国今后的关系。不能拿前一个文件，永远否定后一个文件；更不能一面要求别人不得干涉中国内政，一面又把日本的国内问题说成中国可以随时过问的问题。 中国政府已经宣布放弃对日本的战争赔偿要求，又同日本确认互不干涉内政。既然签了字，就应当按签字的原则办事。不能需要和平友好时承认联合声明，需要进行政治批判时又退回东京审判。 历史责任应当讲清楚，国家关系也应当讲信用。把历史责任变成永久干涉权，不是维护审判的结果，而是否定战后两国自己建立的关系。

有些人说，同中国“脱钩”是不顾本国经济的冒险行为。可是这些人在谈到铁路、工厂和地方产业的时候，又常常说，既然亏损，就应当撤退，既然没有利润，就不必维持。 这是什么道理呢？难道一条铁路亏损以后，把车停了，把工人遣散了，把沿线经济丢在那里不管，就可以说问题已经解决了吗？撤退并不能创造新的交通，关门也不能创造新的产业。 对华经济关系也是一样。要减少依赖，首先就应当建设替代的生产、运输、能源和市场体系。什么都不建设，只宣布“脱钩”，这不是经济政策，而是把撤退命令说成战略。 但是，既然有人主张亏损事业可以退出，那么他就不能反过来说，别国减少对中国的经济依赖，就是不负责任。一个原则，不能在国内叫作“合理撤退”，到了国际上却忽然变成“经济破坏”。 问题不在于退不退出，而在于退出以后由谁生产，由谁运输，由谁就业，由谁承担代价。避开这些问题，只谈政治口号，那就不是解决矛盾，而是把矛盾留给人民。

日本军国主义在第二次世界大战期间侵略中国，给中国人民造成了深重灾难。这是历史事实，日本人民和世界人民都不应忘记。 但是，历史事实是一回事，今天南海各岛礁的主权归属、海洋权利和国家行为，又是另一回事。不能因为中国人民过去遭受过侵略，就说今天中国政府提出的一切海洋主张都是正确的；也不能把凡是不赞成中国主张的国家，都说成是在恢复日本军国主义。 战后，日本在和平条约中放弃了对西沙群岛和南沙群岛的一切权利、权原和要求，但条约并没有因此把南海全部判给中华人民共和国。南海问题涉及中国、越南、菲律宾、马来西亚、文莱和台湾方面等多个当事者。谁主张权利，谁就应当拿出能够经受历史、法律和事实检验的根据。 日本过去侵略过中国，不能成为中国今天拒绝国际法审查的理由；中国过去是受害者，也不能因此取得不受限制的海洋权利。受过压迫的人如果把过去的苦难变成今天扩大权力的通行证，那就不是反对强权，而是在重复强权的逻辑。 2016年的南海仲裁并没有裁定岛屿主权归谁，但它明确审查了所谓“历史性权利”和《联合国海洋法公约》之间的关系，并认定中国在九段线内主张超出公约范围的历史性权利，没有法律根据。中国可以反对这一裁决，但不能假装这一法律问题从未存在。 真正反对军国主义，就应当反对任何国家以武力、威吓和既成事实改变海洋秩序。真正尊重历史，就应当把日本过去的侵略责任和今天南海争端中的法律责任分别讲清楚。 历史不是一顶帽子，不能见人就扣；受害也不是一张无限期的许可证，不能拿来代替证据。谁把这两件事混在一起，谁就不是在维护历史，而是在利用历史。

人民日報：第二次世界大戦中、日本は南中国海における中国の島や岩礁の不法占拠を含む数々の犯罪行為を中国で行い、中国と中国国民に甚大な災難をもたらした。日本は自らの行動を顧みて反省するどころか、いわゆる「利害関係国」を名目に再び南中国海への介入を企図している。これは、世界の人々に日本の対外侵略・拡張の歴史を改めて想起させ、日本の「再軍備化」の企図に対する警戒を一層強めるだけだ。

A government that admits people without defining the terms of membership, leaves local communities to absorb the consequences, and later presents mass enforcement as proof of strength has not solved an immigration crisis. It has merely transferred the cost of its own failure from the state to the citizen.

A government cannot praise immigration enforcement as an indispensable sovereign duty while outsourcing the exercise of that duty to private contractors whose revenues expand with detention capacity. If the power is public, the responsibility must remain public. The state cannot privatise coercion, socialise its failures, and then demand that the taxpayer call the arrangement patriotism. If ICE is truly performing one of the most important duties of the American state, why has so much of that duty been turned into a commercial contract?

The men and women of ICE are doing a GREAT job, one that has to be done. CRIME IS WAY DOWN IN AMERICA, in many cases with numbers that haven’t been seen in decades. The Open Border Policy of Sleepy Joe Biden allowed 25,000,000 people to pour into our Country, unchecked and unvetted. Many were Criminals, and we have to get them out. In order to do this, we must be strong, tough, and smart, and we CANNOT give up one of I.C.E.’s most important and effective Crime Fighting tools, THE TRAFFIC STOP! Once we do, we are playing right into the criminal’s hands. The Radical Left Dumocrats would like to see this done, but it won’t happen on my watch. I.C.E., be judicious, fair and smart, and go back and do your very important job. Keep those Crime Stat Records coming! Remember, you are loved and respected in America. Thank you for your attention to this matter! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP ( TS: Jul 15 2026, 6:45 AM ET )​​​​​​​​‍‌​​​​‍‍​​​‌​​‌‌‍‍‌‍​​‍​​‍‌​‍​​​‌‌​‌

So long as war is conducted as a business, the government that wages it forfeits any honest claim to liberal democracy. Where contracts, political influence and private fortunes are enlarged by war, while the dead, the debt and the taxes are assigned to the public, there is no genuine sharing of national sacrifice. There is only a division of privilege: profit for those who authorise the war, liability for those who are commanded to finance it. A government cannot call the citizen free while treating him as the permanent guarantor of decisions he did not make, accounts he cannot inspect and ambitions from which he receives no material benefit. Nor can it invoke democracy while insulating those who profit from war from the financial consequences of their own policy. This is not representative government. It is the privatisation of power, the socialisation of loss and the compulsory transfer of public wealth under the language of patriotism. Any President who proposes another war must therefore answer one question before all others: will those who demand it bear its cost themselves, or will they once again send the bill to the American people? Until that question is answered, every proclamation of freedom, greatness and national honour is merely an attempt to dress fiscal extraction in the uniform of patriotism.

A Nation Cannot Govern by Sentiment Alone A state is not merely a territory, nor is it simply a market into which labour may be admitted whenever convenient. It is a political community sustained by law, obligation, memory and public confidence. Immigration policy therefore cannot be reduced either to humanitarian sentiment or to economic arithmetic. It is an act of government, and government exists to preserve order before disorder hardens into grievance. The danger begins when a government refuses to define the conditions of entry, settlement and belonging. If housing, schools, hospitals, wages and local services are placed under pressure without explanation, the burden does not fall upon abstractions. It falls upon particular towns, particular families and particular workers. When their concerns are dismissed as prejudice, resentment is not extinguished; it is driven underground, where it becomes easier for extremists to organise and exploit. Yet the opposite error is equally grave. A nation cannot be preserved by reducing citizenship to blood, ancestry or religion. The state belongs neither to one race nor to one sect. It belongs to those who accept its laws, fulfil its duties and participate in its common life. Legal immigration, properly administered, can strengthen a country. Uncontrolled migration, unmanaged settlement and the abandonment of integration can weaken both the migrant and the host society. This is particularly dangerous in the United States. America has never depended upon a single ethnic origin. Its cohesion has rested upon the transformation of immigrants into citizens through a shared constitutional order, a common public language and an expectation of civic duty. If those common standards disappear, the very diversity that once strengthened the republic may be divided into electoral blocs, cultural enclaves and permanent categories of grievance. Europe now demonstrates what occurs when governments confuse tolerance with administrative surrender. Where the state declines to regulate entry, enforce the law or require integration, others will offer harsher definitions of belonging. They will declare that the nation is the possession of an ethnic majority and that minorities are merely tolerated guests. Thus a failure of ordinary administration prepares the ground for extraordinary politics. The proper answer is neither an open frontier nor an ethnic fortress. Borders must be governed. Legal routes must be maintained. Illegal entry must have consequences. New citizens must receive equal protection, but they must also accept equal obligation. Existing citizens must be told honestly what immigration will cost, what it will contribute and how the state intends to prevent local communities from carrying a disproportionate burden. A responsible government does not wait until fear has become hatred. It acts while the matter is still administrative, before it becomes tribal. For when the state abandons the task of defining lawful membership, the street will define it instead—and the street has rarely been a merciful legislator.

The Presidency is entrusted with the stewardship of the Republic, not with the conversion of public authority into an instrument of private political advantage. Military power may defend commerce. It may secure navigation. It may deter aggression. It must never be employed to persuade foreign capital that investment is the price of continued protection, nor may national commemorations become occasions upon which public resources are redirected to magnify the political fortunes of any single administration. A constitutional government measures success not by the volume of capital it attracts through its power, but by the confidence it earns through restraint in exercising that power. Once military influence, public expenditure, and national ceremony are brought together as instruments of political finance, the distinction between a constitutional republic and a state-directed system begins to diminish. The gravest danger is therefore not merely financial. It is constitutional. For the taxpayer is no longer asked to sustain the defence of the Republic alone, but to sustain an expanding mechanism by which public authority and political advantage become increasingly inseparable. History records that republics seldom surrender their liberty in a single dramatic act. They surrender it gradually, whenever public power ceases to recognise the boundary between the nation and the government that temporarily administers it.

If war is now to serve as an instrument of economic policy, then the American people deserve to know not merely what it promises to gain, but what they will be required to finance, for how long, and at what cumulative cost. A nation does not become more prosperous simply because it spends more on sustaining conflict.

The issue is not whether the United States possesses the military strength to secure a sea lane, nor whether foreign investment in American industry may be desirable. The issue is whether military power is now to be converted into an instrument for directing the movement of foreign capital. A democratic nation may defend navigation, negotiate commercial agreements, and invite investment. It may not credibly claim to preserve a free economic order while presenting military protection, exclusion from trade, and compulsory investment as successive parts of the same transaction. Once security is offered on the condition that capital be transferred into factories, plants, and equipment selected for the political benefit of the protecting state, the arrangement ceases to resemble voluntary commerce. It begins to resemble administrative allocation: the state determines where capital should go, invokes national necessity to justify the decision, and then describes the result as mutually beneficial before the affected parties have freely demonstrated that it is so. That is not the logic of a democratic market. It is the logic by which command systems have historically subordinated economic choice to political power. Nor is it sufficient to declare that such investment will produce millions of high-paying jobs. A serious government must identify the agreements, the industries, the duration of the commitments, the distribution of risk, the ownership of the assets, the conditions of withdrawal, and the measurable return to both sides. Without those particulars, military success is being translated into an economic promise for which neither the evidence nor the accountability has yet been supplied. There is also a larger strategic danger. If allies and regional partners conclude that American protection is no longer a common security undertaking, but a mechanism by which Washington may redirect their capital, they will not necessarily abandon the United States. They will, however, begin to diversify their military, financial, and energy relationships beyond American reach. The United States may obtain investment by pressure. It may even obtain compliance for a time. But compliance is not confidence, and capital secured under strategic compulsion does not create durable allegiance. A great power should therefore distinguish clearly between defending international navigation, imposing lawful sanctions, negotiating commercial arrangements, and demanding investment. To combine them in a single declaration is not strength. It is the confusion of military authority with economic command. A democratic republic cannot condemn command economies abroad while using military power to command the destination of foreign capital at home.

The United States should not attempt to reproduce the coercive logic of the Plaza era through tariffs, compulsory purchases, and politically advertised investment figures. A nation’s industrial weaknesses cannot be repaired by treating an ally as a balance-sheet adjustment. Real estate may be negotiated by leverage, timing, and the threat of walking away. Alliances cannot.

If Washington intends to treat this arrangement according to the logic of the 1985 Plaza Accord—once again regarding Japan as the convenient instrument through which America’s domestic economic difficulties may be corrected—it must answer a question that cannot be settled by figures alone. Is the United States prepared to accept the risk that, this time, pressure imposed upon Japan may neither restore American industry nor make the American people more prosperous, but instead persuade Japan to reorganise its trade, investment, production, and strategic relationships beyond Washington’s effective reach? The Plaza Accord altered exchange rates. It did not resolve the structural causes of America’s trade imbalance. To repeat its political logic while expecting a different economic result would not be strategy; it would be an expensive refusal to learn.

JUST NOW: President Trump just dropped a massive, numbers-heavy graphic—a masterclass in the art of negotiation. 🇺🇸🇯🇵 The breakdown of the graphic shows an absolute masterclass in high-stakes leverage. Originally, the U.S. carried a painful $70 billion trade deficit with Japan.😯 To fix it, Trump gave Tokyo an ultimatum: sign a new deal with a 15% reciprocal tariff or face a crushing 25% tariff block on all exports.👏 Under the newly signed deal, Japan is opening its markets to buy $24 billion a year in American energy, agriculture, defense assets, and planes. On top of that, Japan has agreed to make a historic direct contribution of $550 billion, invested straight into the United States.👊

The Government of the United States is, of course, at liberty to withhold its adherence from the International Criminal Court and to maintain such reservations as it may deem necessary for the protection of its constitutional authority. That liberty, however, cannot reasonably be extended into a claim that the Court itself must be dismantled merely because its jurisdiction may now touch interests which the United States considers its own. It should not be forgotten that the United States once took the foremost part in establishing an international tribunal at Tokyo, before which the political and military leaders of a defeated State were called to answer upon the proposition that national sovereignty could not serve as an absolute defence against responsibility for grave offences under international law. Having then invoked that proposition against another nation, the United States cannot now, without manifest contradiction, condemn the same principle as an intolerable violation of sovereignty when its possible application is directed towards itself or towards those whom it elects to protect. The issue is therefore not whether the United States possesses the power to oppose the Court. Plainly, it does. The issue is whether a principle may be proclaimed as universal when applied to the defeated, yet rejected as illegitimate when it approaches the victorious or the powerful. If international criminal responsibility is binding only upon States unable to resist it, then it is not a rule of law, but an instrument of political predominance. The United States may decline the jurisdiction of the Court; it cannot, with equal consistency, demand the destruction of the institution while continuing to uphold the historical judgment rendered at Tokyo in the name of international justice. A nation which once maintained that sovereignty could not extinguish responsibility must be prepared either to accept that proposition as a general rule, or frankly to acknowledge that it was never intended to bind the strong. No third position can be sustained without impairing the very authority of international justice which the United States itself once invoked.

The United States must not employ one language for diplomacy and another for military action. A State possesses but one policy, one responsibility, and one national purpose. Diplomacy must not promise what military action is prepared to deny.

The deeper problem is not merely that American diplomacy and military power sometimes move in different directions. It is that diplomacy may be reduced to a preliminary test of whether the other side will submit, while any subsequent contradiction between declared restraint and military action is absorbed into the language of operational necessity.

The United States must cease mistaking an ultimatum for negotiation and the temporary withholding of force for the avoidance of war. Negotiation exists to prevent the necessity of arms by recognising that the other Power also possesses interests, limits, and responsibilities. It is not a ceremonial interval in which demands already settled in Washington are presented before military action begins. A Government which speaks of diplomacy while accepting no outcome except submission does not understand negotiation. A Government which delays an attack only until its preparations are complete does not understand how war is avoided. This is not strategic patience. It is a two-faced policy in which diplomacy supplies the language of restraint while the military prepares the fact of expansion.

Los Estados Unidos deben dejar de confundir un ultimátum con una negociación y la mera postergación del uso de la fuerza con la verdadera prevención de la guerra. La negociación existe para impedir que las armas lleguen a ser necesarias, reconociendo que la otra parte también posee intereses, límites y responsabilidades legítimos. No es un simple intervalo ceremonial durante el cual se presentan decisiones ya adoptadas antes del comienzo de la acción militar. Un Gobierno que habla de diplomacia mientras sólo acepta la rendición como resultado posible no comprende el significado de la negociación. Un Gobierno que únicamente retrasa un ataque hasta completar sus preparativos no comprende cómo se evita una guerra. Eso no es paciencia estratégica. Es una política de dos caras, en la que la diplomacia proporciona el lenguaje de la moderación mientras las fuerzas armadas preparan la expansión.

Gli Stati Uniti devono smettere di confondere un ultimatum con un negoziato e il semplice rinvio dell’uso della forza con la vera prevenzione della guerra. Il negoziato esiste per evitare che le armi diventino necessarie, riconoscendo che anche l’altra parte possiede interessi, limiti e responsabilità legittimi. Non è un intervallo cerimoniale durante il quale decisioni già prese vengono semplicemente comunicate prima dell’inizio delle operazioni militari. Un Governo che parla di diplomazia pur accettando come unico esito la sottomissione non comprende il significato del negoziato. Un Governo che rinvia un attacco soltanto fino al completamento dei propri preparativi non comprende come si evita una guerra. Questa non è pazienza strategica. È una politica dalle due facce, nella quale la diplomazia fornisce il linguaggio della moderazione mentre le forze armate preparano l’espansione.

The United States must abandon its traditional two-faced policy of professing restraint in diplomacy whilst reserving expansion to military execution. A Government cannot declare through its diplomats that no advance is intended, permit its armed forces to cross the very limit thus proclaimed, and thereafter excuse the contradiction as a matter of operational necessity. The diplomat and the soldier do not represent two separate nations. They act under one authority and incur one responsibility. The United States was fashioned, long before it became an advanced industrial Power, through territorial expansion, armed settlement, civil conflict, and war. It therefore possesses a formidable inheritance of military method. Yet military experience is not diplomatic wisdom, and the possession of superior force does not entitle a nation to speak peace with one voice whilst preparing war with another. Such a two-faced policy must not again be employed to arrange the conditions of conflict, compel another Power to fire the first shot, and then place upon that Power the entire name and burden of aggression.