Vladimir Frolov

🇺🇸🇮🇱🇮🇷VP Vance told Netanyahu in a "difficult" call on Monday that several of Netanyahu's predictions about the war had proved far too optimistic, like the prospects of a popular uprising to topple the regime. @MarcACaputo & I write for @axios axios.com/2026/03/27/van…

NEW: ‘Just drinking the Kool-Aid’: Inside the White House divide on Iran Senior aides describe a widening internal divide over a conflict the president has grown bored with — and a communications strategy some call embarrassing. “The war videos are cringe and disrespectful and gross,” a senior White House official told MS NOW. “It makes me feel embarrassed.” ms.now/news/trump-ira…

Exclusive: The US has made its offer of security guarantees needed for a peace deal in Ukraine conditional on Kyiv ceding all of the country's eastern region of Donbas to Russia, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy told Reuters reut.rs/3NPWIkK

"The White House isn’t ready to commit to any one person, hoping to stress test multiple candidates as they look for someone willing to make a deal." I worry they misunderstand the degree of agency the US can exercise over Iran's domestic politics. politico.com/news/2026/03/2…

If Trump doesn't reopen the Strait before the war's end, US hegemony will take a massive dent. He already failed to get any American allies to even uphold freedom of navigation, even as they are the ones who need the energy trade passing though Hormuz. Officialising Iranian control of the waterway will demonstrate to all that the US is deterred by short econ pain. A perceived victory by Iran would make the American empire look very declining. The acceleration of that decline would then be Trump's defining legacy. As @wrmead wrote: “Trump always chickens out won’t merely be an insult his enemies hurl at him. It will be carved on his tombstone."

Trump aims to shift power from China by forging better ties with Russia via Ukraine deal. A Trump admin official told me finding a “way to align closer with Russia” could create “a different power balance with China that could be very, very beneficial.” politico.com/news/2026/03/1…

NEW: The US-led peace process in Ukraine is fizzling out because Trump is losing interest and his war against Iran is easing pressure on Russia. “A pause has indeed appeared in the talks. The Americans have other priorities,” Kremlin spox Peskov says. ft.com/content/c4fa23…

You need to understand your opponent, you need to bring experts to help explain what you don’t know. Both on Iran & nuke issues. Kushner and Witkoff DID NOT UNDERSTAND an offer that may not have been good enough but was serious. It is like they had a 50% translation diplomatic.substack.com/p/was-diplomac…

Another example for the fact that Strategic Ambiguity Is Putting Operational Success at Risk 1. Nearly ten days into the campaign, it is clear that operational coordination between U.S. Central Command and the Israel Defense Forces is functioning with remarkable efficiency. The two militaries are leveraging years of close cooperation, operating almost seamlessly against Iran’s strategic capabilities and seeking to undermine the regime’s power projection. 2. Yet these operational achievements, significant as they may be—are increasingly at risk due to a growing strategic ambiguity between Washington and Jerusalem. This situation appears to stem from inadequate strategic planning and a rush into a campaign without fully assessing its broader implications. The result has been the articulation of objectives that are either difficult to measure or potentially unattainable. 3. In retrospect, it seems that the campaign may have begun with the exploitation of a fleeting opportunity to eliminate Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. However, it is far from clear that a comprehensive strategic assessment was conducted beforehand. Such an assessment should have examined not only the immediate operational opportunity but also the broader implications—including succession scenarios, such as the possible rise of Mojtaba Khamenei. 4.It increasingly appears that the rush to capitalize on the operational opportunity overtook any structured strategic dialogue between the United States and Israel. Consequently, the campaign’s stated objective—“creating the conditions for an endgame”—was defined in vague and arguably unrealistic terms. Even more concerning has been the frequent adjustment of operational goals as the campaign has unfolded. 5. Moreover, there is little indication that the two governments conducted serious planning regarding ending mechanisms or exit strategies. Senior leadership does not appear to have engaged in comprehensive war-gaming, and the professional advisory structures surrounding decision-makers may not have been fully integrated into the decision-making process. 6. In Israel’s case, the current state of the National Security Council raises questions about whether a structured risk-management process was in place. As a result, developments such as the sharp rise in global oil and gas prices appear to have caught policymakers off guard. 7. Compounding these challenges is the political dynamic between Washington and Jerusalem. Israel’s prime minister has been careful not to be perceived as the leader who pushed President Donald Trump into preventive military action. This political sensitivity has likely limited broader strategic dialogue between senior officials on both sides, leaving much of the communication concentrated in direct conversations between the two leaders. 8. The outcome is a campaign that may be operationally effective but strategically underdefined. There is no clear ending mechanism, no well-defined exit point, and no measurable benchmarks for success. Instead, the dominant message remains that the campaign will continue for the foreseeable future or 4-6 weeks... 9. Recent disagreements between the United States and Israel—such as the debate over striking Iran’s fuel infrastructure, reported by @BarakRavid highlight the problem. In this case, operational decisions appear to have preceded a meaningful strategic discussion between the two allies. 10. This raises a broader question: were the major risks of escalation fully debated before the campaign began? These risks include rising global energy prices, the consolidation of power under Mojtaba Khamenei, the possible entry of Hezbollah and Shiite militias into the conflict, and the prospect of a prolonged war of attrition. It remains unclear whether these scenarios were seriously examined before decision-makers moved to exploit the opportunity to target Khamenei. Without a clearer strategic framework, the campaign’s operational gains could gradually erode. More importantly, the absence of strategic clarity risks creating tensions between Washington and Jerusalem and could intensify political pressure on Israel within the U.S. Congress. It is not too late to address this gap. What is needed now is not another operational discussion between militaries, but a high-level strategic dialogue between the two governments—one that is temporarily detached from the pace of ongoing military operations and focused on defining clear objectives, risks, and an achievable endgame. #israel

The risk: a war of attrition Even against the combined and highly capable military power of Israel and the United States, there are three things that cannot be taken from Iran: its size, its geography, and its history. All three reflect the resilience of its population and the strategic depth of the country. These conditions alone require a certain degree of humility regarding how quickly meaningful strategic objectives can be achieved in Iran. The operational cooperation between Israel and the United States is unprecedented in scope, and the achievements against Iranian capabilities are significant. But the real measure of success will ultimately depend on the strategic objectives Washington and Jerusalem set for this campaign. If the goal,as some voices suggested yesterday, is to influence Iran’s political direction or its post-war policies, it is difficult to see how such an outcome could be achieved without a prolonged and potentially open-ended conflict under the current regime. Moreover, despite the impressive operational successes against Iran’s missile infrastructure, knowledge cannot be destroyed. Even severe damage to Iran’s missile program would not eliminate its long-term ability to rebuild it. The expertise and motivation remain. When strategic goals become too ambitious or unrealistic, even a successful military campaign can gradually slide into a war of attrition. To avoid that outcome, it is essential to define clear, realistic objectives—ones that can be measured and that provide a clear point at which the campaign can end. A diplomatic track will likely be necessary to consolidate and formalize those gains. Military strikes can significantly degrade Iran’s capabilities. But as long as the Iranian regime—and its population—continue to demonstrate resilience, the longer the campaign continues, the more likely it is that This dynamic could evolve into a prolonged war of attrition that will place growing pressure on Middle Eastern economies and societies. #IranIsraelWar

The Trump administration is approaching a decision point in the war — and it is not an optimal one from its perspective. The core problem was never just the technical gaps between Washington and Tehran over the nuclear file. It was a deeper misunderstanding — a flawed assessment of Iran’s strategic doctrine and red lines — that contributed to the collapse of the negotiations in the first place. That same misreading now carries into the war itself. Iran is unlikely to capitulate under military pressure. It will not relinquish its missile arsenal, nor will it forgo what it defines as its right to enrich uranium. Yes, the U.S. and Israel hold overwhelming military superiority. But if the objective is to truly compel Iran to surrender on these core issues, that would likely require regime change. And if regime change is not the goal, then the alternative is an agreement with the very same regime — one that, once the fighting subsides, will move quickly to rebuild its capabilities. In other words, the administration has entered a campaign where the only clear path to decisive victory is regime change — and it is far from clear that Washington is willing to invest the resources and long-term commitment such an outcome would demand. No internal shift within the regime — and no successor to Khamenei — is likely to present surrender terms to the United States. From Tehran’s perspective, capitulation would mean the collapse of the very ideological foundation of the Islamic Republic. Any leader who emerges from within the system will be bound by the same core principles and strategic red lines. They are far more likely to continue fighting than to formally concede. Their assessment, rightly or wrongly, is that time is on their side — that external pressure ebbs, political cycles shift in Washington, and regional dynamics evolve. If that is the case, expectations of a quick political submission from Tehran are detached from how the regime understands survival. #iranisra

How Putin is backing Iran’s war effort A prolonged conflict in the Middle East would serve Russia’s interests By Katie Stallard newstatesman.com/international-…