Valentin Weber

🚨 Launching Sept 3 China:Technosphere, my new biweekly brief — built for those interested in understanding how China controls at home and influences abroad. At the intersection of national security and technology.🔔Subscribe now to get the first issue: chinatechnosphere.substack.com/welcome

In our new op-ed Myf Ma and I propose that the #Taiwanese government should initiate a discussion about constructing the world’s first national #mesh network with the purpose of increasing digital resilience. taipeitimes.com/News/editorial…

As #Chinese machine patrolling solutions scale and interconnect, they point toward #autonomous units that operate under an emerging machine-led #command and #control structure.

Lenovo, headquartered in #China and the #US, does not only redefine #AI frontiers, it also supplies hardware and software to a variety of #PLA units and the Chinese #police.

@chinatechnosphere/note/p-183860878?r=6anhdv&utm_medium=ios&utm_source=notes-share-action" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">substack.com/@chinatechnosp…

Germany should consider supplying weapons to Taiwan – as the US has been doing for years now. We should also view defense and security cooperation as a geo-economic lever. An article worth reading by @AylinMatle @weberv_ ip-quarterly.com/en/case-berlin…

Part II of my analysis on China’s Lianyungang Forum is out. It breaks down how the Forum’s Global Public Security Index pushes China’s security agenda, using biased rankings based on a survey by Dataway, a firm tied to UFWD work on Xinjiang/Tibet. chinatechnosphere.substack.com/p/lianyungang-…

Just as China’s approach to cyber operations has developed, so has its counter-attribution strategy. Western attribution strategies haven’t kept pace, argues @weberv_ in his latest for Binding Hook: bindinghook.com/chinas-attribu…

„Sicherheit ist kein Zustand, sondern ein Prozess“, so Bundesminister der Verteidigung Boris Pistorius in seiner Videobotschaft anlässlich unserer Zentrumseröffnung. Sein Wunsch an das Zentrum ist es, „einen Raum für kritische & faktenfokussierte Debatten“ anzubieten. /3

The Lianyungang Forum is #China's blueprint for an alternative global #security architecture. The Forum has been taking place since 2015 and gathers hundreds of #police and government officials from across the world in China. Here is my analysis of it 👇 chinatechnosphere.substack.com/p/lianyungang-…

In our new @dgapev memo, Maria Pericàs Riera and I lay out what #Europe should do to mitigate the risks emanating from connected vehicles. dgap.org/en/research/pu…

Soon you’ll watch horror movies and go to Halloween parties. But real horror is out there. Chinese “smart prisons” show tech control at its peak—and the same monitoring systems are spreading to elderly care and military sites worldwide. #Surveillance chinatechnosphere.substack.com/p/you-might-be…

CHINA'S AI-POWERED SURVEILLANCE STATE In this fresh article, Valentin Weber (@weberv_) discusses the development of China's surveillance state and how the party is increasing its control over the people using AI. Some selected quotes: On the tactical level, AI is increasingly able to run the whole law-enforcement cycle: gathering information, deploying units, commanding, planning, and patrolling. On the strategic level, AI’s impact on the PRC surveillance state is even more profound. Technology has made massive data integration possible not only within cities, but on the level of whole provinces and indeed the entire country (rural and wild areas included). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will soon be setting up a national digital command center. The current PRC surveillance state is corrupt, costly, and takes a lot of human effort to run. The CCP wants one that will require little human participation, being “staffed” instead by AI working through drones, autonomous vehicles, and humanoid robots. Strikingly, the CCP has gone to great lengths to keep physical distance between rulers and ruled. Restricting dissidents’ movements is common, with phone tracking used to ensure that they do not reach a part of a city in which government offices or other sensitive regime properties are housed. This focus on physical limits is in keeping with the CCP’s rating of “in real life” protest as a graver threat than online dissent. Chinese securocrats feel that they have perfected online control but still struggle to find the handle offline. Their main goal is to prevent large crowds from gathering. In 2022 and again in 2024, they failed notably at this. muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/…

The Forum is proud to congratulate @MariaCorinaYA on her Nobel Peace prize for her fight for liberty in Venezuela 🇻🇪 On an episode of Power 3.0, @NSC & @weberv_ discuss how autocratic tech provided by the PRC has stifled freedom and privacy in Venezuela. buff.ly/umA02Fg

„Die jüngsten Cyberangriffe auf 🇪🇺 Flughäfen sind eine erneute Mahnung: 🇩🇪 muss unabhängiger von 🇺🇸 & 🇨🇳Technologie werden“, schreibt @weberv_ im @handelsblatt- Gastbeitrag. Er skizizziert darin vier Ansätze für mehr technologische Souveränität. 📰👇 handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbe…